PKK announced on May 12, 2025, that it would disband and end its armed struggle. ME-100, The Middle East Chief of III’ Corporate conducted an extremely cautious and skeptical analysis, always prioritizing risk. Being a Middle East Chief requires thinking in a risk-intensive manner.
ME-100, Middle East Chief:
The PKK’s announcement to disband and end its armed struggle marks a strategic inflection point rather than a definitive resolution. Driven by Abdullah Öcalan’s directive from prison, the group declared its mission “historically complete,” signaling a shift toward democratic engagement. However, the Turkish government remains cautious, with ongoing military operations and demands for a formal disarmament timeline . Regional actors like the Kurdistan Regional Government have endorsed Öcalan’s call, aiming to stabilize cross-border Kurdish dynamics . Yet, the PKK’s capacity to convene a disbandment congress is hindered by security concerns, as Turkish airstrikes continue in northern Iraq. This development reflects a broader oscillation from armed insurgency to political negotiation, contingent on reciprocal actions from Ankara. The durability of this transition hinges on Turkey’s willingness to engage in substantive reforms and the PKK’s ability to unify its factions under a peaceful framework.
*The PKK is an armed terrorist organization designated as such by Turkey, the United States (since 1997), the European Union, and NATO.
“The mountains are silent now, but in their silence lies the weight of a thousand unsung songs.”
— Yaşar Kemal
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı: Deeper take?
ME-100, Middle East Chief:
The PKK’s announced disarmament is not a peace deal—it is a strategic repositioning. Four decades of asymmetric struggle failed to alter Ankara’s fundamental policy toward Kurdish autonomy, but the PKK now seeks relevance through political legitimacy rather than military leverage. This shift is driven not only by Öcalan’s aging authority and prolonged isolation, but also by regional realignments: the weakening of Iran-backed militias post-October 7, Erdoğan’s transactional pragmatism, and increasing Kurdish disillusionment with endless insurgency cycles. Crucially, this move coincides with a broader tactical retreat by Kurdish armed factions across the region, signaling a possible end to the armed struggle phase of Kurdish nationalism—not its goals. Turkey, however, is not incentivized to negotiate under current conditions. With the PKK’s perceived capitulation, Ankara may double down militarily to ensure the group’s full dismantlement before considering any political concessions. This risks internal Kurdish fragmentation, especially among hardline commanders who view the leadership’s tone as capitulatory. The power vacuum this creates may open space for Iran or rival Kurdish factions (like PJAK or KDP-backed splinters) to reposition.
Who benefits? Turkey gains military and diplomatic space; Iraq’s KRG consolidates regional legitimacy; Öcalan’s legacy is rebranded as pragmatic.
Who loses? Radical Kurdish factions, pan-Kurdish insurgency aspirations, and Western actors who used the PKK indirectly as leverage against ISIS.
Oscillation pattern? This is a familiar cycle: armed insurgency peaks → militarized stalemate → call for disarmament → state refuses political compromise → vacuum → potential rearmament under new banner.
Strategic forecast: Unless Turkey seizes this moment for structured reconciliation—including cultural and political reintegration—the PKK’s disbandment may simply birth smaller, more fragmented actors with less control and more unpredictability.
“We have always lived in the hills, between thunder and silence. And when one leaves, another voice fills the valley.”
— Sherko Bekas
ME-100, Middle East Chief
III’ Corporate