As the great Aşık Veysel said decades ago:
“I walk a long and delicate way,
Going day and night.
I do not know what state I am in,
Going day and night…”
Not knowing is a natural process—but one must escape the unconsciousness that comes from being determined not to learn.
Although each middle power has its own distinct dynamics in projecting influence, there are ultimately two essential principles they must keep in mind:
- Avoid rushing into every perceived power vacuum, because the notion of a vacuum in analysis is often intuitive rather than reflective of realities on the ground.
- Avoid being pulled into the spotlight, and even if placed there, develop a counter-strategy to the spotlight strategy.
In this article, let us focus on the second point.
A middle power like Iran may enjoy imagining itself as the king of the Middle East, the founder of the Shiite Crescent, the rightful owner of Africa and Oceania, the 21st-century reincarnation of Emperor Cyrus. But this has never been true—not even in Iraq, the place where its influence is said to be at its strongest. Never.
Iran, unaware of the limits of its power, entered regional vacuums through asymmetric methods. The United States and the entire Western bloc portrayed it as the dominant force of the Middle East, the singular actor across its spheres of influence. This framing is, in fact, a “spotlight policy”* deliberately constructed for Iran—this is a term I coined. Beyond its ties to various terrorist activities, the spread of its official military elements throughout the region generated a sense of prestige and notoriety that became a major trap.
Iran assumed it could turn this Western narrative into an opportunity.
I argued—using data rather than rhetoric—that while Iran attempted to do so in Iraq, its influence had clear limits and could not be exaggerated to the degree the narratives claimed.
We are not speaking of a completely ineffective state, of course. But its highly limited influence was inflated so dramatically that, in the end, Iran became a massive scapegoat—blamed not only for its own sins but for many external sins as well. After a 20-year game, we witnessed an Iran whose Qassem Soleimani was killed in Iraq with a single strike, whose bases in Syria were forced to deactivate overnight, and which even lost its entire general staff in Tehran in a single day.
The middle power that must draw lessons from Iran’s experience is Turkey. It must avoid two major mistakes:
- Do not jump into every vacuum.
- Do not step under the spotlight.
This is the psychology of a novice nightclub singer who thinks the crowd adores her because she moves gracefully on stage under bright lights.
Let me remind that psychology, cognitive framing, and adjustments are crucial in decision-making. So, I deeply know what I am saying.
If an inexperienced singer gets too close to the audience,
A thuggish fan of arabesque music might throw acid on his face.
The real problem is the inability to maintain distance from the audience.
I call this situation in international relations foreblind*.
If tomorrow Turkey is placed under the big lights, instead of striking grand poses and performing flashy shows, it must deepen mutual dependencies with its Western allies, conduct military moves through multilateral guarantorship mechanisms, avoid isolation, and respect its own power limits.
As I said:
- Do not enter every vacuum, because this leads to the cognitive trap of believing you will “turn it into an opportunity,” and it may take 20 years to escape that mental distortion.
- Avoid the spotlight, because this is the illusion of a new local artist thinking she is Madonna, imagining the masses adore her, stepping too close to the crowd.
Such overconfidence sometimes ends in a foreblind that no one can read for 20 years.
So, DON’T.
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı, November 15, 2025, Istanbul.
- Spotlighting is my own conceptual term in international relations, referring to the strategy of polishing and elevating an actor onto the stage even when it lacks the actual power to deserve that level of prominence.
- Foreblind is also my own conceptual term, referring to a middle-power syndrome that emerges when decision-makers rely on intuitive impulses rather than maintaining cognitive balance in the decision-making process.