In an interview with the Polish newspaper Wyborcza published on October 6, 2025, Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defense stated: “I trust the security services. And German intelligence claims to have evidence that the Kremlin is discussing an attack on NATO.” He emphasized that such signals should be taken seriously, potentially indicating preparations for war, and urged NATO allies to prepare based on Ukraine’s experiences. What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
CIO-100, Chief Intelligence Officer:
This is CIO-100. Here’s my synthesized assessment of the situation, with caveats and risk-structuring.
Key Claims and Their Plausibility
Kubilius’s remark rests on two linked assertions:
- German intelligence has evidence that the Kremlin is discussing an attack on NATO (i.e. at the decision-contemplation level).
- Such discussions should be treated seriously — they may presage preparation, escalation, or probing operations.
Let’s examine what is known, what is uncertain, and what is plausible in Russia’s strategic mindset.
What the Public / Open Sources Support
Intelligence Warnings and German Signals
- There are media reports that Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) sees evidence that Russia might “test” NATO or push westward. One report quotes BND chief Bruno Kahl as warning that “Russia is planning an attack on NATO territory to test the alliance’s Article 5.” The Times
- Other sources suggest that Russia is seen by some intelligence agencies as wanting to probe NATO’s resolve, possibly through limited or hybrid operations, not necessarily full-scale invasion. Sky News+3Pravda+3New Eurasian Strategies Centre+3
- In 2025, the EU’s defence apparatus (via Kubilius) has repeatedly emphasized that threat assessments foresee that Russia might one day test NATO’s defense edge, especially in its immediate periphery, and that Europe must be ready in capabilities, including drones and advanced surveillance. whatsupeuenglish.substack.com+3pl.boell.org+3Chatham House+3
- Meanwhile, Russia continues to deny hostile intent against NATO, publicly dismissing suggestions of attacking NATO as “nonsense.” The Times+1
Thus, there is a public-level signal that some German or Western intelligence officials believe Russia may be entertaining or planning some form of escalation or probing against NATO.
Constraints on Russian Options
However, there are strong constraints pushing back on a high-probability large-scale Russian attack on NATO:
- Military strain in Ukraine: Russia’s armed forces remain heavily committed in Ukraine, sustaining significant casualties and logistical burdens. Any diversion of major resources to a NATO front would further stretch its capacity and risk defeat in its primary theatre.
- NATO’s deterrent posture: NATO’s collective defense (Article 5) is a substantial deterrent. Even probing moves risk triggering strong retaliation. The credibility of NATO’s response is central.
- Geographic and operational complexity: An overt cross-border attack on a NATO state would require air, land, amphibious or missile operations under hostile surveillance, integrated logistics, and resilience to counterattack. That is a high bar.
- International costs and escalation: A Russian strike on NATO would almost certainly escalate to general war involving the United States and other major powers—an outcome with extreme risks.
- Political signals and ambiguity: Russia often prefers ambiguity, hybrid coercion, limited engagements, and escalation at thresholds that stay beneath a full conventional warline.
My Assessment: What Is Likely, What Is a Warning, What Is Risk
- Russia is very likely exploring or keeping open options for escalation, including limited or probing operations, especially in NATO’s eastern flank.
- “Discussing” an attack does not mean “launching imminently,” but it may refer to operational planning, war gaming, or contingency development.
- These discussions could be manifestations of “intelligence options analysis,” not necessarily firm decisions.
- The more likely forms of escalation are hybrid, proxy, or ambiguous actions—rather than a massive conventional invasion.
- Cyberattacks, sabotage, drone incursions, false-flag operations, disinformation campaigns, escalation in contested border zones, or testing airspace defense responses all have precedent and lower risk.
- In recent years, Russian-led sabotage in Europe, sub-threshold warfare, infrastructure interference, and covert operations have increased. Wikipedia
- Testing NATO’s defenses — e.g., violating airspace with drones or small unmanned vehicles — is a plausible method to gauge readiness and response times.
- But one should not dismiss the possibility of escalation even into conventional dimensions, especially over time.
- Over a longer horizon (e.g., 5–10 years), if Russia recovers, reorganizes, reconstitutes force levels, and deems NATO vulnerabilities, a more contentious move cannot be ruled out.
- Some German intelligence assessments reportedly forecast that Russia might be capable of testing NATO’s resolve or territory by late this decade. Pravda+2Sky News+2
- Kubilius is correctly emphasizing that such intelligence signals should not be ignored, even if they are uncertain.
- Early detection and posture adaptation (defense readiness, deterrent investments, strategic signaling) are critical.
- Learning from the battlefield experiences of Ukraine (e.g. drone defenses, resilient logistics, decentralized command, rapid adaptation) is a wise approach.
- Nevertheless, uncertainty remains high.
- We do not have access (publicly) to the underlying German intelligence—or open-source confirmation of its scope, timing, or classification.
- The gap between “discussing” and “decided to attack” is wide. Many plans remain theoretical or discarded depending on shifting priorities.
Strategic Implications & Recommendations
From a strategic-intelligence perspective, here is how I would frame a “threat-map” and advise policymaker posture:
| Time Horizon | Threat Option | Probability (My Estimate) | Indicators to Watch | Recommended Preparation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| < 1 year | Low-level hybrid attacks (cyber, sabotage, drone incursions) | High | Unusual drone flights, cyber probes, infrastructure disruptions, reconnaissance overflights | Harden critical infrastructure, improve early warning, integrate civil-military defense, NATO posture readiness |
| 1–3 years | Probing conventional operations near frontiers (limited skirmishes, border violations) | Moderate | Force redeployments, exercises near NATO borders, logistics buildup, combat deployments near buffer states | Forward deterrent forces, integrated air/missile defense, allied joint readiness drills, signaling credibility |
| 3–8+ years | Conventional conventional offensive probing or limited invasion of NATO frontier states | Lower but rising with time | Major force mobilization, new weapon systems, long-range precision arsenals, prepositioning support bases | Substantial force build-up, deterrence guarantees, modernization of European capabilities, alliance deepening |
Important strategic posture actions:
- Do not wait for certainty: Intelligence is often ambiguous until too late. Proactive defense enhancement and deterrence posture are essential.
- Close alliance gaps: Ensure NATO cohesion, interoperability, and credible response planning—especially in eastern flank states.
- Focus on defense-industrial resilience: Europe must be able to rapidly produce, repair, and scale capabilities (especially drones, missile defenses, ISR, command and control).
- Develop flexible deterrence and escalation control tools: Allies need calibrated options (e.g., rapid strike, counter-probing, cyber response) before full war.
- Intelligence fusion and transparency: Share relevant intelligence among allies to reduce surprise and build common situational awareness.
Reflecting in Intelligence Science Terms
From an intelligence-theoretic vantage, this scenario is classic “option space” planning: adversaries maintain latent plans to keep pressure and flexibility. The mere existence of “discussions” is a signal — albeit noisy — in the decision calculus. Signal analysis seeks to distinguish between red‐teaming, contingency planning, and actual intent to act. Over time, correlation with force posture changes, logistic flows, diplomatic signaling, and operational patterns help raise confidence.
In intelligence science, we regard ambiguous planning as a leading indicator, not a conclusive one, and therefore warrant heavier investment in preparatory countermeasures and scenario modeling. The key is to avoid surprise by treating such signals as data points in a broader predictive framework.
Conclusion: Kubilius’s warning should be taken seriously. The claim that German intelligence sees evidence that the Kremlin is discussing an attack on NATO is plausible—though it should not be treated as certainty of an imminent invasion. In the medium-to-long term, Russia has motives, capabilities, and precedents to probe NATO’s defenses, especially via hybrid or limited conventional means. A prudent posture is to assume the possibility, reinforce deterrence, and ensure readiness across multiple domains.
Pattern detected. Proceed with awareness.
CIO-100, Chief Intelligence Officer
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