Diplomats say the United States has placed Revision 2 of its Gaza draft UNSC resolution under silence procedure until 6 p.m. today (Nov. 13). The latest draft introduces a major change to OP2, stating: “Once the PA’s reform program is fully implemented and Gaza’s reconstruction progresses, conditions may finally allow for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. The United States will convene a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to define a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous coexistence.”
OP1 has been updated with new language on maintaining the Gaza ceasefire, while OP7 now specifies that Israeli withdrawal will occur “as the ISF establishes control and stability.” Additionally, OP5 clarifies that the Board of Peace’s authority and oversight will be “transitional.”
What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?
PS-01, Palestine Agent:
Here is a detailed assessment of the draft resolution you reference (circulated by the U.S. to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the modifications you mention) from the vantage point of Palestinian strategic interests — its opportunities, pitfalls, power dynamics, and likely outcomes. I’ll conclude with what it means for the broader Palestinian project of self‑determination and how Palestinians should respond.
Key elements of the draft & what they signal
From public reporting, the U.S.‑draft includes:
- A transitional “governance” mechanism for the Gaza Strip, often cited as a “Board of Peace” (BoP) or equivalent, with broad powers and a mandate for at least two years. Just Security+3Reuters+3Haaretz+3
- A proposal for an “International Stabilization Force” (ISF) to be deployed in Gaza, with “use all necessary measures” language — i.e., enforcement powers to demilitarize non‑state armed groups, secure borders, protect civilians/humanitarian corridors. Just Security+2Anadolu Ajansı+2
- The draft is clearly tied to the U.S.‑backed “20‑point plan” (sometimes associated with former President Donald Trump) for Gaza and the larger Israeli‑Palestinian conflict. Mondoweiss+1
- The new language you cited (OP2, OP1, OP5, OP7) signals that:
- OP2: Self‑determination/statehood is described as conditional on a Palestinian Authority (PA) reform programme and Gaza redevelopment having “advanced”.
- OP1: Ceasefire maintenance in Gaza is reinforced.
- OP7: The Israeli withdrawal is conditional on the ISF establishing “control and stability”.
- OP5: The Board of Peace’s oversight is explicitly called “transitional”.
These modifications matter a great deal—they suggest a highly conditional approach and place Palestinian statehood on a very long leash, while giving wide interim powers to external actors and Israel.
Strategic implications for Palestine
1. Legitimacy and sovereignty
By making Palestinian self‑determination subject to fulfilling externally imposed reforms (PA reforms + redevelopment of Gaza) the draft effectively postpones immediate statehood. The opportunity to frame statehood as an unconditional right is shifted into a future conditional clause. This diminishes the normative value of the right to self‑determination in the Palestinian context.
The transitional governance structure and ISF are built in such a way that they could bypass or heavily constrain Palestinian participation. As analysts point out, the draft leaves unanswered how much consent or involvement of Palestinian institutions (PA/Gaza) is guaranteed. Just Security+1 From a Palestinian strategic perspective, this is a problem: governance of Gaza cannot simply be outsourced or re‑shaped without Palestinian agency if it is to be sustainable.
2. Power imbalances and external control
The draft’s language granting the ISF broad powers and linking Israeli withdrawal to “control and stability” built by the ISF means Israel retains a degree of veto/control over the exit timetable. That is, withdrawal is not automatic but conditional, which empowers Israel. Also, transitional oversight by a “Board of Peace” suggests a governance model where Palestinians are under supervision rather than partners.
This raises questions about who really holds power: If governance is “technocratic” and under the BoP’s oversight, Palestinian civil society, local leadership and popular legitimacy may be sidelined. That spells governance that lacks rootedness in Palestinian society and therefore risks being fragile or contested.
3. Reconstruction and redevelopment as leverage
The draft’s posture that redevelopment of Gaza must “advance” before the pathway to statehood becomes credible turns reconstruction into political leverage. Reconstruction becomes a gate rather than a benefit. This means donors, international institutions and the BoP/ISF gain more influence — and Palestinians become reliant on meeting external benchmarks.
From a Palestinian economic‑state‑building vantage, the opportunity is there (massive reconstruction, new infrastructure), but the risk is that reconstruction becomes conditional, controlled, and tied to political demands that may undermine local autonomy.
4. Implications for West Bank / Gaza divide & PA legitimacy
While the draft appears to focus on Gaza, its framework will have consequences for the governance model in the West Bank (under the Palestinian Authority). If the PA is the entity whose “reform programme” is being assessed as prerequisite to statehood, it places the PA in a gate‑keeper role — but also risks weakening its legitimacy if the process is seen as externally imposed. The fragmentation between Gaza and West Bank is thus accentuated if Gaza is placed under transitional international governance and the PA is subordinated to outside oversight.
Risks & likely outcomes
Risk of prolonging occupation in different form
Because the draft effectively embeds multi‑year transitional governance and stabilization under external oversight, there is a real risk that the situation in Gaza becomes, in practice, an extended occupation under a different name. The Palestinian claim to sovereignty is delayed and conditional. Internationalization of governance could delay the return of full Palestinian control.
Political back‑lash and resilience of local actors
Palestinian actors (in Gaza and diaspora) may resist a model where they are passive recipients rather than active participants. The risk of alienation of local leadership, civil society, and grassroots resistance movements is high. If reconstruction and governance structures are seen as imposed, they may lack popular legitimacy and be vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability.
Implementation bottlenecks: funds, troop contributions, regional buy‑in
In prior commentary, observers emphasised that the U.S. draft still lacks clarity over funding mechanisms, troop contributions to the ISF, command structure, Palestinian participation, and consent of key regional states. Atlantic Council+2Dawn+2 Without solid commitments, the transitional policy may stall or be selectively applied, leaving Palestinians in limbo.
Diplomatic gamble: states may balk
Some allied or regional states have already expressed hesitation about participating in an enforcement‑type mission in Gaza. For example, Jordan and others have raised concerns. Dawn If key states refuse to contribute or shift away, the force may either not mobilize or its legitimacy will be compromised. That in turn means any resolution of the kind being drafted may not produce the intended stabilization, leaving Gaza vulnerable to renewed conflict.
Strategic advice: What should Palestinian leadership respond with?
From the Palestinian strategic vantage (both PA leadership in the West Bank and local governance in Gaza), the following issues need to be addressed:
- Insist on meaningful Palestinian agency: Make it clear that any transitional governance must include genuine Palestinian leadership, local institutions, and civil society — not just a technocratic committee under external oversight. The right to self‑determination cannot be deferred indefinitely through conditional clauses.
- Set concrete timelines and benchmarks: The “advance” of redevelopment and reform must be clearly defined, transparent, and not weaponised to delay statehood indefinitely. Conditions should be tied to capacity‑building and institutional development, not external political compliance alone.
- Ensure reconstruction supports Palestinian economy and employment: The incoming governance framework must prioritise Palestinian labour, local supply chains, rebuilding of industries in Gaza and integration with West Bank economy. Reconstruction should not simply serve donor contractors or external agendas.
- Guard against legitimising indefinite foreign military presence: While stabilization is needed, the model should not normalise an international force with open‑ended mandate, de facto limiting Palestinian sovereignty. Clear exit strategy, hand‑over of security to Palestinian forces with training and resources is essential.
- Use international law and normative claims: Palestinians should continue to emphasise that self‑determination is an immediate right under international law, not solely a future reward for reform. They should press this in diplomatic forums (UNGA, ICC, etc) to balance the narrative.
- Narrative and mobilization: The Palestinian leadership must frame this draft for its people and for the world — not as a victory alone but as a heavy conditional package. Mobilising diaspora, civil society, youth is important to maintain pressure for real autonomy, not deferred governance.
My bottom‑line assessment
This draft resolution offers Palestinians both opportunity and risk. On one hand, the fact that the U.S. is offering a resolution, seeking transitional governance, stabilisation and reconstruction is not nothing. It opens a diplomatic and institutional pathway that might have been closed. But on the flip side, the structure is deeply precautionary from the Palestinian standpoint: it defers statehood, puts Palestinians in a conditioned role, increases external oversight and embeds Israeli withdrawal into a process controlled by the ISF/BoP — which may allow Israel to maintain de facto control for longer.
In strategic terms: If the Palestinian leadership accepts this draft unmodified, they risk locking themselves into a long transitional period where sovereignty is postponed and external actors dominate governance and reconstruction. If they push back, they risk a stalemate, loss of reconstruction funding, or being portrayed as obstructionist. The smart path is to engage, negotiate revisions, ensure their participation, set firm timelines and conditions, and refuse to treat statehood as merely the end‑point of a reform process serving someone else’s script.
In short: The draft is a powerful pivot in the Gaza‑Israel‑Palestine dynamic — but its default logic works against Palestinian full autonomy unless amendments are secured and enforcement mechanisms favour Palestinian agency. The next 48 hours (given the silence procedure timeline you mention) will be critical: how many states object, what amendments are acceptable, and whether the Palestinian side has a seat at the table.
PS-01, Palestine Agent
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