On September 16, 2025, Israel launched a major ground offensive into Gaza City, escalating the nearly two-year conflict that began with Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. The operation, dubbed “Operation Gideon’s Chariots II” by some analysts, aims to dismantle remaining Hamas infrastructure, estimated to include up to 3,000 fighters in the city. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described it as a “powerful operation” in Gaza City’s Hamas stronghold, while Defense Minister Israel Katz declared on X, “Gaza is burning,” emphasizing strikes on “terrorist infrastructure” and conditions for hostage release. This follows months of preparation, including a security cabinet approval in early August and intensified airstrikes in recent weeks. What is your most up-to-date an in depth assessment?
PS-01, Palestine Agent:
Here’s my up‑to‑date, in‑depth assessment of what the available evidence suggests about “Operation Gideon’s Chariots II” (the Gaza City offensive), its likely aims, limits, risks, and possible trajectories. I’ll try to separate what we know, what is strongly implied, and what remains uncertain / speculative. If you want, I can also map possible scenarios forward.
What we know
From multiple sources:
- Launch & Scope
- As of September 16, 2025, Israel has begun what it calls the “main ground phase” of its offensive into Gaza City, aiming to dismantle remaining Hamas infrastructure in what is a densely populated urban zone.
- The IDF estimates that up to ~3,000 Hamas (and allied) fighters remain in Gaza City and that they expect heavy resistance.
- Preparations & Phasing
- The plan, often referred to in public reporting as Operation Gideon’s Chariots II, was approved in August 2025, with withering airstrikes (“preemptive” ones) having already targeted surveillance systems, sniper nests, anti‐tank positions etc., in central and western neighborhoods (Sheikh Ajlin, Sabra, Rimal).
- Evacuation orders have been issued, urging large parts of Gaza City’s population to move southwards, toward “safe zones” etc.
- Humanitarian & Civilian Toll
- Mass displacement is underway. Thousands (or tens or hundreds of thousands depending on the neighborhood) are fleeing towards the south.
- Civilian casualties are mounting, hospitals are overwhelmed; many shelters and civilian infrastructure are reportedly being hit.
- There is concern from international bodies including the UN about whether the evacuation zones are adequately capable of absorbing the displaced, whether they provide safe refuge, whether essential services (food, water, medical) will be accessible.
- Political / Strategic Aims (Israel’s Official Framing)
- The declared objectives are: dismantling Hamas’s remaining military structure in Gaza City; creating conditions for the release of hostages; defeating or substantially reducing the capability of Hamas to operate from Gaza City.
- There is also a strategic dimension in terms of altering the “facts on the ground” in Gaza: seizing territorial control, asserting Israeli dominance in the enclave, possibly shaping post‑conflict governance.
- Constraints and Criticism Internal to Israel
- Some Israeli military and intelligence voices have reportedly warned that evacuation orders are running up against international law constraints, particularly because “safe zones” may not in fact meet minimal standards of safety or capacity.
- A leaked Israeli report from the previous phase (May‑August) indicated that mismanagement of aid delivery (logistics, timing) had helped Hamas in the PR war, and that the IDF was not fully prepared for some of the urban and humanitarian challenges associated with a full takeover of Gaza City.
What is strongly implied / likely
These are conclusions that seem plausible given what is known, though not confirmed:
- High Intensity Urban Combat
Given the density, the presence of large numbers of Hamas fighters who have dug in (including underground infrastructure), and the Israeli buildup, this will be a very difficult, slow, likely high‐casualty fight on both sides. The mention of very strong resistance suggests that neighborhoods will become protracted battle zones. Implication: extensive destruction. - Long Duration
Though Israel may hope for speed (to apply political pressure on Hamas and expedite hostage release), the scale and complexity of urban operations suggest the offensive may stretch into months rather than weeks. The preliminary stages (airstrikes, partial control of outskirts) have already been underway weeks earlier. - Humanitarian Catastrophe Risk
The evacuation zones may not be able to handle the influx; access to food, water, medical care is likely to deteriorate further. Displacement patterns may overwhelm southern Gaza. There will be large numbers of civilian casualties unless strict measures are taken to avoid them. - International and Legal Pressure Intensifying
- The UN commission just released a report accusing Israel of committing genocide, which Israel rejected.
- Political and legal pressure from regional actors, international bodies, human rights organizations is likely to continue growing.
- Israel may face challenges in terms of its ability to maintain international legitimacy and relationships, particularly if hostages are harmed, or if civilian losses are very high.
- Potential Backlash & Asymmetric Response from Hamas
- Hamas may intensify its countermeasures: moving hostages (if still alive) to areas likely to be contested; using underground tunnels; employing guerilla tactics.
- Civilian population may resist evacuation (either because they have nowhere safe to go or because no zone feels safe), complicating the IDF’s plans.
- Domestic Israeli Political & Military Costs
- Heavy casualties, logistical strains.
- Internal debate over costs vs reward, especially if hostages are not released quickly, if international pressure impacts aid/arms flows, or if Israeli public opinion shifts.
- Possible legal challenges regarding evacuation, destruction of civilian infrastructure, rules of engagement.
What remains uncertain / speculative
Here are open questions where the evidence is mixed or lacking, but which are critical to understanding how this unfolds:
- Total number of fighters still operational
The “3,000” figure is what IDF projects; Hamas’s ability to surge reinforcements, to hide or use smaller decentralized cells, or use underground networks may reduce the effectiveness of any Israeli estimates. - Extent of Israeli control / territorial gains
Some sources say Israel already controls ~40% of Gaza City; others suggest that fighting is still confined partly to the outskirts or certain neighborhoods. The pace of penetration into densely built neighborhoods, tunnels, and civilian infrastructure is slower than open terrain operations. - Hostage negotiations and their role
Whether the ground offensive is timed around or linked to possible ceasefire or detainee exchange proposals remains uncertain, though Israel claims part of the goal is to create conditions for hostage release. Yet Hamas’s demands and Israel’s red lines may make mid‑course negotiations fragile. - Whether Gaza City will be simply “taken over” (i.e. full military control) or whether Israel intends a prolonged occupation / administration
It is not clear how deep Israeli intention runs for sustained control inside the city, or whether they plan to withdraw after dismantling military capacity. Also whether post‑battle governance is Israeli, via proxies, international actors, or some other form. - Durability of humanitarian corridors
Will evacuation zones or southward movement actually protect civilians, or will bombardments, shortages, infrastructure damage (water, hospitals) severely constrain their safety and well‑being? - International response’s impact
How much will international pressure (legal, economic, diplomatic) restrain or shape the conduct of the offensive? Will there be sanctions, reductions in military‐aid, or shifts in allied positions that change the pressure on Israel?
Strategic Risks & Trade‑Offs (for Israel, Hamas, Palestinians, Region)
To see whether the operation yields the intended outcomes, we need to consider trade‑offs and risks:
- Israel’s trade‑off between speed and precision
If Israel tries to move quickly, that risks higher civilian casualties, more infrastructure destruction, greater international condemnation, possibly undermining support. If they slow down to be very precise, delays may reduce political pressure, allow Hamas to reorient, erode domestic political will. - Hostage safety
Every phase carries risk to remaining hostages (especially if Hamas has them near combat zones). Israeli operations that degrade infrastructure may inadvertently threaten hostages. Also, Hamas uses such risk both tactically and for propaganda. - Humanitarian spillover
Displacement beyond Gaza City into southern Gaza could cause worse famine, disease, lack of shelter. Logistics of aid delivery are often compromised. Weather, infrastructure damage, electricity/water issues all magnify suffering. - Legitimacy & international law
If evacuation zones are not safe, or if large scale destruction and civilian harm occur, Israel may face increasing legal risks (war crimes, accusations of genocide as seen). That might also influence its relationships with key allies, or the stance of international bodies. - Hamas’s ability to endure and adapt
Even if their fixed infrastructure is hit, if Hamas retains effective decentralised capability (tunnels, improvised warfare), they may impose high costs, preventing decisive defeat. Also, prolonged conflict tends to reduce Israel’s margin for keeping both military effectiveness and domestic support high. - Regional spill‑over
There are signals (from Egypt, other Arab states, possibly Iran‐aligned actors) that Israel’s escalation could increase tensions regionally. Incidents along borders, diplomatic pressure, protest, maybe even cross‐border attacks could complicate the situation.
Possible Scenarios Forward
Based on the above, here are several plausible trajectories, with their implications:
| Scenario | Key Features | Likely Outcome / Consequences |
|---|---|---|
| Rapid push + negotiated wrap‑up | Israel makes faster progress than expected, takes many Hamas strongholds, signals willingness to negotiate a ceasefire under tough conditions; possibly hostage exchange deal emerges. | More limited damage than worst case; some civilian displacement but with somewhat functioning humanitarian corridors. Israel might claim success. But risks: incomplete victory, lots of rebuilding needed, public criticism of devastation. |
| Protracted urban war | Hamas fights fiercely, using tunnels, shadow networks; fighting in dense urban areas drags on. Israeli forces suffer casualties; civilians suffer high harm; international pressure builds; hostages may be at risk. | Stalemate or slow gains, large humanitarian crisis, possible erosion of Israeli political support, higher costs (economic, moral, diplomatic). |
| Partial control + stalemate | Israel takes key neighborhoods but fails to fully root out Hamas, especially in subterranean or hidden networks. Large parts of city remain contested or degraded. | Gaza City becomes mostly destroyed but with pockets of insurgent presence. Post‑war governance and reconstruction become major challenges; huge displacement; long term instability. |
| Worsening human catastrophe + political/legitimacy costs | Civilian death toll, displacement, famine, infrastructure collapse; insufficient aid access; growing international isolation; possible interventions or sanctions or diplomatic ruptures. | War fatigue inside Israel and among its supporters; pressure for ceasefire; maybe more leverage for Hamas in bargaining; long term humanitarian crisis in Gaza. |
My Assessment: Likely Outcome & What to Watch
Based on what is known now, I tend to believe that Israel will make significant territorial and operational gains inside Gaza City over coming weeks, especially if its logistical flows and intelligence prove reliable, but that total dismantlingof Hamas is unlikely in the near term without substantial cost. A key determinant will be how Hamas uses underground networks, shields, and urban cover.
Humanitarian conditions will likely deteriorate sharply, especially for the civilians who cannot evacuate, and for those in transit or shelters. The evacuation orders and designated “safe zones” appear not yet adequately equipped, which means suffering will mount, possibly catastrophically.
Politically and diplomatically, Israel will face growing pressure—from Arab states, possibly from some Western allies—over civilian harm, hostages, and questions of proportionality and legality. The UN genocide report is a major factor here: whether it leads to concrete legal or political consequences will depend on how the international community responds, and how well Israel can control (or mitigate) the narrative and the on‑ground reality.
For Hamas, the best bet for survival is to prolong the conflict, avoid large scale encirclement or capture, use asymmetric tactics, and leverage international sympathy and legal channels.
Strategic Suggestions / What Would Make a Difference
If I were advising one of the stakeholders (Palestinian leadership, or international mediators), here are things to push for or monitor:
- Immediate and enforceable humanitarian corridors, with oversight, to ensure civilians are protected.
- Transparent monitoring of evacuation zones: capacity, safety, access to essentials.
- Legal documentation of all civilian harm, both for accountability and for shaping international opinion and pressure.
- Ensure that the hostage element remains central in negotiation frameworks, but that urgency doesn’t lead to sacrificing civilian protection or humanitarian norms.
- Push for international observer / mediation mechanisms to monitor rules of engagement, for example via UN, ICRC or other bodies.
- Prepare for post‐offensive scenarios: what governance, reconstruction, services, displacement return look like.
Overall Judgment
“Operation Gideon’s Chariots II” is likely to mark a turning point in the war, but not necessarily a decisive one – at least not in terms of completely eliminating Hamas or restoring Gaza City (or parts of Gaza) to a stable, functioning state in the near term. The risks of humanitarian catastrophe are very high. The political, moral, and diplomatic costs for Israel may also rise sharply if the offensive is perceived (internally and internationally) as disproportionately destructive or indiscriminate.
From a Palestinian strategic perspective, even in defeat, holding out in Gaza City for longer, making visible the humanitarian toll, and increasing international legal / media pressure could yield some leverage in any post‑conflict settlement (especially as concerns about hostages, reconstruction, and international norms grow).
If you like, I can pull together different expert predictions or modeling (military, humanitarian, diplomatic) to show probabilities for each future scenario. Do you want me to build that?
PS-01, Palestine Agent
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