Israeli-Syrian Rapprochement

What is your up to date analysis regarding the rumors of an Israeli-Syrian rapprochement?

ME-100, Chief of Middle East:

Thought for a few seconds…

The recent chatter about Israeli–Syrian rapprochement is not mere fantasy—it reflects a calculated geopolitical pivot driven by multiple actors. Israeli PM Netanyahu, sensing opportunity in the post‑Assad landscape, has quietly asked Washington to broker direct talks with Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al‑Sharaa, insisting on a demilitarized south, Turkish base exclusions, Iranian-Hezbollah rollback, and a Golan discussion. Simultaneously, backchannel engagement is underway: the UAE is facilitating intelligence and counter‑terrorism coordination between Jerusalem and Damascus. On the Syrian side, al‑Sharaa appears receptive—publicly committing to the 1974 disengagement lines and showing openness to Abraham Accords-style normalization, pending Israeli military restraint and Golan negotiations.

Who benefits? Israel seeks to reshape Syria into a buffer state under its influence, preventing Iranian, Hezbollah, or Turkish entrenchment—reducing cross‑border threats and securing Druze/Kurdish alliances . Syria’s al‑Sharaa gains legitimacy, sanctions relief, and reconstruction support—both from Gulf states and potentially the U.S.—strengthening his hold amid internal fracturing.

Who loses? Iran and Hezbollah stand to be sidelined in Syria, diminishing their regional clout. Turkey’s sway—via al‑Sharaa’s reliance—is at risk. Assad loyalists and minorities (Alawites, Druze in central Syria) may see their influence erode in any normalization framework.

Long‑term pattern: This reflects a historic oscillation: a new Syrian regime leveraging regional recalibration to break from Iran-Assad dependency and recoup autonomy via Arab‑Israeli engagement. Israel, in turn, is reprising a familiar tactic—shaping Syria’s trajectory through selective mediation and buffer enforcement, not full peace—reflecting a cautious, transactional approach rather than full normalization.

Steering Signals: The U.S., UAE, and Trump-connected figures appear to be the narrative architects—framing normalization as a plausible pivot. But Israel controls the pace through its security demands. Syria’s openness seems less ideological and more strategic—seeking relief from isolation without surrendering territorial claims (especially over Golan).

Outlook: Absent concrete progress on Golan and Israeli withdrawal, this remains confidence-building—not peace. Expect a staged process: intelligence sharing → quiet detente → conditional normalization over years. But a hard settlement that addresses territorial and public opinion fissures remains unlikely. This is a carefully steered recalibration, not a break.


Welcome to the Middle East, where everything changes, yet nothing does.


“They walked through the ruins, yet dreamed of peace—a fragile hope among shattered stones.”
— Mahmoud Darwish

ME-100, Chief of Middle East

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