On November 26, 2025, Poland announced its selection of Sweden’s Saab as the supplier for three advanced A26 (Blekinge-class) submarines under the “Orka” program. This decision marks a significant milestone in modernizing Poland’s navy, which currently relies on a single aging Soviet-era Kilo-class submarine (ORP Orzeł, commissioned in 1986 and frequently out of service for repairs).
What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?
PL-01, Poland Agent:
Here is my up‑to‑date, in‑depth assessment of what the 26 November 2025 decision — selecting Sweden’s Saab / A26 Blekinge‑class submarine for Poland’s Orka programme — means for the future of the Polish Navy, Poland’s strategic posture, and the risks & caveats to watch.
✅ Why this is a breakthrough — and what Poland gains
- From zero to credible under‑sea deterrence. For decades the Polish Navy has been limited to a single aging Soviet‑era submarine (ORP Orzeł, a Kilo‑class SSK commissioned in 1986), whose frequent technical issues left Poland with — at best — a token submarine capability. European Security & Defence+2Naval News+2 The selection of A26 finally replaces that near‑void with a modern, purpose-built conventional submarine force. Reuters+2European Security & Defence+2
- Baltic Sea–optimized design and enhanced missions. The A26 is widely regarded as among the most modern conventional submarines in the world — built by Saab with the Baltic Sea’s specific conditions in mind (shallow waters, acoustic environment, dense seabed infrastructure). European Security & Defence+2Reuters+2 The A26 features diesel‑electric propulsion with air‑independent propulsion (AIP, Saab’s Stirling‑engine based system), giving Poland the ability to operate quietly and remain submerged for extended periods — a crucial advantage in a contested Baltic environment. European Security & Defence+2Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego+2
- Multi‑role capability extending beyond traditional anti‑ship warfare. The A26 design offers more than just torpedoes: it includes a “Multi‑Mission Portal” module able to deploy underwater drones, special‑forces diver teams, mines or minesweepers, and potentially support seabed-warfare operations. European Security & Defence+2Reuters+2 This versatility may allow the Polish Navy to contribute to seabed monitoring and protection of critical undersea infrastructure — pipelines, cables, shipping lanes — increasingly important in a Baltic Sea environment where hybrid threats (sabotage, underwater surveillance, infrastructure attacks) are a growing concern.
- Strategic and industrial dividends. The choice of Sweden includes a clear industrial‑cooperation and technology‑transfer component: Polish firms (some already part of the Saab supply chain) will participate in construction, maintenance, and potentially future upgrades. Notes From Poland+2Defence Industry Europe+2This not only strengthens Poland’s defense‑industrial base, but also deepens bilateral defense ties with Sweden — a NATO member with close interest in Baltic security. Reuters+1
- Filling a growing security gap under broader NATO posture. With the heightened Russian threat since 2022, submarine capability in the Baltic is no longer a luxury but a necessity: both for deterrence and intelligence/sea‑denial operations. The new subs help Poland move from symbolic to functional investment in Baltic defense, aligning its navy with Poland’s broader security and NATO responsibilities. Reuters+2Defense News+2
In short: this decision is a long‑awaited and structurally transformative upgrade — one that restores Poland’s submarine capability after decades of decline, while aligning with the strategic imperatives of Baltic‑region deterrence and allied interoperability.
⚠️ Risks, caveats, and remaining challenges
However — and this is as important as the gains — the decision does not automatically guarantee success. Several risks and challenges remain:
- Delay & uncertainty — first subs only by 2030 at the earliest. According to public statements, first delivery is not expected before 2030, with final contract hoped by Q2 2026. Reuters+2Reuters+2 That leaves a multi‑year window where Poland remains effectively without reliable sub‑surface deterrence, and risks ever‑evolving security environment in the Baltic.
- A26 has never been fully proven under high-intensity conflict yet (especially in Baltic wartime conditions).While Saab markets it as “fifth‑generation,” and it is indeed among the most advanced non‑nuclear SSKs, the configuration includes experimental modules (e.g., seabed warfare portal, UUV deployment, potential vertical launchers). Full integration of all those — especially in a high-threat context (anti‑submarine warfare by a peer adversary, saturation missile/ASW attacks, electronic/underwater countermeasures) — remains untested. Indeed, some of the envisioned capabilities (e.g., seabed warfare, UUV operations, future missile upgrades) are still emergent, even in NATO navies. Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego+2Debuglies+2
- Industrial & sustainment burden — long-term maintenance and infrastructure requirements. Transforming from a one-submarine force to a multi-boat fleet requires shore infrastructure (docks, maintenance yards, diving support, training), qualified submarine crews, logistics, and perhaps doctrinal overhaul. Even with Polishindustrial involvement, building such capacity is nontrivial — especially given the gap with decades of neglect.
- Strategic trade-offs — conventional SSK vs. potential nuclear‑powered SSN baseline. While A26 makes sense for the Baltic (shallow, coastal waters), conventional AIP submarines have inherent limitations versus nuclear‑powered SSNs: endurance, speed, deep‑water transit, long‑range strike, and rapid redeployment. Some analysts had earlier speculated about Poland even considering an SSN in the long-term. Naval News+1 By going conventional now, Poland buys immediate capability — but may limit ceiling of future naval power projection.
- Political/strategic dependencies and regional signaling. While cooperation with Sweden is politically and industrially attractive, it also signals Warsaw’s alignment with Nordic/Baltic defense architecture rather than purely Central‑European or NATO‑Atlantic frameworks. This may shift Poland’s naval doctrine and regional posture — not necessarily a downside, but a strategic shift that merits careful integration with Poland’s broader defense and foreign‑policy goals (e.g., vis‑à‑vis Germany, Baltic states, Sweden, and also NATO burden‑sharing).
🎯 Strategic Implications for Poland & the Baltic Region
- Poland becomes a credible second‑tier Baltic Sea naval power. With three A26s, Poland will no longer be an afterthought in Baltic submarine dynamics — but a real actor capable of sea denial, intelligence, and undersea deterrence. This recalibrates the regional balance, making operations against Russian or hybrid threats more complex.
- Closer Sweden–Poland defense‑industrial and strategic cooperation. This deal may mark the beginning of deeper bilateral naval collaboration, including maintenance, training, arms procurement, and possibly shared patrol or deterrence missions in the Baltic under NATO/Nordic frameworks.
- Foundation for future upgrades — but also a test of sustainability. If Poland can deliver the maintenance infrastructure, crew training and sustainment — and later possibly upgrade or retrofit the subs (e.g., add vertical-launch capabilities, UUV/mine-warfare modules, enhanced sensors) — this fleet could serve as a cornerstone for Polish naval strategy for decades. If not, subs risk becoming expensive, under‑utilized trophies.
- A step in Poland’s broader posture of strategic autonomy balanced with alliance burden‑sharing. By investing in independent undersea capabilities — yet purchasing them from a friendly European partner with technology‑transfer — Poland signals a desire for credible national capacity while remaining integrated in NATO/European defense ecosystems.
🧮 My Overall Assessment (Risk‑Balanced)
The 26 November 2025 decision should be judged as one of the most consequential defence‑industrial and strategic moves by Warsaw in decades: it finally ends a long‑standing undersea capability gap, lays the foundation for a credible Baltic‑Sea naval deterrent, and by involving Polish industry sets the stage for sustainable long‑term capability. However, the true value will depend heavily on effective implementation: infrastructure, crew training, long‑term sustainment, and full exploitation of A26’s modular potential. It is not a guaranteed “silver bullet,” but — if managed astutely — it arguably represents the single most important modernization step for the Polish Navy since the end of the Cold War.
In geopolitical terms, this moves Poland closer to a dual posture: a national, independent Baltic maritime force — but also a committed regional anchor within NATO’s northern flank. Over the next 5–10 years, how Warsaw balances these roles will shape Poland’s maritime relevance and strategic leverage in Northern and Central Europe.
„Jeszcze jeden okręt — to nie flota; ale bez tych statków — flota nie istniała.”
— Z „Popiół i diament” – Jerzy Andrzejewski
PL-01, Poland Agent
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