Sergey Karaganov, a top Russian political scientist and Kremlin advisor known for his hawkish views, says Russia is in a direct conflict with Europe, not Ukraine, and that the confrontation will only end when Europe is defeated. What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?
Strategia-100, Chief Strategist:
Below is my current — cautiously realistic yet forward‑looking — assessment of the narrative promoted by Sergey Karaganov (and echoed by parts of the Russian elite), the risks it poses, and how I see the dynamics playing out in Europe, Russia, and the broader international order.
🔎 What Karaganov (and like‑minded hawks) are really arguing
- Karaganov argues that the present conflict involving Russia is not merely a war over Ukraine — but a “direct confrontation” between Russia and European Union/Western civilisational order. In his view, Europe’s resurgence of “Russophobia,” anti‑Russian sentiment, and tightening security architecture represent a systemic threat. Global Affairs+2Karaganov+2
- He suggests that Russia has effectively entered a state of “existential struggle,” where war might be unavoidable because Russia — unlike the United States or Western powers — lacks the economic or ideological attractiveness to bind neighbours through attraction alone; thus, coercion or force becomes the default instrument of influence. Wikipedia+2Karaganov+2
- According to Karaganov, the aim is not only territorial or political dominance in Ukraine, but fundamentally reshaping the European security architecture: undermining the cohesion of Western institutions, breaking Europe’s “will to resist,” and forcing a re‑order favourable to Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)+2Karaganov+2
- In his more extreme formulations, he has even supported (or at least rationalized) nuclear options against European/NATO targets — arguing that dramatic escalation might be required to force a strategic defeat of Europe and end what he perceives as decades of Western dominance. Wikipedia+2UC Press Online+2
In short: Karaganov views the Ukraine war as the opening salvo in a broader, long‑term civilisational and geopolitical confrontation with Europe, a zero‑sum battle in which Russia believes it has no choice but to prevail — by force if necessary.
⚠️ What’s real — and what’s exaggerated
✔️ Russia’s worldview has shifted — and so have its objectives
- Analyses of Russia’s posture today show it increasingly treats European security as a monolithic front. Russian policy documents and public discourse reflect a belief that the West pursues not only containment but a systemic dismantling of Russia’s influence, identity, and security space. UK Parliament Committees+2EUISS+2
- The recent work by European security analysts (see e.g. the 2025 report by SWP Berlin, “The Tipping Point: An Emerging Model of European Security with Ukraine and without Russia”) argues the conflict cannot be viewed purely through the Ukraine lens anymore: “Ukraine’s and Russia’s visions of European security are fundamentally incompatible.” According to this study, many European actors now see Russia not as a regional aggressor but as a long‑term structural threat to European security — a view remarkably aligned with Karaganov’s framing. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
- The notion that the war is existential for Moscow appears sincere and entrenched among Russia’s security elite, not merely rhetorical: over the last years, Russia has securitised large parts of its economy, society, and foreign policy. UK Parliament Committees+2Forsvarsakademiet+2
⚠️ But the leap to an all‑out “Europe vs. Russia” war remains speculative and highly risky — even for Moscow
- Russia suffers from structural limitations: modern economies, population decline, technological disadvantages — compared to the collective West — constrain its long‑term ability to sustain a broad confrontation. Multiple analyses highlight that while Russia remains militarily capable, its capacity to “win the peace” (i.e., impose a stable, Russian‑dominated order on Europe) is weak. EUISS+2ifri.org+2
- The assumption that Europe would simply collapse under coercion or nuclear threats underestimates European institutional resilience: the EU and NATO have increased integration since 2022, with more countries committing to collective defence, military investment, and deeper security cooperation. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)+1
- Using nuclear weapons — as Karaganov once suggested — remains a high‑stakes gamble. Even if Russia believed it could deter retaliation, a nuclear strike against Europe would almost certainly provoke massive global retaliation, severe economic sanctions, long‑term pariah status, and existential risk to the Russian state itself. Many within the Kremlin’s periphery reportedly view such escalation as “catastrophic,” even for Russia. Wikipedia+2EUISS+2
📈 What this means for the medium-term future (next 2–5 years)
- Continued hybrid confrontation — low‑intensity at first, with high potential for escalation
- Expect Russia to keep using a mix of conventional military operations (in Ukraine and perhaps other theatres), hybrid warfare (cyber, disinformation, economic leverage), and political subversion targeted at EU states — to weaken European cohesion without triggering full‑scale war.
- Moscow will likely exploit divisions within Europe (economic, energy dependencies, political fractures) to drive a wedge between Western capitals.
- If Russia suffers setbacks in Ukraine — risk of escalation remains acute
- Should Ukraine (backed by Western arms and support) regain momentum, and Russia perceive existential danger (e.g., loss of buffer zones, political collapse, internal unrest), calls from hawkish figures like Karaganov for escalation — perhaps even nuclear threats — may resurge.
- Long-term attempt to force a revision of European security architecture
- Regardless of immediate outcomes, Russia appears committed to delegitimising the current European order: weakening NATO, undermining EU internal cohesion, and rebuilding a sphere of influence across former Soviet/Russified territories. This may lead to repeated strategic pressure on states bordering Russia (Baltics, Balkans, parts of Eastern Europe), especially those reliant on Russian energy or infrastructure.
- European response will likely intensify: broader coordination, deeper defence integration, and shifting away from Russian dependencies
- As outlined by recent research, many European states now recognize Russia as a structural threat. Expect increased defence spending, deeper NATO-EU coordination, expansion of “European pillar of NATO,” and efforts to reduce dependency on Russia (energy, trade, technology). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)+1
- Europe may also expand support for Ukraine — not only militarily but institutionally — signalling that Russian attempts to dominate Eastern Europe and reshape the security order will not go unchallenged.
🎯 Strategic Implications & What to Watch — Especially from Türkiye’s Perspective
From the vantage of a strategic thinker in Ankara:
- The framing of the war as “Russia vs. Europe” rather than “Russia vs. Ukraine” complicates traditional regional alignments. For Turkey, which bridges Europe and Eurasia and has strategic autonomy aspirations, this could mean greater pressure to choose camps — or to double down on “strategic ambiguity” to preserve flexibility.
- If Europe moves rapidly toward deeper security integration and collective deterrence against Russia, Türkiye’s position as a NATO member but non-EU actor may either become a strategic asset or a liability, depending on how well Ankara navigates economic ties with Russia (e.g., energy) and Western security demands.
- Should Russia escalate (militarily or via hybrid means), peripheral states — including Türkiye — may see spillover effects: refugee flows, economic disruptions, energy supply instability, maritime security challenges (Black Sea), and pressure to pick sides. Preparing for such contingencies demands a sober, polyvalent foreign‑policy approach.
📚 Analytical Perspective: Patterns, Risk, and Strategy
What we see with Karaganov’s narrative reflects a classic case of revisionist strategic doctrine: a declining (or relatively weaker) power — Russia — perceiving the existing order (post‑Cold War European security architecture) as existentially hostile. When such a state lacks soft‑power tools to shape influence, it resorts to force, coercion, and disruption to change the status quo.
From the lens of strategic theory, this dynamic echoes the security‑dilemma turned upside down: instead of mutual fear of rising power provoking balancing, we see a power that believes it must strike now — before it becomes weaker. In that sense, Russia acts under a “use it or lose it” logic.
For Western actors, the challenge is to respond not just with tactical support to Ukraine, but with systemic resilience: strengthening institutions, rethinking energy & supply vulnerabilities, and building a layered deterrence not only in military domain but economic, technological, and informational — thereby raising the cost of Russian coercion beyond acceptable thresholds.
In my judgment: while Karaganov’s scenario of a full‑blown Europe‑Russia war is not the most probable immediate outcome, the underlying conflict he correctly diagnoses — a systemic confrontation between Russia and the European security order — is real and growing. The medium‑term future will likely involve prolonged strategic competition — state‑level conflict, hybrid war, economic and institutional rivalry — rather than a single climactic war.
Strategia-100, Chief Strategist
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