In response, the Islamic Republic has mobilized pro-government/pro-Ayatollah rallies in recent days (notably January 11–12, 2026), with state media broadcasting footage of large crowds in places like Tehran (e.g., Revolution Square), Arak, and other cities. Chants include support for Khamenei, “Death to America/Israel,” and loyalty to the Islamic Republic. Reports describe tens of thousands turning out in some cases, framed by authorities as a “show of power” and popular backing amid the unrest. What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?
IR-01, Iran Agent:
Here’s a current, in-depth assessment of the pro-government rallies on January 11–12 2026 and what they mean in the broader context of Iran’s ongoing unrest:
📌 1) Pro-government rallies are real — but their scale and framing are politically engineered
State media and official sources report tens of thousands of people rallying in multiple cities — Tehran (notably at Revolution Square), Arak, Rasht, Kerman, Zahedan, and other urban centers — chanting support for Supreme Leader Khamenei, the Islamic Republic, and slogans like “Death to America/Israel.” Officials and pro-regime outlets frame these events as massive demonstrations of national unity and a rejection of what they label “riots” or “foreign-backed unrest.”
But critically:
• Government institutions (state media, IRGC, mosque networks, public sector unions) appear to have actively organized or mobilized participants rather than these rallies emerging spontaneously. Participation may include civil servants, Basij volunteers, unionized workers, and others whose livelihoods depend on the state or its affiliates.
• The messaging emphasizes defense of the regime and condemnation of “terrorism” rather than addressing underlying economic and political grievances that have driven anti-regime protests.
This pattern — highly choreographed rallies amplified by state media — mirrors past Iranian efforts to project strength amid crisis (e.g., after the 2019 protests). It’s not yet independent evidence of sustained grassroots support at the same scale as the anti-government movement.
📌 2) The domestic crisis is deeper than these demonstrations suggest
While rallies show the regime can still mobilize loyalists, they do not appear to reflect a broad reversal in public discontent:
• Protests continue and have broadened
Unrest that began in late December over economic frustrations — especially sharp currency depreciation, inflation, and job insecurity — has spread nationwide. Independent accounts and rights groups say protests have occurred in hundreds of cities and towns, with slogans increasingly anti-regime and anti-Khamenei in nature.
Videos circulating outside Iran show large crowds chanting against the regime and calling for systemic change, even as authorities cut communications.
• Crackdown and information blackout are intensifying
Iran has implemented a nationwide internet shutdown, significantly restricting visibility into real conditions and complicating efforts to verify crowd sizes or sentiment.
Security forces have arrested protest leaders nationwide and publicly framed demonstrators as terrorists or foreign pawns — a rhetorical shift indicating the regime perceives a serious internal threat and is preparing tougher reprisals.
📌 3) Regime narratives and strategic signaling
The timing and tone of pro-government rallies, especially synchronized across cities, serve multiple internal and external strategic functions:
🛡 Internal Solidarity & Fear Projection
By broadcasting large loyalist gatherings, authorities aim to:
- Reassure conservative constituencies and security forces that the regime still has “legitimate backing.”
- Deter fence-sitting segments of society from joining anti-government protests.
- Communicate to hardliners that leadership remains unassailable, reducing fractures within the security apparatus.
🧠 Narrative Control
State outlets are amplifying slogans such as “Death to America/Israel” and accusing protests of being driven by foreign interference. This language serves to:
- Reinforce the regime’s long-standing external threat narrative.
- Redirect attention away from domestic socioeconomic failings.
- Position the unrest within a familiar ideological frame for loyalist mobilization.
This rhetorical pivot is evident in both the calls for rallies and the framing of protestors as “terrorists” intent on instability.
📌 4) Assessment of social traction and limitations
Pro-government rallies do not currently negate the scale or seriousness of the broader protest movement.Indicators of deep public unrest include:
- Continued widespread demonstrations across provinces.
- Slogans increasingly openly critical of the Supreme Leader and the system.
- Persistent internet and communication blackouts, suggesting the regime fears unfiltered information flows.
- Reports from multiple sources — despite state media constraints — of deaths, injuries, and mass detentions in anti-government protests.
While the regime can still summon loyalists, discontent at the grassroots level remains pervasive — driven by lifelong economic frustrations and accelerating political dissatisfaction. The organizing capacity of the anti-government movement appears decentralized and resilient, even amid repression.
📌 Strategic Outlook
🔹 Short Term
- The regime will continue to use organized rallies, state media, and ideological narratives to project strength.
- Crackdowns and repression will likely intensify, with more arrests and harsher rhetoric.
- Internet blackouts and censorship will persist as control mechanisms.
🔹 Medium Term
- If economic conditions deteriorate further without credible reforms, the credibility gap between the state and broad swaths of the population could grow.
- Hardline factions within the regime may push for even more authoritarian tactics, narrowing elite consensus on controlled concessions.
🔹 Longer Term Risk
- Sustained unrest without political accommodation could fragment the regime’s social base, particularly among non-aligned or economically burdened demographics.
Summary
Pro-government rallies on January 11–12 2026 are significant as a regime performance of internal legitimacy, but they are not by themselves evidence of a broad reversal in public sentiment against the anti-government uprising. The ongoing protests — rooted in economic collapse and widening into political demands — remain widespread and resilient, and the regime’s reliance on narrative control, mobilized loyalists, and repression underscores its perception of a serious legitimacy crisis rather than societal stability.
IR-01, Iran Agent
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