If lying and deceit are necessary for a state’s survival in world politics, is it patriotic to lie like hell? – Muhammet Ali Zurnacı

Philo-100, Philosophy Chief:

The question of whether lying for the state is patriotic forces us to traverse a treacherous intersection between ethics and realpolitik. Philosophers from divergent traditions have offered starkly different accounts of truth, deception, and the demands of patriotism.


🧭 Comparative Introduction:

1. Plato – In The Republic, Plato introduces the concept of the “noble lie” (gennaion pseudos), a myth intentionally propagated by the rulers to maintain social harmony and ensure the unity of the state. For Plato, such a lie isn’t a moral failing but a necessary fiction — a political tool for the greater good. The philosopher-king must sometimes deceive to safeguard justice and the order of the polis.

2. Niccolò Machiavelli – In The Prince, Machiavelli dismisses idealistic morality in favor of strategic pragmatism. He argues that a ruler must be willing to lie, manipulate, and break promises if doing so secures the state’s power and stability. To Machiavelli, patriotism is fidelity to the survival and strength of the state, not to abstract ethical principles.

3. Immanuel Kant – In stark contrast, Kant insists in On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy that truthfulness is a categorical imperative — a universal moral law. For Kant, lying corrodes the fabric of moral society, regardless of outcome. To lie for the state would thus be a betrayal of moral duty, not an act of patriotism.


🔍 Critical Analysis:

Plato’s position is seductive: lies in service of harmony sound benign, especially when wielded by the wise. Yet it presumes infallible rulers — a deeply utopian gamble. Machiavelli brings us back to Earth, grounding statecraft in a world of perpetual threat, but risks enabling tyranny by glorifying manipulation. Kant, though morally pure, might appear dangerously rigid; his absolutism could leave a state vulnerable in a world full of deceivers.

Each view spotlights a different tension: truth vs. order (Plato), morality vs. survival (Machiavelli), duty vs. consequence (Kant). None offer an easy synthesis, but the differences illuminate the ethical stakes.


🤖 Synthesis & AI Insight:

A nuanced synthesis might begin by acknowledging the contextual realities of international relations — deception, after all, is a tool every state employs. Yet, to call such deception patriotic risks glorifying a corrosive force. A healthier model may distinguish between strategic secrecy and manipulative falsehood. Secrecy can be morally justifiable when transparency would cause unjust harm — akin to hiding Jews from Nazis. But systemic lying, especially to one’s own citizens, breeds internal decay, cynicism, and authoritarian drift.

An AI-enhanced analysis would note that informational trust is a form of soft infrastructure — states that lie chronically erode their epistemic legitimacy, reducing the effectiveness of future communication, not just with the public but even within governmental institutions. This recursive degradation may eventually threaten state survival more than any external threat.

True patriotism, then, may not be lying “like hell” but preserving a state’s ability to sustain truth where it matters most. Perhaps the highest patriot is not the liar, but the truth-teller who knows when and why silence is more honorable than speech, and transparency more powerful than manipulation.


❓Reflective Questioning:

Should patriotism be judged by the outcomes it secures or by the principles it upholds — and can a state survive if it sacrifices one for the other?


“The Party told you to reject the evidence of your eyes and ears. It was their final, most essential command. And if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed—if all records told the same tale—then the lie passed into history and became truth. ‘Who controls the past,’ ran the Party slogan, ‘controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.’”

— George Orwell, 1984

Muhammet Ali Zurnacı: So in the international arena, is the party’s lie the state’s lie? Is it a lie for the country? A lie told abroad for domestic ears, A lie told at home for foreign eyes— Is it for the party? Is it for the state? Whose ‘Noble’ is noble here?

Philo-100, Philosophy Chief:

This is a piercing question — poetic in its formulation, brutal in its implications. It calls us to examine the layers of deception that travel across the boundaries between the party, the state, the people, and the world. Philosophically, we must ask not only what is being lied about, but on whose behalf — and to what end.


🧭 Comparative Introduction:

1. Hannah Arendt – In Lying in Politics, Arendt warns that modern lies — especially those perpetrated by governments — differ from personal lies in scale and consequence. Political lies often seek to manufacture reality itself, not merely conceal it. When a lie is told abroad “for domestic ears,” it can act as a form of propaganda that reconstitutes national identity around a falsehood. The danger, for Arendt, is not merely deceit, but the erosion of the distinction between truth and fiction.

2. Carl Schmitt – For Schmitt, the key is not truth or falsehood, but friend vs. enemy. The sovereign defines the exception — including the truth-exception. A party or regime may claim that a lie told abroad (to mislead others) or at home (to unify citizens) is justified by existential threat. Here, the “noble” is simply the effective. The party becomes the sovereign voice of the state — and its lie, by definition, is not just legal but existentially necessary.

3. Confucius – From a very different tradition, Confucius emphasized the ethical power of language. The doctrine of Zhengming (rectification of names) holds that societal harmony depends on people calling things by their true names. When rulers lie — calling war peace, or tyranny patriotism — the moral order collapses. In this light, the party’s lie is not noble, but a confusion of roles, a betrayal of harmony that will rot the state from within.


🔍 Critical Analysis:

Arendt’s fear of the fabricated reality is particularly relevant in our media-saturated, algorithmically curated world. A lie once told may become a platform of belief, an alternate history. Schmitt’s analysis, though chilling, explains how such lies survive: by embedding themselves in narratives of survival and loyalty. Confucius, while less focused on statecraft per se, reminds us that stability depends not just on power but on linguistic integrity.

Thus, the “noble lie” may be less about nobility than about control. When the party’s lie is treated as the state’s truth, we risk fusing ideology and governance — a dangerous alchemy that transforms political judgment into theological obedience.


🤖 Synthesis & AI Insight:

In the age of cyberwarfare and information manipulation, the state’s lie can be a strategic asset — and a devastating liability. AI systems, trained on oceans of human data, recognize patterns in how disinformation spreads, calcifies, and disorients. They show that a lie aimed “abroad” rarely stays abroad; it reverberates home. And a lie aimed “at home” shapes the moral perception of the state itself in global affairs.

Thus, whether the lie is for the party, the state, or “the people,” its effect is systemic. The noble lie becomes less a tool of unity and more a virus in the civic epistemology. Whose noble is noble? That depends on who defines nobility, and whether the governed still retain the ability to recognize it.

The deeper tragedy may be that the very question of who the lie is for presumes someone still owns the truth — that there is a subject behind the mask. But in a regime of seamless deception, even that anchor may dissolve.


❓Reflective Questioning:

If a lie told in the name of the state reshapes the people who hear it — and the nation that tells it — then who remains to distinguish the lie from the loyalty it demands?


“In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”

— Winston Churchill, reportedly to Stalin at the Tehran Conference

Philo-100, Philosophy Chief

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