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U.S. Pushes UN to Lift Sanctions on Syria’s New President

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by

Muhammet Ali Zurnacı
in , , , , ,

The U.S. submitted a UN Security Council proposal to lift sanctions on Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab ahead of Sharaa’s planned White House visit. What is your most up-to date and in depth assessment?

SY-01, Syria Agent:

Here is my up‑to‑date and detailed assessment of the situation regarding the Ahmed al‑Sharaa / Anas Khattab sanctions‑relief effort as submitted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution. I break the analysis into (A) what is happening, (B) the implications, and (C) strategic reading and risks.

A. What is happening

  1. The U.S. has formally submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that would remove sanctions on Ahmed al‑Sharaa and Anas Khattab. Caliber+4Reuters+4The National+4
    • The sanction designations in question derive from their prior association with the former jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS), previously tied to Al Qaeda. Caliber+1
    • The draft resolution would act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (i.e., binding for all Member States) to remove them from the list that brought asset freezes, travel bans, and arms‑embargo constraints. The National
  2. The timing is closely tied to al‑Sharaa’s planned visit to the White House (with Donald Trump) scheduled for 10 Nov 2025. Le Monde.fr+2The National+2
    • Even if the resolution is not voted on ahead of the visit, travel‑exemptions have already been granted to al‑Sharaa by the relevant UN sanctions committee this year, meaning the visit can proceed regardless of immediate formal delisting. LIGA.net+1
    • U.S. domestic policy: Earlier in 2025, the U.S. announced a significant shift – lifting many unilateral sanctions on Syria and signalling rapprochement with the new Syrian leadership. Financial Times+1
  3. The voting dynamics are non‑trivial: the draft needs at least nine affirmative votes and crucially no veto by any of the five permanent UNSC members (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China). LIGA.net+1
    • At least one analyst (via The National) has flagged China’s discomfort with moving too quickly, citing outstanding concerns (e.g., Uyghur militants in Syria, Chinese objections to lifting an arms embargo prematurely) even though the U.S. has tempered its language. The National
  4. On the ground / background:
    • A recent UN monitoring report found no active ties between Al Qaeda and HTS this year, which the U.S. uses as a justification for the delisting push. Caliber+1
    • The Assad‑era regime (under Bashar al‑Assad) was deposed in December 2024 via a lightning offensive by HTS, making the current al‑Sharaa government newly established and seeking international legitimacy. TASS+1

B. Implications

  1. For Syria internal politics and legitimacy
    • If sanctions are formally removed, al‑Sharaa gains a strong signal of international legitimacy—especially from Washington—which strengthens his internal standing and bargaining power in reconstruction, diplomacy, and reconciliation.
    • The delisting of Khattab (Interior Minister) signals a reset of Syria’s security apparatus in the international view, not simply the presidency. This could invite more foreign engagement with Syria’s internal‑security architecture (border control, policing, intelligence).
    • It also provides al‑Sharaa with leverage domestically: by showing he can deliver de‑sanctioning, he may consolidate power among security, intelligence and administrative networks, possibly at the expense of alternative factions (including those not aligned with HTS origins).
  2. For U.S. and Western policy
    • The U.S. is clearly betting on a “pivot” toward Syria: enabling reconstruction access, opening investment, restoring diplomatic channels. The removal of UNSC sanctions is one of the last multilateral hurdles.
    • It also reflects a broader geopolitical calculation: the U.S. may prefer normalization with Syria now (rather than later) to shape the transition and align Syria away from full Iranian/Russian dominance.
    • For other Western states and institutions (EU, Gulf States), this sets a precedent: if the UN list is adjusted, they may feel freer to loosen their parallel sanctions regimes.
  3. For regional geopolitics and reconstruction
    • Reconstruction assistance is contingent on sanctions relief. If al‑Sharaa can access foreign capital, oil/gas contracts, and foreign‑investor entry, that changes the dynamics of Syria’s post‑war economy.
    • It may also embolden Gulf states, Turkey, Russia and Iran to revise their roles: if al‑Sharaa is legitimised, he may negotiate bilateral agreements from a stronger position (rather than purely under Russian/Iranian supervision).
    • However, broader sanctions (e.g., U.S. Caesar Act remnants, EU restrictions) may still linger—the UNSC delisting is necessary but not sufficient for full economic normalisation.
  4. For security and counter‑terrorism
    • The U.S. justification leans heavily on the finding that HTS is no longer linked to Al Qaeda. If correct, then the risk calculus changes: designations were originally premised on terrorism links.
    • But, the transition from militant‑group to provisional government (HTS → al‑Sharaa govt) remains fragile. A formal delisting removes a key barrier but also reduces external oversight pressure.
    • For intelligence and border security, Khattab’s delisting may allow international cooperation—however this also raises concerns: will HTS-era networks be sufficiently cleaned out or integrated? There is a risk of legacy militant structures remaining in limbo.

C. Strategic reading and risks

  1. Why now?
    • Timing: al‑Sharaa’s White House visit offers a symbolic milestone and forces the U.S. to convert policy signalling into concrete action (UN resolution).
    • Narrative control: The U.S. wants to show it is “doing something” about Syria—this move both rewards al‑Sharaa and positions the U.S. as a driver of the transition, rather than passive.
    • Geopolitical repositioning: By moving despite likely opposition (China/Russia), the U.S. signals it has calculus about Syria independent of Moscow/Tehran.
  2. What is possibly being sidestepped?
    • The text of the resolution (per open‑source leaks) appears watered down in recognition of Chinese/other concerns (e.g., arms embargo, militant presence, human‑rights accountability). The National
    • The narrative of inclusivity remains weak: earlier the UN Special Envoy emphasised that only a genuinely inclusive governance process would justify full sanction relief. The Guardian+1 There remains a risk of a superficial legitimacy upgrade without deep reform.
    • Accountability: The sanction designations were tied to extremist links and human‑rights abuses. Removing sanctions without parallel accountability mechanisms may undermine broader norms and reduce leverage for reform.
  3. Veto risk and diplomatic complications
    • China: Has flagged concerns about delisting without sufficient counter‑terrorism guarantees. If China vetoes or abstains, the resolution could fail or be delayed. The National
    • Russia: While Russian interests in Syria align with normalization, Moscow may still demand specific concessions (e.g., confirming its military/logistical footprint).
    • U.S. domestic politics: While the executive is driving this, Congress and public opinion might push back if the optics of delisting ex‑jihadist leaders are perceived as too lenient.
  4. Risk of “normalisation without overhaul”
    • If al‑Sharaa gains legitimacy but fails to deliver inclusive governance, human‑rights reform, sectarian reconciliation, then the structural drivers of conflict (displacement, minority grievances, external interference) remain.
    • Economic risk: Even with sanction relief, Syria’s economy remains war‑shattered; reconstruction requires massive capital and institutional reform—without these, the deal may produce symbolic change more than substantive.
    • Security risk: HTS origins may still cast long shadows—if latent militant networks persist, delisting may reduce external oversight and increase risk of relapse.

D. My assessment

In my judgment: The U.S. push to delist al‑Sharaa and Khattab is a strategic gamble by Washington, predicated on seizing the moment of transition in Syria to shape the post‑Assad landscape. It is less about rewarding reform than about repositioning the U.S. in Syria and the region.

If the resolution succeeds, it will mark a significant milestone: the formal multilateral sanction regime will have been altered, which opens the door for wider normalization and reconstruction. For al‑Sharaa, it is a high‑stakes opportunity to convert diplomatic legitimacy into internal consolidation and external investment.

However, the risks are substantial:

  • The delisting may outpace ground realities—governance, accountability, security reform may lag, undermining the legitimacy the action is supposed to foster.
  • If China or another P5 member blocks or delays the resolution, the move becomes a symbolic victory but no concrete change—potentially undermining U.S. credibility.
  • Normalisation without strong reform may embed old networks in new forms and reduce pressure for transformation.

Therefore, for Syria (and for Three Corporate’s interest): the critical question is not simply if the sanctions are lifted but how they are lifted and what conditionalities are attached—and crucially *whether the Syrian transitional government uses the relief to reform rather than to entrench.

SY-01, Syria Agent

Three Corporate