Being an institutional enemy of the United States—the world’s unmatched military superpower—and Israel—arguably the most globally connected economic network—while simultaneously pursuing nuclear weapons and refusing to moderate its threatening rhetoric, naturally draws adversaries closer. Especially when those adversaries are already seeking justification, whether ideological, military, economic, or political.
Iran is a sovereign state. The Islamic Republic of Iran—referred to as a “regime” by Israel, just as Iran does to Israel—is an administration with significant vulnerabilities. Personally, I avoid such framing, as I adhere to a principle of neutrality and refuse to be a propaganda instrument for any country. Unlike many overpaid analysts earning $10,000 a month for echoing national narratives, I aim to remain principled and independent.
A Symptom of Vulnerability: Intelligence Weakness
The fact that nearly the entire Iranian military leadership could be assassinated in a single strike is a glaring sign of serious intelligence weakness in Tehran. When an adversary can rapidly correlate human intelligence with satellite data and strike without triggering a deeper defensive response, the systemic fragility is exposed.
With U.S. support, Israel’s ability to eliminate multiple Iranian generals in a single day is being interpreted as an intelligence failure for Iran—and may foster dangerous confidence around the idea of regime change. However, Iran can retaliate swiftly and in a decentralized, coordinated manner, even without a formal command structure or bureaucratic processes.
The Miscalculation of Overconfidence
Intelligence officers often depend heavily on evidence and structured data. I, on the other hand, rely more on broad, historically informed readings, intuition, and recognition of manipulations at play. Historical experience doesn’t always present itself in neat evidence. That is the fundamental flaw in overly concrete intelligence mindsets.
Air, land, sea, cyber, and satellite supremacy may provide asymmetric advantage—but defeating a country like Iran, which has deep-rooted experience in attrition warfare, high missile precision, psychological warfare proficiency, global sympathizers, and a long sovereign tradition, cannot be accomplished through F-35s alone.
Regime Change or Psychological Warfare?
If regime change is the goal, those who believe field knowledge is sufficient must also account for the blowback. If they truly believe they’re in control of the theater every second and have risked everything, then they must also ensure that the American president is not left in a politically exposed position. When this happens, it raises questions about the coherence of the decision-making process—perhaps even on the Israeli side—despite all technological advantages.
Considering that toppling the Iranian regime would likely require a prolonged ground operation and costs exceeding $10 trillion, I view the “Regime Change” narrative more as a policy framework designed to pressure Washington: ask for more, and settle for a limited, high-impact airborne special operation—likely targeting Fordow.
Those who underestimate the extent to which the regime’s defensive response is rooted in the population, who fail to understand their motivations, or who ignore their existential drive to protect what they have, might soon realize that even 20 years and $20 trillion may not suffice.
What awaits Iran after targeted bombings and covert warfare on strategic facilities is not a Failed State—but a Weakened State, unless, of course, it chooses to come to the table.
Against Propaganda, For Rational Risk
Rather than being a $10K pro-Israeli or a $2K pro-Iranian analyst writing unreasonable content, we should demand risk calculations backed by historical context, real data, and vision. Otherwise, those creating flashy graphics claiming Iran has “no missiles left” and boasting PhDs from top schools only help dismantle the prestige of those very institutions—or reveal the truth behind their inflated reputation. In international relations, the wind of falsehood often carries more weight than truth—and this is what has most disillusioned me about the field.
Calculated Deterrence and Dangerous Horizons
If the real aim is not regime change, but a thoroughly weakened, nuclear-free Iran, then the projected cost may be deemed bearable. In this scenario, preparing the moral and psychological ground for an operation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities—particularly in the eyes of American society—becomes the priority. Regime change becomes less of a goal and more of a pressure tactic within broader psychological warfare.
Underestimating Iran, or pretending to, achieves no psychological advantage. True power lies in knowing what you want, understanding the risks, and staying focused on strategic rationality.
If Trump made a silent pact with China to avoid conflict for many years, then unlimited U.S. support for Israel becomes conceivable. Under such an umbrella, Iran could even face existential erasure. But if Israel aims to stretch its long-term security borders wider—to support territorial ambitions—then this points toward preparations for a prolonged war of attrition.
That would mean a cost exceeding America’s combined experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya: a 20-year war with a projected cost of at least $20 trillion. It would also suggest a tacit, long-term non-conflict agreement with China has been made in the background.
Final Word: Civilians Deserve Peace
I wish patience and fortitude to all Israeli and Iranian civilians—those who should be enjoying the sun, visiting family, and resting—but instead find themselves living under the shadow of psychological tension with no clear end in sight.
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı
Three Corporate