Mr. Zurnacı, do you foresee a shift in the trajectory of Türkiye’s domestic politics?
A new kind of Eurasianism is gaining ground in Türkiye. It needs no one to organize it. The leftward wave in Europe and America, youth unemployment, persistent inflation, and widespread fatigue with the AKP are changing what voters are willing to hear. The fund crisis has deepened the sense that domestic politics has become a tired performance.
The stronger force, though, is external. The transatlantic power bloc has made clear how little it is willing to do to tilt the regional military balance in Türkiye’s favor. A change of government in Ankara will have limited power to change that calculation. Those who run the state apparatus, who for some reason are very fond of me (irony), will keep their options open through strategic balancing and strategic ambiguity. Türkiye means hedging without limits. Anyone expecting it to abandon that habit should look more closely at the conditions that made it necessary in the first place.
That is why Eurasianism can spread quickly among the public while Türkiye’s strategic posture shifts slowly. A voter can lose faith in Washington and Brussels overnight. A state takes years to change its security and economic relationships. This new Eurasianism will draw much of its energy from frustration with the West, so I doubt any one tradition will own it, whether CHP-aligned, Atatürkist, Kemalist, socialist, Perinçekist, scientific socialist, or poststructuralist anarchist.
Political Islam will also endure. Its electorate is too large, and its roots are too deep. What can change is its political language. Anti-American and anti-European sentiment can give it a more Eurasianist vocabulary. The prospect of renewed prosperity can make it more pragmatic at home.
The opposition has shown it can win more than half the vote. The question is whether it can hold that majority together and bring in voters who want the AKP out but still see the CHP as outside their political home. The AKP can lose ground in by-elections and still show signs of recovery in polls. The frustration is real, and so is the attachment.
There is another problem I have pointed to in Türkiye and comparable countries. Voters give an opposition party or candidate a mandate to challenge those in power. After the election, some of those same politicians decide to support the government. That is how the story of the “Weary Democrats” keeps repeating itself.
This is where Ali Babacan comes in. I have been saying since 2019 that he is the only candidate I foresee taking power. His route runs through an internal AKP crisis. If the party splits, voters and cadres who want to leave will need somewhere politically familiar to go. Babacan’s years inside the AKP give him credibility with that constituency. His record in economic management gives him a way to speak to voters outside it. The two together are what make him a plausible successor.
My forecast is that the AKP will split from within and enough of its electoral base will move to Babacan to put him in power. When I said this years ago, they mocked me. Let them. It is the fate of realists to be understood only later.
The opposition, true to its nature, will oppose. In the period ahead, Türkiye will be governed by a center right that is liberal in practice, Eurasianist in outlook, somewhat Islamist in its popular appeal, more at peace with Atatürk, and guided by a hedging mindset that seeks to reduce risk in every direction. And Babacan will be the one to lead it.
For the record, I have never had political or financial ties to Ali Babacan. If asked to advise them, I could work with Perinçek, Babacan, or Kamala Harris.
Winning power and governing under those conditions are two different things. As Demirel once put it, “We inherited a country in flames. As we tried to put out the fire, our pant legs caught fire.” Babacan may come in with big promises and take democratic steps. Europe and America will still have their own interests, and the structural limits on what Türkiye can achieve abroad will remain. That is why he may find it hard to fare any better than Demirel.
Türkiye should prepare for Babacan after a period of political turmoil.
The deep state was furious with me when I first said this. But I’ll go deeper still. This forecast, made years ago, will prove right just like the others.
I wish my beautiful country years in which love, justice, and beauty prevail.
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı
November 7, 2026, Istanbul