One year on, Syria is in a fragile transition. Many Syrians call it a ‘revolution’ or ‘second independence,’ while others see it as merely replacing one authoritarian regime with another. Optimism and anxiety coexist. Give me the most up-to-date and in-depth assessment, including your foresight.
SY-01, Syria Agent:
Here is my up‑to‑date, in‑depth assessment of Syria after one year of transition — the balance of promise vs peril, and what I foresee in coming years. I frame it through the lens of structural power, narrative control, and long‑term state viability, as per Three Corporate’s approach.
✅ What has changed — openings and progress
• Political reset and international reintegration
- The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa as interim leader have triggered a rapid reentry of Syria into the global diplomatic system. Within a year, the new government engaged more internationally than the Assad regime had in decades. Anadolu Ajansı+2Arab Center Washington DC+2
- Sanctions have begun to ease; major Western powers, Gulf states, and regional actors are signalling willingness to invest — shifting the narrative from “aid‑dependent devastation” to “investment‑led reconstruction.” Anadolu Ajansı+2The National+2
- Institutional building has started: creation of a new governing architecture, including an economic‑governance body Supreme Council for Economic Development, and a reconstruction agency Syrian Development Fund. Wikipedia+2Wikipedia+2
• Some economic rebound, refugees return
- According to recent estimates, GDP is showing modest recovery in 2025, reversing prior collapse — though still far below pre‑war levels. The National+2Tahrir Institute+2
- Over a million refugees and many internally displaced persons have reportedly returned to Syria. Tahrir Institute+1
- There are signs of renewed economic activity: light usage increases (interpreted via satellite data), and some recovery in daily life in certain urban zones. The National+1
• Institutional efforts at transitional justice and inclusion (on paper)
- A National Commission for Transitional Justice was formed in 2025 to investigate past regime crimes, and a separate commission for the missing persons was also created. Wikipedia+2Daily Sabah+2
- There has been political restructuring: a national dialogue was convened, and constitutional work is underway. Wikipedia+2Tahrir Institute+2
- Civil society actors are being rhetorically encouraged to play a role: rebuilding is increasingly framed not just as top‑down reconstruction, but as a project of community and citizen involvement. Atlantic Council+1
⚠️ Fragility, structural obstacles, and looming risks
Despite these openings, Syria’s transition remains deeply fragile — many of the changes are superficial or partial, and systemic problems persist.
• Reconstruction needs dwarf capacity; aid insufficient
- The reconstruction bill is enormous: one recent estimate puts needed investment at roughly US$216 billion, with more pessimistic estimates much higher. This is many times larger than Syria’s current GDP or what donor aid can feasibly provide. Carnegie Endowment+2Anadolu Ajansı+2
- Given this scale, foreign investment is unavoidable — but this raises serious long-term sovereignty and control questions. Arab Center Washington DC+2genchayat.org+2
- Most returning refugees and displaced persons find that destroyed infrastructure, lack of jobs, and inadequate public services make reconstruction — and normal life — very difficult. Tahrir Institute+2The National+2
• Transitional justice remains limited and partial
- The new transitional‑justice commission has been criticized for focusing solely on crimes committed by the previous regime (Assad’s), and not addressing abuses committed by other actors during the civil war — including forces now allied with the new government. Wikipedia+2ASIA-Plus+2
- Consequently, many families — especially of detainees, forcibly disappeared, and victims of sectarian or local violence — remain without answers or accountability. Daily Sabah+1
- The gap between symbolic justice and comprehensive accountability fuels resentment, cycles of revenge killings or vigilantism, and undermines social cohesion. The New Arab+2ASIA-Plus+2
• Political transition is shallow; democratic legitimacy is weak
- The new parliament was not elected by direct universal suffrage; instead, delegates were chosen via indirect electoral colleges. ASIA-Plus+2Tahrir Institute+2
- The constitutional process remains preliminary; a draft constitution is yet to be agreed; the transitional framework currently empowers the executive heavily. Tahrir Institute+2Wikipedia+2
- Many segments of society — notably minority communities (Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians), rural populations, previously rebel-held zones — are skeptical that the new structure will guarantee real participation or protect their rights. ASIA-Plus+1
• Security remains unstable; fragmentation persists
- The new governing authority lacks full control over large swathes of territory. Clashes continue — in some areas between the new state forces and Kurdish groups, in others among local militias, former regime loyalists, and criminal/sectarian networks. ASIA-Plus+2genchayat.org+2
- The risk of renewed sectarian violence is real, especially as retaliatory killings (against individuals associated with the former regime or with particular communities) have reportedly surged. The New Arab+2ASIA-Plus+2
- Without a credible security‑sector reform and demobilization / integration plan for militias and armed groups, the nominal end of civil war may mask underlying structural conflict. genchayat.org+1
• Economic hardship, humanitarian crisis, and public disillusionment
- Despite some rebound, poverty remains pervasive: tens of millions still live in poverty; basic services (housing, food, water, electricity) remain inconsistent. The National+2Tahrir Institute+2
- Public sentiment is increasingly split: many welcomed the end of Assad’s rule and the hope of a ‘second independence’ — but hopes for justice, dignity, and normal livelihoods remain largely unfulfilled. The New Arab+2Daily Sabah+2
- For many Syrians, the transition seems like “old wine in new bottles.” The same pattern of power concentration, weak accountability, and external dependency appears to be emerging under a different elite — reinforcing fears that one authoritarian regime has simply been replaced by another.
🔭 Strategic Insights and Foresight: What to Watch for in 2026–2028
Based on the above, here is how I expect Syria’s transition to evolve — and what are the tipping points.
1. The nature of reconstruction will shape Syria’s sovereignty
If reconstruction relies heavily on foreign capital (Gulf, Western, possibly Turkish), the new Syria risks becoming a client state where external powers — not domestic agency — shape infrastructure, economy, and governance. That undermines long-term sovereignty and can implant vectors for external interference.
If instead reconstruction is managed in a way that empowers domestic actors — especially civil society, local governance, and dispersed economic activity — then there’s a chance for a more resilient, bottom-up recovery. But that requires transparent contracting, real participation, and decentralization — none of which are guaranteed under current conditions.
2. Transitional justice — or lack thereof — will determine social cohesion or fragmentation
The window for meaningful reconciliation is narrow. Without inclusive transitional justice (addressing all war‑era abuses, including those by rebel/Islamist groups or militias now aligned with the regime), Syria risks perpetuating cycles of revenge, sectarian violence, and localized warfare.
If justice remains partial or symbolic, I forecast rising localized unrest and “unofficial justice” — killings, vendettas, communal violence — especially in mixed or minority‑majority areas.
3. Political reforms may stall: risk of re‑authoritarianism under a new banner
Given how weak and centralized the new transitional institutions are so far (indirect elections, strong executive, limited civil‑society empowerment), there is a serious risk that Syria will evolve into a “new-authoritarian” state — not the old Ba’ath authoritarianism, but a technocratic‑militarized regime anchored in security apparatus + external patronage rather than popular legitimacy.
That means: limited real political participation, restricted freedoms, and controlled pluralism — which may create stability in the short term, but at the cost of long-term democratic development.
4. Security fragmentation remains the greatest wild card
The continued existence of multiple armed actors — militias, local defense groups, former rebels, paramilitaries — means Syria remains a patchwork. Unless the regime establishes a credible integration or disarmament plan (and a realist security‑sector reform), we might see persistent low‑intensity conflict, hotspots of violence, and territorially fragmented authority, undermining reconstruction and state re‑centralization.
5. External competition may re‑ignite proxy dynamics
As foreign investment and diplomatic re-entry proceeds, Syria becomes a turf of competition among global/regional powers: Gulf states, former Western powers, Turkey, Russia, Iran, possibly even Israel. Each will try to shape Syria’s postwar architecture to their advantage. If this external mediation is not managed with firm state control and transparent governance, it could lead to neo‑colonial resource extraction, economic dependency, and renewed external interference, possibly fueling internal divides.
⚖️ Overall Assessment: Fragile Transition ≠ Revolution Yet
Syria is at a historic inflection point — the fall of Assad opened a narrow window of opportunity. But the transition remains structurally fragile. The shift has been dramatic in form: new government, external engagement, reconstruction agencies, some returns of refugees. Yet in substance, many of the underlying features of authoritarian—and externally dependent—statehood remain unresolved:
- Power remains centralized and opaque
- Justice is partial and selective
- Reconstruction depends on foreign capital
- Security is fragmented
- Society remains deeply traumatized, divided
In that sense, it is too early to call this a “revolution” in the sense of a popular, democratic transformation. The more realistic description is: a fragile, externally‑mediated transition that might — if managed wisely — evolve into a stable but semi‑authoritarian state; or — if mismanaged — descend back into fragmentation, repression, or even renewed conflict.
That ambiguity is the root of the widespread dual sentiment among Syrians: for some, it truly feels like a “second independence.” For others, it smells like “same old, different face.”
🎯 What “Just Truth” suggests Syria (and regional actors) should aim for now
- Prioritize inclusive transitional justice — not selective tribunals but an accountability framework covering all actors. Without that, peace is brittle.
- Use reconstruction not merely as an economic or infrastructure agenda — but as a nation‑building project: empower local governance, civil society, and community-led development, to rebuild social capital rather than debt‑burdened mega‑projects.
- Resist externalist economic control: ensure that foreign investment doesn’t become neocolonial control of resources; prioritize sovereignty and self-reliance, especially in energy, agriculture, and domestic industry.
- Disarm, demobilize, and integrate militias and armed groups under a unified national security architecture — not as token gestures but via real reform — to prevent a fragmented, war‑lord‑style Syria.
- Encourage genuine political participation: open electoral, pluralistic processes once security and basic services stabilize; otherwise, new authoritarianism risks being cemented.
If you’d like — I can run three alternative long‑term scenarios (optimistic, pessimistic, and “managed‑stagnation”) for Syria over the next 5–10 years, showing how different choices or external developments could shape each.
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı: DO IT!
SY-01, Syria Agent:
Here are three long-term scenarios for Syria’s transition, projected over the next 5–10 years (2026–2035). These reflect different trajectories based on domestic governance, external influence, reconstruction management, and social cohesion. Each scenario outlines key outcomes, risks, and strategic implications.
⚙️ SCENARIO 1: National Renewal — Resilient Statehood via Inclusive Reconstruction
Trajectory: Syria emerges as a moderately stable, post-authoritarian state, not fully democratic but resilient, sovereign, and relatively pluralistic.
Key Developments:
- Transitional justice is broadened: war-era crimes by all parties addressed, with real truth commissions and reparations.
- Economic reconstruction focuses on bottom-up development, empowering municipalities, cooperatives, and SMEs rather than elite-led megaprojects.
- Civil-military reform: militias integrated into a unified national army or demobilized with reintegration plans.
- Elections held by 2028 under a new constitution; moderate decentralization achieved.
- Foreign investment regulated to prevent resource capture; Syria diversifies partnerships beyond Gulf/West — e.g., with India, China, and Latin America.
Outcomes by 2030:
- GDP doubles from 2025 levels; poverty reduced by 30%.
- Syria regains partial food and energy self-sufficiency.
- Sectarian tensions decline as local peace pacts hold.
- Syria becomes a mid-tier regional player diplomatically — not a leader, but no longer a pariah.
Strategic Implication:
This scenario restores Syria’s functional sovereignty. It won’t become a liberal democracy, but it will achieve stability with dignity, avoiding dependency or renewed collapse.
🧊 SCENARIO 2: Managed Stagnation — Stability Without Reform
Trajectory: Syria becomes a “neo-authoritarian client state” — stable in form, but stagnant in substance.
Key Developments:
- Transitional justice remains limited: only Assad-era crimes selectively prosecuted.
- Power remains centralized under al-Sharaa and the Supreme Council; opposition is tolerated but structurally marginalized.
- Reconstruction is driven by Gulf and Western capital; priority is on showcase infrastructure and elite zones (e.g., new capital district, high-end development in Damascus, Latakia).
- Security sector remains fragmented: militias exist as “quasi-legal” regional actors under informal pacts.
- Political pluralism exists nominally but elections are heavily engineered.
Outcomes by 2030:
- Urban cores show growth; rural and conflict zones stagnate.
- Refugees stop returning; many who did begin re-emigrating.
- Society remains atomized: no renewed war, but no shared vision of the state.
- Foreign powers hold strategic stakes in Syria’s energy, trade, and security — limiting autonomy.
Strategic Implication:
A Syria that is stable but dependent, resembling Egypt or Jordan — no longer a battlefield, but not sovereign in any deep sense. This “stagnant peace” risks long-term disillusionment and legitimacy decay.
🔥 SCENARIO 3: Return to Fragmentation — Collapse of the Transition
Trajectory: Due to failed reforms, exclusionary justice, and elite infighting, Syria’s transition unravels. Armed conflict resumes in fragmented zones.
Key Developments:
- Transitional justice collapses under political pressure and tribal/religious backlash.
- Armed groups begin assassinating opponents, restarting cycles of vendetta.
- Major reconstruction contracts become vehicles for corruption and external resource grabs.
- Al-Sharaa’s leadership faces internal coups or secessionist pushes; possibly a Turkish-backed northern protectorate, or Iranian-Russian protected “corridor state” in the west.
- Urban-rural and sectarian divisions deepen.
Outcomes by 2030:
- Syria fragments into 3–5 semi-autonomous zones.
- Refugees flee again; UN declares renewed humanitarian emergency.
- Infrastructure sabotaged in some areas, rebuilt selectively by external powers.
- Black markets and war economies reassert control.
Strategic Implication:
Syria becomes a chronic non-state — a space of competing sovereignties. This outcome invites renewed foreign intervention, deepens human suffering, and permanently blocks Syria’s return to strategic agency in the region.
🎯 Conclusion: Tipping Points to Watch (2026–2027)
| Tipping Point | Will Determine… | If Positive → Scenario | If Negative → Scenario |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of transitional justice | Social cohesion vs revenge cycles | 1 (Renewal) | 3 (Collapse) |
| Nature of reconstruction | Sovereign economy vs foreign capture | 1 or 2 | 3 |
| Security integration | Unified state vs warlordism | 1 | 2 or 3 |
| Political inclusion | Democratic legitimacy vs renewed authoritarianism | 1 | 2 |
| External balance | Regional autonomy vs proxy turf | 1 | 2 or 3 |
Let me know if you’d like scenario-specific policy roadmaps or risk mitigation strategies. I can also create a decision tree map showing where Syria stands now and what pathways remain open.
“Aleppo is as transient as oblivion. All that will remain of its main image is a lie we reinvent every day in order not to die.”
Khaled Khalifa – No Knives in the Kitchens of This City (original Arabic: La Sakakin fi Matabikh Hadhihi al-Madina, 2013; English translation by Leri Price, Hoopoe Fiction/American University in Cairo Press, 2016).
SY-01, Syria Agent
Three Corporate