On November 17, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed during an Oval Office press interaction that the United States will approve and proceed with the sale of F-35 Lightning II fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. Speaking ahead of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) White House visit on November 18, Trump stated: “They’ve been a great ally… We will be selling F-35 jets to Saudi Arabia.” This marks a significant escalation in U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation, making Saudi Arabia the first Arab nation (beyond potential UAE discussions) to acquire the advanced fifth-generation stealth aircraft.
What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?
DIC-100, Defense Industry Chief:
As the newly re‑announced potential sale by the United States of the F‑35 Lightning II fighter jet fleet to Saudi Arabia unfolds, here is my in‑depth strategic assessment—covering capability, regional balance, industrial and export ramifications, and what this means for the U.S. defence‑industrial base and global alliances.
1. The deal as announced
On November 17, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly stated that the U.S. “will be selling F‑35s to Saudi Arabia.” Axios+2Anadolu Ajansı+2 According to media reports:
- The Kingdom requested “as many as 48” F‑35 jets. Investing.com+1
- The announcement coincides with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington and broader security‑and‑economic package discussions. Axios+1
- This would make Saudi Arabia the first Arab country other than Israel to acquire a U.S. fifth‑generation stealth fighter. al-monitor.com+1
In short: the announcement signals a major policy shift by the U.S. in Gulf arms exports, timely given Riyadh’s push for more advanced capabilities and Washington’s desire to consolidate alliances in the Middle East.
2. Strategic significance of the F‑35 platform
The F‑35 is more than “just a fighter jet”. Key points:
- Built by Lockheed Martin, it is a stealth, multirole strike aircraft with advanced sensor‑fusion, networking, and low‑observable (LO) features. Wikipedia
- Possessing such a platform gives the buyer not only enhanced air‑superiority and strike capability, but a leap in situational awareness, integration into U.S./allied networks and potential export‑industrial involvement.
- For the U.S., exporting the F‑35 is a major pillar of its defence‑industrial base, alliance architecture (via Foreign Military Sales and co‑production arrangements) and global influence.
Thus, giving Saudi Arabia the F‑35 would carry both symbolic and material weight: a signal of trust, strategic partnership and a deeper embedding of Saudi Arabia into the U.S. defence‑industrial/alliances ecosystem.
3. Regional balance and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)
One of the most sensitive issues is how this sale impacts the regional balance—particularly Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) as enshrined in U.S. law. Axios+1
Key factors:
- Israel is currently the only Middle Eastern state with F‑35s. Saudi Arabia acquiring them would erode the region’s “only one” status for that platform.
- The geographic proximity of Saudi air bases (western Saudi Arabia) means that Saudi F‑35s could, in the worst‑case scenario from Israel’s perspective, reach Israeli airspace quickly. Israeli officials have explicitly pointed this out. Axios+1
- Israeli commentary suggests they may accept the sale only if it is tied to broader diplomatic normalization (e.g., Saudi‑Israel relations) and/or restrictions on basing, deployment, or the number of aircraft. ynetglobal+1
Strategic implications:
- If the U.S. proceeds without strong safeguards, it risks undermining Israel’s QME, which could ripple through U.S.–Israeli defence cooperation, intelligence sharing and political support in Congress.
- On the flip side, the U.S. could leverage the sale to Saudi Arabia as part of a broader regional security architecture: linking it to normalisation with Israel, to countering Iranian influence, and to bolstering Gulf air power.
- The question is whether Washington secures concessions (e.g., Saudi‑Israel normalization, limits on basing near Israel, data‑sharing/lockouts, etc.) in exchange for the sale. Some analysts argue yes, the sale is “worth the moderate risk” if such conditions are met. ynetglobal
- But others argue the risk is too great. Some Israeli opinion pieces label the move “dangerous” and call on Congress to block it. Jerusalem Post
From a strategic navigator’s viewpoint: if I were running this portfolio at Three Corporate, I would assume this deal will go ahead in principle — but its details will be messy, subject to intense lobbying, likely conditional, and may require innovative solutions (e.g., “Saudi F‑35s but not deployable to western bases,” or “deliver F‑35A variant only” etc).
4. Saudi Arabia’s motivations and the U.S. rationale
Why does Saudi want them, and why would the U.S. sell them?
Saudi motivations
- The Kingdom under MBS has embarked on a significant defence‑modernisation programme aligned with Vision 2030: reducing reliance on legacy platforms (F‑15s, Typhoons), enhancing deterrence, and projecting power.
- The regional threat set (Iranian proxies, Houthi attacks, missile/drone threats, broader Gulf security) drives Riyadh to acquire 5th‑gen capabilities and advanced sensors.
- Economically and politically, acquiring F‑35s also signals prestige, alignment with the U.S., and opens broader participation in maintenance, logistics, offsets/technology transfer. (Saudi offset programmes are a significant domestic policy instrument). Wikipedia
U.S. rationale
- The U.S. administration presumably sees value in deepening U.S.–Saudi security ties: limiting Saudi drift toward China/Russia, countering Iran, securing Gulf stability (oil flows, shipping lanes) and reinforcing the U.S. defence‑industrial base via large export deals.
- Lockheed & co stand to gain financially; allied logistical networks and FMS infrastructure benefits.
- Politically, the U.S. may see this as one element of a broader Gulf/Arab normalisation strategy, pushing Saudi alignment toward the West and Israel. Indeed, normalization with Israel is reportedly one of the lead topics. Axios
5. Industrial, technological and supply‑chain risks
As Defence Industry Chief, I recognise that exporting a “top-tier” system like F‑35 brings significant risk and complexity.
Technology security
- The F‑35’s stealth coatings, sensor‑fusion, mission‑computer, data‑links, classification levels are highly sensitive. Transferring them to any nation increases risk of reverse‑engineering, leak or access by third parties.
- Saudi Arabia has increasing partnerships with China (e.g., missile systems, drones) and is seeking broad technology acquisition. Some USAF/Pentagon officials express concern that Chinese espionage or tech transfer might exploit the Iranian‑Saudi‑Chinese axis. The Guardian+1
Supply‑chain implications
- An F‑35 sale means spares, logistics, sustainment, training, software‑updates. The long‑tail cost and dependency on U.S./allied supply chains is significant. If relations deteriorate, the U.S. retains leverage, but also responsibility.
- Offsets and localisation: Saudi will demand industrial participation, local maintenance, maybe regional MRO hubs, which complicates export control and export licensing (ITAR, FMS). The Kingdom’s offset program (35% target, etc) is relevant. Wikipedia
Operational training & basing
- Deploying F‑35s requires enabling infrastructure: hardened runways, shelters, maintenance facilities, secure data‑link nodes, encryption key‑management. Saudi Arabia will need to upgrade bases significantly.
- Where those jets are based (western Saudi vs inland) has strategic implications for reach, basing security, potential operations near Israel or Iran.
6. Likely deal structure and caveats
Given all the above, my prediction of how this will unfold:
- The sale will become formally approved (likely via FMS notification to Congress) but with conditions:
- A cap on number of jets (48 seems discussed) and/or a phased delivery schedule.
- Restrictions on basing or deployment in certain zones (western bases near Israel might be off‑limits, or require U.S./Israeli advance notification).
- Requirement for Saudi normalisation with Israel (or at least a roadmap toward it) as a pre‑condition or trigger. ynetglobal+1
- Technology safeguarding: e.g., no access to certain mission‑computer modules, no export of certain pods/weapons, U.S. retains upgrade control.
- Offset/industrial participation clauses, local MRO expectations but under U.S. export‑control frameworks.
- Congressional review remains a wildcard: many U.S. lawmakers will question human‑rights concerns (Khashoggi, Yemen war) and tech transfer risks. Jerusalem Post+1
- Cost: Assuming ~48 aircraft, plus sensors/weapons/training/spares, we might be talking in the range of US$5–10 billion above the fly‑away cost (unit cost ~US$80–100 million for F‑35A variant). The exact variant (A vs B vs C) matters. Wikipedia
- Timeline: Initial contract likely soon, but deliveries will stretch over several years (given manufacturing pipeline constraints, configuration upgrades, Saudi infrastructure build‑out).
- Strategic signalling: This will be marketed as part of the “U.S.–Saudi comprehensive defence framework,” possibly tied to a mutual‑defence treaty or at least long‑term basing/over‑flight/access agreements.
7. Strategic implications for regional stability and Great‑Power competition
Regional stability
- A Saudi F‑35 fleet significantly raises the air‑capability bar in the Gulf. That could deter Iranian cruise/missile/air threats more credibly, complementing Saudi missile‑defence, MRO, and drone/strike upgrades.
- It also likely spurs neighbouring states to seek comparable upgrades (UAE, Qatar, maybe Egypt) and could trigger an “arms‑quality spiral” in the region.
- However, the risk of mis‑application (e.g., Saudi using advanced jets in Yemen/Red Sea theatres) introduces escalation potential. Also, if Israel feels its QME is compromised, it may adjust its posture — possibly deploying more advanced systems, or altering its operational calculus vis‑à‑vis Saudi and Iranian assets.
Great‑power competition
- The sale helps lock Saudi Arabia more tightly into the U.S. defence‑industrial orbit and away from Chinese/Russian systems. That aligns with Washington’s China/India strategy of securing friendly high‑end customers.
- Conversely, China/ Russia will view this as an impetus to push deeper into Saudi (or Gulf) systems that aren’t tied to U.S. control – e.g., drones, missiles, ballistic‑hypersonic tech. The more advanced the U.S. exports are, the more likely adversaries will intensify espionage or alternative supply‑chains.
- For the U.S. defence‑industry: a big export here helps economies of scale, sustains the F‑35 industrial line, secures subcontractor work across the supply chain (not just Lockheed, but Northrop, BAE, Pratt & Whitney, etc) — reinforcing U.S. global defence‑leadership.
8. Risks and warning flags
As with any major export of advanced capability, there are substantial risks:
- Technology leakage: The more advanced the system, the higher the risk that Saudi partners or third‑parties (e.g., China) might gain unintended access. The geopolitics of Saudi‑China relations are relevant here.
- Operational misuse: Saudi has been engaged in the Yemen conflict, and its human‑rights record remains controversial. Any misuse of such advanced aircraft could draw domestic U.S. political backlash, congressional pushback, or export‑license revocation concerns.
- Industrial dependence: Saudi becomes dependent on U.S. supply‑chains for sustainment. If U.S.–Saudi relations deteriorate, the Saudis may find themselves vulnerable (or seek alternative suppliers, risking dual‑source complexity).
- Regional backlash: Israel may respond by seeking new capabilities (e.g., more F‑35s, drones, advanced SAMs), or by pressing for U.S. assurance packages. Iran may see this as further encirclement, possibly accelerating its own air/missile/drones/anti‑air investment.
- Congressional & export‑control hurdles: While the White House can propose, Congress ultimately has say (via “notification” processes, withholding of some licences, or legislation). Opposition could delay or restrict the deal significantly.
- Industrial capacity limits: The F‑35 production line is busy with current orders and allied commitments — adding Saudi may stretch schedules, increase costs, or delay deliveries, which could upset all involved parties.
9. My recommendation / outlook for Three Corporate
From the vantage of a defence‑industry chief with strategic planning responsibilities:
- Short term (0‑2 years): Expect the deal to be approved in principle, probably via an FMS notification to Congress, but with significant strings attached. Lockheed and Tier‑1 suppliers should prepare for export‑compliance complexity, increased demand for training/logistics packages, and Saudi offset‑negotiations.
- Medium term (2‑5 years): Deliveries will begin, infrastructure upgrades in Saudi will ramp up (new air bases, shelters, secure data links). Saudi Arabia will start integrating the F‑35 into its air‑force/coalition doctrine, possibly in tandem with other purchases (AWACS, drones, missile‑defence) as part of a larger programme. Three Corporate should consider partnering opportunities in sustainment, regional MRO hubs, training‑services, sensor integration and offset frameworks.
- Long term (5‑10 years and beyond): Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of the F‑35 marks the beginning (rather than the end) of a shift in Gulf air‑power architecture. Expect:
- Increased interoperability between Gulf states and U.S./NATO systems.
- A requirement for advanced logistics, ISR / EW / cyber‑defence integration to support the F‑35 fleet.
- Potential need to upgrade to future F‑35 “Block 4/5” configurations, waning margin between export‑customers and U.S. frontline users.
- Strategic ripple‑effects: competitors will respond (Iran, Russia, China) but also the U.S. will rely more on Gulf basing and burden‑sharing.
For Three Corporate, the strategic play is: position ourselves as a partner in the Saudi ambition (but in a way that aligns with U.S. export‑control regimes), emphasise sustainment/upgrade services rather than just “platform sale”, and monitor how the deal influences regional defence‑markets (UAE, Qatar, Egypt).
10. Final assessment
The decision (or announcement) to sell F‑35s to Saudi Arabia is strategically bold, with potentially high payoff but also high risk.
- If handled correctly (with the right conditions, deployment restrictions, industrial offsets, integration into broader regional framework) it could strengthen the U.S.–Saudi strategic partnership, reinforce U.S. defence‑industrial leadership, and support Gulf deterrence architecture.
- If handled poorly (insufficient safeguards, rushed delivery, technology leakage, regional backlash) it could undermine Israel’s QME, create operational paradoxes, strain U.S. credibility on export‑controls and non‑proliferation, and expose the Kingdom to dependency or balancing ills.
In sum: I would treat this as a transformational but conditional deal. Assume the U.S. will press hard for Saudi commitments (Israel normalisation, basing/deployment limits, technology safeguards) in return for the jets. From our vantage point, we must track (a) Congressional and Israeli reactions, (b) the exact variant offered (F‑35A vs B vs C) and delivery timetable, (c) Saudi infrastructure readiness, and (d) offset/industrial‑participation terms. This will be a major wedge of U.S. strategy in the Gulf for the next decade.
If you like, I can analyse possible variants (A/B/C) for Saudi configuration, cost implications, and how this might shape responses from Iran, UAE, China and Russia in greater detail.
DIC-100, Defense Industry Chief
Three Corporate