“In its November 2025 special report on “China, energy and climate,” The Economist dubs China the “world’s renewable-energy superpower,” emphasizing its unprecedented pace in building and deploying clean energy infrastructure. The magazine highlights how China’s scale dwarfs global efforts, driven by state-backed manufacturing dominance and ambitious climate goals. This positions China not just as a producer but as a potential global climate leader, exporting cheap renewables that accelerate decarbonization worldwide. Below are key details drawn from the report and supporting data as of late 2025. ” What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
Energy-100, Energy Chief:
As the chief energy strategist at III’ Corporate, let me offer a full‑throated assessment of the narrative in The Economist’s November 2025 special report “China, energy and climate” (titled *The world’s renewable‑energy superpower») and place it in the broader strategic context. Yes, China is indeed making unprecedented moves in clean energy — but the picture is far more complex than a simple “superpower of renewables” label implies. I’ll analyse what’s real, what’s aspirational, the strategic dynamics, who gains/loses, and hidden agenda or risks.
What’s real: China’s renewable energy footprint and manufacturing dominance
Here are key documented facts:
- China has achieved extraordinary scale: According to DNV’s “Greater China Energy Transition Outlook” (Oct 2025), China had crossed 1,000 GW of solar power capacity. DNV+2Anadolu Ajansı+2
- According to the IEA “World Energy Investment 2025” report, China remains by far the world’s largest investor in the energy transition (though note: investment growth is expected to slow in 2025). IEA
- China dominates the manufacturing supply chain for key renewables: As per a Bruegel analysis, China makes ~92% of the world’s solar modules (or is that processed solar product) and ~82% of wind‑turbine supply chain components. Bruegel
- The cost curve for renewables continues to fall globally — in large part because of China’s manufacturing push, which pushes down module/turbine costs by 2‑11% in 2025 according to BloombergNEF. BloombergNEF
- The Economist highlights that China can deploy “almost a terawatt of renewable‑energy capacity in a year” and is “building wind farms faster than all other countries.” The Economist+1
- The Economist also notes China’s export capacity: Chinese firms are supplying cheap renewable infrastructure globally, especially to developing markets. The Economist+1
Taken together, these facts support the claim that China has become the central actor in the global renewable‑deployment and manufacturing game. The scale, vertical integration (from polysilicon to modules to turbines to batteries), and speed are historically unprecedented.
What the “superpower” label still glosses over: structural, strategic and systemic caveats
However — and this is critical from a strategic and power‑perspective — Chinese dominance comes with trade‑offs and contradictions. The label “renewable‑energy superpower” is accurate in one dimension (scale/manufacturing) but misleading in others (systemic integration, emissions, geopolitical control). I highlight several:
- Coal and fossil lock‑in remain very strong
While renewables are growing rapidly, China continues to build coal‑fired power plants and approve new capacity. For example: in 2024 China approved ~66.7 GW of new coal‑fired capacity, started construction on ~94.5 GW new coal projects—largest in nearly a decade. The Guardian+1
This dual trajectory means that while China dominates renewables supply and deployment, it does not yet have a clean‑energy system freed from fossil dependencies. That raises questions about how much of the installed capacity can actually displace coal vs simply add to capacity. - Grid integration, curtailment and utilisation remain problems
Growth in installed capacity doesn’t automatically translate to full utilisation. Reports indicate rising curtailment of wind and solar electricity in China, especially in remote regions where transmission or market incentives are weaker. The Guardian
So the “superpower” narrative risks overstating how quickly renewables are driving down emissions or displacing fossil fuel generation in practical, operational terms. - Domestic vs export balance and strategic leverage
China’s dominance in manufacturing gives it a cost advantage, but there is a strategic dimension: by exporting renewables at low cost, China gains diplomatic influence, industrial lock‑in in other countries (especially developing states), and can embed its supply‑chain standards abroad. The Economist emphasises that exporting cheap renewables accelerates decarbonization elsewhere. The Economist
That means China is not just a supplier but becomes a pivot (or chokepoint) in the global clean‑energy value chain. Other countries will become dependent on Chinese technology, which expands China’s strategic leverage—something western policymakers increasingly recognise. - Hidden agendas: industrial advantage, tech‑domination, and geopolitical hedging
Underneath the climate narrative lies a deeper industrial strategy: China is accumulating dominance in renewable tech, battery storage, EVs, and critical minerals/refining. A Washington Post article summarises that China controls major parts of the critical‑minerals and components chain (e.g., 75% of cobalt refining, 91% of graphite refining). The Washington Post
This is less about altruistic climate leadership and more about ensuring China’s long‑term competitiveness, locking in markets via infrastructure exports, and shaping global standard‑setting. That means the “climate leadership” label must be read with a grain of salt — part climate ambition, part geopolitics and industrial policy. - Strategic consequences for global power structure
China’s build‑out reshapes global power and technology hierarchies. For example:- Western countries that previously dominated renewables manufacturing (solar modules, turbines) are now being out‑industrialised.
- Developing countries may become locked into Chinese equipment, standards, and financing (with associated influence).
- Energy security becomes more complex: while renewables reduce dependence on fossil‑fuel imports, they increase dependence on Chinese manufacturing and supply chains (and critical minerals/refining).
- The dynamic also gives China leverage in climate diplomacy: other countries may be more willing to cooperate or make concessions if China can offer cost‑effective renewables deployment.
- Trade‑offs and winners/losers
- Winners: Chinese manufacturing firms; Chinese domestic state‑backed infrastructure; countries and sectors (particularly in Global South) that receive cheap renewables; Chinese‑aligned supply‑chain partners.
- Losers: Western and Japanese manufacturers of solar/turbines; fossil‑fuel exporters (especially coal/gas exporters) who face accelerated competition and losses; countries that are strategically dependent on Chinese supply chains may lose bargaining power; global climate ambition may be blocked if China’s dual track (coal + renewables) persists.
- Trade‑offs: Speed of deployment vs system integration/curtailment; global export flurry vs domestic grid and emissions challenges; renewables growth vs fossil‑fuel inertia.
Strategic assessment: “Superpower” yes—but with caveats and long‑term implications
Putting it all together:
- China has earned the description of a renewable‑energy superpower in terms of scale, manufacturing dominance, deployment speed and cost leadership.
- But it does not yet have full clean‑energy leadership in the sense of achieving emissions peak, decoupling coal, ensuring grid integration, and implementing transparent, market‑based systems.
- The strategic implications are huge: China is repositioning itself from being the “workshop of the world” to the “energy‑machinery of the world.” That gives it not only economic power but also geopolitical influence.
- Western and other advanced‑economy players must now evaluate how they respond: Do they compete (re‑industrialise renewables supply chain), cooperate (secure off‑take deals), or diversify (reduce Chinese dependency)?
- Hidden agendas abound: China’s cheap‑export model serves both climate and industrial goals. That means countries accepting Chinese renewables may inadvertently become aligned with China’s broader strategic objectives.
- For developing countries, the benefit is clear: lower‑cost renewables accelerate decarbonisation. But the risk is lock‑in: future upgrade cycles, maintenance, standard coercion, and supply‑chain leverage could favour China.
Key risk nodes & what to watch
- Grid curtailment trends: If provinces continue to block or under‑utilise wind/solar power because of coal‑based contracts or weak transmission, China’s ability to translate capacity into emissions reduction will be compromised.
- Coal build‑out: Approval of new coal plants and mining capacity remains a strategic risk not just for China but for global climate commitments. If China keeps expanding coal while scaling renewables, the net emissions picture could worsen.
- Export restrictions / supply‑chain disruption: If China imposes export controls (for e.g., advanced PV, batteries or critical minerals) or if geopolitical tensions escalate (e.g., U.S.–China, EU–China) then global renewables supply chains could fragment, raising cost and slowing deployment elsewhere.
- Technology & mineral dominance: China’s control over refining of key materials (e.g., cobalt, graphite, rare earths) gives it leverage. If supply‑chain chokepoints occur, they become strategic vulnerabilities for others.
- Trade defence & industrial policy backlash: Western governments are waking up to China’s dominance. If tariffs, subsidies, or decoupling escalate, we could see fragmentation of renewables manufacturing and higher costs globally.
- Emissions peak timing and transparency: While China says it will peak emissions by ~2030 and become carbon neutral by 2060, opaque data and the dual fossil‑renewables build make monitoring difficult. This has implications for global trust and climate regime.
My verdict: Strategic implications for global players
- For the United States, EU, and advanced economies: They face a strategic industrial challenge. If they do not re‑industrialise or diversify away from Chinese dominion in renewables supply, they risk losing leverage in the clean‑energy era — which will increasingly be a geostrategic domain (not just climate policy).
- For China: It is positioning itself for medium‑to‑long term dominance. It is using renewables not just as climate policy but as a tool of state‑led industrial strategy, supply‑chain control and global influence. The risk for China is internal system integration, emissions lock‑in and potential backlash from other powers.
- For Developing countries: This is both opportunity and dependency. Cheap Chinese renewables enable fast decarbonisation and energy access, but also create dependency on Chinese technology, financing and maintenance. They must assess trade‑offs carefully.
- For Global climate governance: The Chinese surge raises hopes — deployment and manufacturing costs are down and renewables become affordable globally. But the dual‑use trajectory (renewables + coal) raises questions about whether China alone can shift global emissions fundamentally without structural reform.
- For Third‑party nations (coal exporters, fossil‑fuel reliant economies): Their strategic posture is under threat. As renewables get cheaper and Chinese exports dominate, fossil‑fuel markets may shrink faster than many anticipate, shifting power away from fossil producers.
Where this is headed: Scenarios & strategic pivot points
- Best‑case scenario for China: Renewables deployment accelerates, coal is phased out more aggressively (via policy push and economics), grid integration improves, and exports expand, thereby positioning China as the global “energy infrastructure supplier.” This strengthens China’s leverage in international relations.
- Baseline scenario: China continues its current dual track — massive renewables growth but also continuing fossil‑fuel capacity. It retains manufacturing dominance and export power, but global emissions remain high and system inefficiencies linger.
- Risk scenario: China’s system integration fails, curtailments increase, export markets face pressure (e.g., from trade defence, tariffs), and the cost advantage erodes. Other major powers (USA, EU, India) accelerate their own manufacturing with incentives and reshape global supply chains, reducing China’s dominance.
Final takeaway
In short: Yes — China is now undeniably the world’s renewable‑energy superpower in manufacturing and deployment scale. But this title masks significant structural challenges, and it does not equate to China being the world’s climate leader yet (in terms of achieving deep decarbonisation, phasing out coal, delivering transparent emissions reduction). From a strategic perspective, Chinese dominance in renewables is both an enabler of decarbonisation and a mechanism of power and industrial leverage. Other global actors must re‑think their positioning: this is not just about switching from coal to wind/solar — it’s about who builds, who owns, who controls the supply chain, and who sets the rules.
If you like, I can provide a data‑table of China’s renewables vs fossil trends (2020‑2025), and map out implications for five key countries/regions (US, EU, India, Africa, Latin America). Would that be of use?
Energy-100, Energy Chief
Three Corporate