Lee Jae-myung, the liberal Democratic Party candidate, won the snap presidential election on June 3, 2025, with exit polls projecting him securing 51.7% of the votes against conservative Kim Moon-soo’s 39.3%. Lee, who took office immediately without the usual two-month transition period, is tasked with restoring stability after former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment in April 2025. Yoon was removed following his controversial declaration of martial law in December 2024, which sparked a constitutional crisis and widespread protests. Your assessment?
SKR-01, South Korea Agent:
Strategic Assessment | June 3, 2025
Subject: Snap Election Victory of Lee Jae-myung – Strategic Implications for South Korea
I. POLITICAL RESET: LIBERAL ASCENDANCY IN CRISIS MODE
Lee Jae-myung’s victory marks more than a political comeback for the Democratic Party—it represents a sharp course correction from the crisis-ridden final months of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration. With a decisive 51.7% to 39.3% win over conservative Kim Moon-soo, Lee inherits a fractured polity, a disillusioned electorate, and an unstable security apparatus, but also an unprecedented mandate delivered in the shadow of constitutional breakdown.
The immediate assumption of office, bypassing the standard two-month transition, signals the urgency of reestablishing executive legitimacy and controlling bureaucratic drift. However, it also means Lee is operating without the political honeymoon usually afforded to incoming administrations. The bureaucratic elite, particularly within the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and Presidential Security Service (PSS), remain partly staffed by Yoon-era loyalists. Purges and reshuffles are imminent—but their execution must be calibrated to avoid sparking elite backlash or accusations of political vengeance.
II. INSTITUTIONAL REPAIR VS. STRATEGIC CONTINUITY
Lee Jae-myung’s presidency begins under the banner of restoring constitutional order. But beyond legal and institutional clean-up, two immediate questions define the strategic horizon:
- Will Lee maintain continuity in South Korea’s foreign and defense policy posture amid the crisis?
- The Yoon government’s increasing alignment with U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy, strengthening trilateral ties with the U.S. and Japan, and hawkish stance on North Korea are unlikely to be immediately dismantled. Lee, a known critic of aggressive military expansion, will likely pivot to a more autonomous security approach, but cannot afford to project weakness.
- Expect a soft recalibration, not a hard rollback: he may soften rhetoric on North Korea, decelerate joint military exercises, and reintroduce inter-Korean engagement, but with limited deliverables to avoid alienating key allies.
- Will economic security take precedence over ideological posturing?
- Given the geopolitical risks of alienating Washington or Beijing amid semiconductor tensions, Lee is expected to adopt a balanced hedging strategy—engaging in pragmatic de-risking from China while avoiding the overt economic securitization of the Yoon era.
- Look for renewed pushes for supply chain diplomacy with the EU and Global South, consistent with Lee’s populist economic platform and Global South-oriented worldview.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY AND MILITARY CONTROL
Yoon’s fall from power—triggered by his December 2024 martial law declaration—has deeply eroded public trust in the civilian-military boundary. The constitutional crisis has thrust South Korea into uncharted civil-military territory. Under Lee:
- Immediate stabilization of civil-military relations will be crucial. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Ministry of National Defense are likely under quiet observation for loyalty shifts.
- Expect Lee to reassert parliamentary oversight over defense matters and possibly restructure the National Security Council (NSC), curbing the executive’s unchecked war powers, especially in preemptive doctrines like “Kill Chain.”
- Defense Reform 4.0 will face temporary slowdown—but not cancellation. Lee cannot afford to look weak in the face of North Korean threats, especially with Pyongyang testing new tactical nuclear-capable systems as recently as May 2025.
IV. REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK: PERCEPTIONS OF VULNERABILITY
South Korea’s adversaries and allies alike are recalibrating.
- North Korea may test Lee’s resolve early with provocations—potentially resuming satellite launches or tactical missile tests to probe Seoul’s new red lines.
- China will seek to re-engage diplomatically, capitalizing on Lee’s more dovish approach compared to Yoon. However, Beijing will test Seoul’s willingness to participate in Taiwan Strait contingencies or tech containment.
- The U.S. will cautiously engage. While the Biden administration (or its successor) may welcome democratic restoration, it will closely watch for any dilution of the trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan military framework.
- Japan, under Kishida, will approach Lee with guarded optimism. Recent normalization efforts (GSOMIA, intel-sharing) will face a stress test, but Lee is unlikely to escalate historical grievances in the short term.
V. STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY: WHAT TO WATCH
- Restoration vs. Reform Dilemma: Will Lee focus on returning to pre-crisis governance, or use the moment to launch deeper reforms of South Korea’s security state?
- Public Mood & Civil Society: Having mobilized to oust Yoon, civil society actors are now empowered but fragmented. Lee must convert momentum into legitimacy without alienating moderates.
- Narrative Control: Foreign influence campaigns (especially from China and Russia) will attempt to exploit the crisis period. Seoul’s information space is vulnerable—Lee must act swiftly to restore media credibility and cyber resilience.
- Leadership Style: Lee’s populist, sometimes confrontational tone must evolve into statesmanship. His success depends not on ideology, but on his ability to consolidate institutions without provoking elite resistance or public fatigue.
Conclusion:
Lee Jae-myung’s presidency is not a return to normal—it is the beginning of a high-risk recalibration of South Korea’s democratic architecture, alliance structure, and national identity. The collapse of Yoon’s government has shattered political illusions about South Korea’s institutional invulnerability. Lee must now navigate a narrow corridor between stability and transformation—under domestic surveillance, international scrutiny, and historical weight.
Excerpt | Cho Haejin, I Met Loh Kiwan
“In a country that has forgotten how quickly peace can be revoked, we carry silence like a burden, pretending order is always rightful. But the line between law and force is thinner than we believe—and when it breaks, the only thing left is what we choose to become in the aftermath.”
SKR-01, South Korea Agent
Three Corporate | Just Truth