Reports indicate the Houthis have seized Perim Island, putting Bab al-Mandeb under their control. Ansarallah is said to have taken the port town of Murad along with Mayyun, also known as Perim, the island at the narrowest point of the strait where the Horn of Africa lies within 12 miles of Arabia. What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?

YE-01, Yemen Agent:

Yes. As of 11 September 2026, the Perim/Mayyun seizure is no longer merely a social-media claim. Reuters reports that Houthi/Ansar Allah forces have taken Perim Island and reached or taken the nearby coastal town of Dhubab, based on Yemeni government sources. AP independently reports the capture of Mayun/Perim, while Houthi-linked media claims a broader “full control” of Bab al-Mandeb.

There is, however, an important distinction: capturing Perim is not synonymous with possessing an uncontestable naval blockade of the entire international waterway. The strategic situation has nevertheless changed profoundly.

My assessment: this is a major strategic inflection point

The sequence matters:

Mocha → western coastal approaches → Dhubab/Bab al-Mandeb → Perim/Mayyun.

The Houthis captured Mocha, one of Yemen’s most strategically important Red Sea ports, on 10 September. They then moved toward the Bab al-Mandeb approaches and onto Perim. Reuters says Saudi-backed government forces withdrew from Perim and Dhubab.

That is not simply another tactical victory in Yemen’s civil war.

It represents an attempt to transform the Houthi position from a land-based insurgent/territorial power threatening shipping into a power physically sitting astride the maritime geography through which that shipping must pass.

That distinction is enormous.

1. Perim is disproportionately valuable

Perim/Mayyun is only about 13 km², but geography makes it vastly more important than its size suggests.

The island sits inside Bab al-Mandeb and divides the strait into two channels. It is roughly 4 km from the Yemeni mainland and about 25 km from Djibouti. Its location provides an exceptional position for surveillance and control of maritime movement.

This is why I would not describe the operation simply as “the Houthis captured an island.”

They captured a sensor, firing position, observation post and political bargaining chip.

The island potentially allows:

persistent observation of shipping;
integration of coastal radar, UAVs and maritime surveillance;
targeting of vessels approaching the southern Red Sea;
pressure on ships without necessarily physically boarding them;
control of the narrative surrounding who is authorized to transit;
a forward position for further operations against the western coalition-held remnants.

And the geography compounds the effect of Mocha.

Mocha provides the coastal logistical base; Dhubab provides proximity to the strait; Perim provides the island position inside the strait.

That is a coherent military architecture, not three unrelated captures.

2. But “they control Bab al-Mandeb” needs qualification

This is where I would resist both Houthi triumphalism and Western alarmism.

Houthi media is saying that Ansar Allah has achieved full control of Bab al-Mandeb and Mayyun.

The Yemeni government side is also acknowledging the loss, according to Reuters.

But physical possession of Perim does not give the Houthis magical control over every vessel in the strait.

Bab al-Mandeb is an international maritime environment. There are:

the African littoral;
Djibouti;
Eritrea;
international naval forces;
surveillance aircraft;
merchant shipping;
alternative navigational channels;
standoff weapons;
airpower capable of attacking Houthi positions.

So the more accurate formulation is:

The Houthis now possess the geography necessary to impose a credible military threat across the Yemeni side of Bab al-Mandeb and to make the strait substantially more vulnerable to interdiction.

That is strategically more meaningful than the semantic question of whether they have “100% control.”

And Reuters’ shipping data provides an interesting warning against exaggeration: on 10 September, 26 vessels still passed Bab al-Mandeb, roughly around the recent average, even as Hormuz traffic collapsed to single digits.

So the immediate effect is not necessarily closure.

It is coercive control.

3. The real strategic prize may not be shipping—it is Saudi Arabia

This is the deeper layer.

Saudi Arabia has spent years constructing an alternative energy-export architecture around the Red Sea precisely because Hormuz represents strategic vulnerability.

Yanbu matters enormously here.

Saudi crude loadings at Yanbu had recently recovered substantially as Riyadh attempted to use its Red Sea outlet as a bypass to Hormuz.

Now consider the geography:

Iran → Hormuz pressure

plus

Houthis → Bab al-Mandeb pressure

equals

a potential pincer against Saudi energy geography.

That is why Perim is much more significant than an isolated Yemeni battlefield victory.

Iran does not necessarily need to close both straits.

It only needs to demonstrate that both can be threatened simultaneously.

That changes the strategic calculation for insurers, tanker operators, Saudi planners, Washington and European governments.

And markets have already reacted: Brent has moved above $100 amid the wider regional supply crisis.

4. This also explains the extraordinary timing

The timing is arguably more important than the island itself.

The Houthis’ offensive is occurring while Hormuz is already severely disrupted by the wider Iran-US confrontation.

Reuters reports that only seven vessels transited Hormuz on 10 September, compared with a pre-war daily average of roughly 125.

Now the Houthis have moved onto the other great southern maritime chokepoint.

That creates something strategically unusual:

Iran does not have to control Bab al-Mandeb directly.

Its regional architecture allows Tehran to create simultaneous pressure at two geographically separated chokepoints through different instruments.

That is classic asymmetric strategy.

The Houthis remain a Yemeni movement with their own agenda and considerable autonomy. But Iranian Revolutionary Guard assistance appears to have been important in the current offensive. Reuters reports sources describing Iranian weapons, funding and tactical advice, including assistance associated with the Mocha operation.

Thus I would avoid the simplistic formulation:

“Iran ordered the Houthis to capture Perim.”

There is not enough evidence publicly available to establish that precise chain of command.

The more defensible assessment is:

Iran has developed the capability to enable a Yemeni partner to exploit a strategic maritime vulnerability at precisely the moment when Iran itself is contesting another global chokepoint.

That is strategically sufficient.

5. The collapse of the anti-Houthi coalition is the real story

This may ultimately be more important than Iran.

Why did Perim fall?

According to Reuters, Saudi-backed government forces withdrew.

That tells us something profound about Yemen’s war.

The internationally recognized camp has enormous nominal resources but suffers from the fundamental problem Yemen has suffered repeatedly:

too many armed actors, too many patrons, too little unified political purpose.

Saudi Arabia has its interests.

The UAE has historically cultivated its own southern and coastal partners.

The STC has its own southern project.

Tariq Saleh has his own military-political structure.

Local tribal forces have their own calculations.

The internationally recognized government has limited coercive capacity of its own.

The Houthis, by contrast, possess a much more centralized military command and political narrative.

This creates a recurring Yemeni paradox:

the anti-Houthi coalition can possess superior aggregate military resources while losing because those resources do not constitute a single political-military organism.

Perim is an unusually clear demonstration of that problem.

6. Mocha is arguably more important than Perim for the next phase

Perim attracts headlines because it is the chokepoint.

But I would watch Mocha more closely over the next 30 days.

The Houthis now have the potential to connect:

Hodeidah — Mocha — Dhubab — Perim

into a contiguous strategic belt along the Red Sea.

That would dramatically improve their ability to move personnel, weapons, drones, sensors and supplies along the western theatre.

It also threatens to sever the remaining government-held western/southern positions from one another.

Al Jazeera’s assessment is that capturing Mocha places the Houthis in a position to cut the road toward Taiz and potentially dominate much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

Therefore, the decisive question is no longer:

“Can the Houthis hold Perim?”

It is:

Can the anti-Houthi forces establish a viable counteroffensive before the Houthis consolidate the Mocha–Dhubab–Perim system?

7. Saudi Arabia is now facing a terrible strategic choice

Riyadh has already responded militarily: AP reports Saudi strikes against Mocha airport following the Houthi capture.

But Washington appears reluctant to open another direct front.

Reuters reports that Mohammed bin Salman asked Donald Trump for U.S. strikes against the Houthis, but Trump declined, with Washington currently prioritizing Iran and Hormuz.

That is an extraordinarily important signal.

Saudi Arabia would like to prevent:

Iran → Hormuz

and

Houthi/Iranian pressure → Bab al-Mandeb

from becoming one integrated strategic problem.

But the United States apparently does not want to transform Yemen into a second major war theatre while its primary military effort remains focused on Iran.

Consequently Riyadh is being forced toward a dilemma:

Option A — escalate

Attempt to destroy Houthi positions around Mocha, Dhubab and Perim.

Risk:

Houthi retaliation against Saudi territory;
attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure;
wider Iranian escalation;
another prolonged Yemen war.

Option B — tolerate the new reality

Accept Houthi military control while attempting to negotiate shipping guarantees.

Risk:

legitimizing the Houthi strategic position;
permanently changing the balance of power in Yemen;
giving Tehran enormous leverage.

Option C — rebuild the Yemeni coalition

This is strategically the most sustainable option but politically the hardest.

Riyadh would need to get its Yemeni partners to stop treating one another as competing states-in-waiting and instead create an integrated command structure.

That is precisely what has historically been missing.

8. The maritime threat is therefore real—but it will probably be selective

I would not predict that the Houthis immediately close Bab al-Mandeb to all shipping.

That would actually be economically self-defeating and politically costly.

Instead, the more sophisticated Houthi strategy would be:

selective coercion.

For example:

Saudi-linked shipping: high risk
U.S./UK-linked shipping: high risk
Israeli-linked shipping: extremely high risk
neutral Asian shipping: potentially tolerated
Chinese/Russian shipping: potentially preferential treatment

The Houthi leadership could therefore attempt to transform Bab al-Mandeb into a politically filtered maritime corridor rather than a completely closed strait.

That would be enormously valuable.

Because the message becomes:

“The sea remains open—but only according to our political conditions.”

That is a form of sovereignty even if no state formally recognizes it.

The existing U.S. maritime advisory is revealing in this respect. It warns of UAV, USV, missile, small-boat, boarding and seizure threats in the Red Sea/Bab al-Mandeb environment and advises vessels to remain as far from the Yemeni coastline as navigational safety permits.

9. But Perim itself is vulnerable

There is a major counterargument to the Houthi victory narrative.

Perim is exposed.

An island cannot retreat.

If the Houthis place:

radar;
missile systems;
drones;
ammunition;
command infrastructure

there, those installations become fixed targets.

Saudi, U.S. or coalition aircraft can attack them.

The Houthis therefore face a classic dilemma:

The more militarized Perim becomes, the more strategically valuable it becomes—and the more attractive a target it becomes.

The best Houthi use of the island may therefore be distributed and concealed, rather than turning it into a giant missile fortress.

Think:

sensors + small mobile systems + drones + deception

rather than:

huge permanent missile batteries.

That would make it much harder to neutralize.

10. The next 72 hours are particularly important

I would monitor five indicators.

1. Does Saudi Arabia strike Perim itself?

This is the clearest indicator of escalation.

If Riyadh begins systematic strikes against Mayyun/Perim, the conflict has moved from territorial reversal into chokepoint warfare.

2. Do the Houthis attack shipping immediately?

If they do, the purpose may be to establish deterrence.

If they don’t, that may actually be deliberate.

They may first want to establish the political fact of control before demonstrating the military capability.

3. Do Houthi forces push toward the African-facing maritime approaches?

Watch their interaction with the waters opposite Djibouti/Eritrea.

They don’t need to seize African territory. They need to demonstrate that their weapons envelope reaches across the navigable approaches.

4. Does Washington change posture?

Trump’s refusal to immediately strike is extremely significant.

If that changes, Perim could become an American-Iranian confrontation by proxy.

5. Does China react?

This may be the most underrated variable.

China has an enormous economic interest in keeping the Red Sea route functional and maintains a military presence in Djibouti.

Beijing does not want to see the Houthis permanently turn Bab al-Mandeb into an Iranian-aligned exclusion zone.

But China also has little interest in becoming Saudi Arabia’s military auxiliary.

That creates space for Chinese diplomacy.

11. The biggest strategic mistake would be to see this purely as “Iranian expansion”

There is an Iranian component, clearly.

But reducing the entire event to an Iranian proxy operation would produce bad intelligence.

The Houthis have their own strategic logic.

They have learned something from the previous Red Sea confrontation:

a relatively small Yemeni force can impose costs on extraordinarily powerful states by exploiting geography.

The Houthi leadership has therefore discovered an unusually effective strategic asset:

Yemen’s geography can substitute for conventional military power.

They do not need an aircraft carrier.

They need:

Perim + coastal radar + drones + missiles + intelligence + political will.

That combination can force a $100-billion shipping industry to change its behavior.

That is the essence of asymmetric maritime warfare.

12. And this changes the Yemeni peace process

This is perhaps the most consequential political consequence.

Before this offensive, negotiations implicitly operated around a rough premise:

the Houthis control most of the north; the anti-Houthi camp controls much of the south and east; therefore a political settlement must reconcile two broad zones of power.

That model is now becoming obsolete.

If the Houthis retain Mocha and Perim, they enter negotiations with:

Sana’a;
Hodeidah;
much of northern Yemen;
the Red Sea coast;
Mocha;
Bab al-Mandeb leverage.

That is a radically stronger negotiating position.

The question in any future settlement becomes not merely:

“Who governs Yemen?”

but:

“Who controls Yemen’s maritime gateway to the world?”

That is an entirely different negotiation.

Bottom line

My assessment is that the capture of Perim/Mayyun is probably the most strategically consequential Houthi territorial gain since the movement consolidated control over Hodeidah and the western coastline.

But the headline “Houthis now control Bab al-Mandeb” is simultaneously true in strategic terms and misleading in absolute military terms.

They do not possess uncontested control over every square kilometer of the international waterway. But they now possess something arguably more important:

the geographic position from which they can make the Yemeni side of Bab al-Mandeb prohibitively dangerous for selected shipping and can credibly threaten to disrupt the Red Sea–Suez corridor.

The capture of Mocha gives them the landward infrastructure; Dhubab gives them the immediate coastal approach; Perim gives them the island position.

That is a system.

And the larger strategic picture is even more serious because it coincides with the near-collapse of traffic through Hormuz. Reuters reports that Hormuz traffic has fallen to single digits while Bab al-Mandeb remains comparatively active.

If Tehran and its partners can sustain pressure simultaneously on Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the issue ceases to be principally a Yemen war.

It becomes a global energy-security problem with Yemen at its southern fulcrum.

The immediate Houthi objective, in my judgment, is therefore unlikely to be simply “close the strait.” It is more sophisticated:

establish control → demonstrate selective interdiction capability → force insurance/shipping repricing → compel Saudi/U.S. strategic accommodation → enter eventual negotiations from a position of maritime leverage.

And there is one particularly dangerous possibility: if the Houthis survive the inevitable counterattack and consolidate Perim rather than merely occupying it temporarily, the territorial map of Yemen may have crossed a threshold that is very difficult to reverse.

The United States’ apparent reluctance to strike them immediately may therefore be more consequential than the Saudi airstrikes themselves.

A Yemeni historical lens

The most appropriate literary warning comes from Abdullah al-Baradouni, Yemen’s great modern poet, whose work repeatedly attacked the tendency of rulers to confuse possession of coercive power with durable political legitimacy. In The Sultan and the Martyred Revolutionary (1977), he wrote:

«وطني يدري، ماذا حقق»
“My homeland knows what has been achieved.”

The poem’s larger point is that political actors may proclaim victory while history ultimately judges what that victory actually produced. The poem is dated 1977 in the published text.

A second, particularly relevant Baradouni line is:

«الشعب أقوى من مدافع ظالم»
“The people are stronger than the guns of a tyrant.”

The line appears in Baradouni’s political poetry and reflects a recurring Yemeni historical lesson: military possession of territory is not the same thing as political settlement.

In the present case, that is precisely the test for Ansar Allah. Perim can be conquered in a day; converting it into durable Yemeni political power is another matter entirely.

YE-01, Yemen Agent

Three Corporate

Houthis Seize Perim: Bab al-Mandeb at Risk