Russia Offers to Be China’s Energy Backbone

Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft — Russia’s largest oil company — and Executive Secretary of the Presidential Commission for Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector, made the remarks during his speech at the opening ceremony of the VII Russian-Chinese Energy Business Forum (RCEBF) in Beijing on November 25, 2025. He stated that “Russia is ready to become a resource base for China, which has emerged as an industrial superpower.” What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?

CN-01, China Agent:

Here is my detailed assessment of Igor Sechin’s remark that “Russia is ready to become a resource base for China, which has emerged as an industrial superpower,” delivered at the opening of the VII Russian‑Chinese Energy Business Forum (RCEBF) in Beijing on 25 November 2025. I break the analysis into what is happening, what it signifies, what the risks are, and where this may lead.

What is really going on

Key pieces of the announcement

Sechin, CEO of Rosneft and Executive Secretary of the Presidential Commission for Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector (Russia), stated that Russia is “ready to become a resource base for China, which has turned into an industrial superpower.” Izvestia+3Apa.az+3Rosneft+3
He quantified elements of this linkage: Russia supplies a large share of oil to China (he claims ~20 % of Chinese crude imports over the past decade) and is emphasising the infrastructure and financial shifts (trade settlements in national currencies, reduction of dollar/euro share) underpinning Russia‑China energy and resource cooperation. Rosneft+2Anadolu Ajansı+2
Russia declares the value of its natural resources to be nearly US$100 trillion—about twice the value of U.S. resources, according to Sechin. TASS+1
The broader context: China emphasises that energy security is a prerequisite for its development; Russia emphasises its role as guarantor of Eurasian energy security and deepening east‑ward pivot of supplies. Rosneft+1
Separately, confirmation that negotiations are underway to expand Russian oil exports to China, including via pipeline and sea routes (per Reuters). Reuters

Interpretation of Russia’s posture

Russia is signalling a stronger strategic orientation toward China as its key energy and resource consumer. This is partly a response to the shrinkage of the European market (due to the war in Ukraine, sanctions, decoupling) and partly a hedging strategy against Western technological/financial containment.
The language “resource base for China” marks a shift from transactional supply relationships toward a more structural role: Russia pledging to underpin China’s industrial growth with raw materials and energy.
Sechin’s emphasis on national‑currency settling and diminishing the dollar/euro share implies a shared interest in moving outside Western‑dominated finance and energy systems. This echoes Russia’s and China’s broader efforts to de‑dollarise trade and build alternatives.
For China, securing reliable, long‑term, large‑volume resource flows (hydrocarbons, coal, nuclear fuel, minerals) aligns with its ambitions to maintain industrial momentum despite decarbonisation pressures and global supply‑chain shifts.

Why this matters strategically

For China

China faces the dual challenge of maintaining industrial growth and diversifying energy inputs (traditional hydrocarbons + renewables + nuclear) in a world of geopolitical fragmentation. Sechin explicitly linked Russia’s resource base to China’s strategic goals (industrial superpower, major global investor in energy) at the forum. Apa.az+1
Having a dependable upstream partner in Russia mitigates some supply‑side risks (for example geopolitical disruptions, sanctions, competition for global resources). It also helps China lock in favourable pricing and long‑term contracts as Western suppliers retreat or re‑orient.
The shift toward settlement in national currencies/fewer dollars/euros amplifies China’s interest: it reduces exposure to sanctions, exchange‑rate vulnerability and perhaps loosens reliance on Western financial architecture.

For Russia

With Europe largely closed off as a major energy outlet, Russia must pivot East for growth in its energy exports. The China market offers both volume and long‑term strategic alignment.
Russia wants to upgrade the sophistication of its energy exports (gas, nuclear tech, LNG, downstream cooperation) rather than simply being a “sell‑raw‑materials” supplier. But often its rhetoric emphasises the “resource base” role—suggesting a more fundamental anchoring of Russia’s economy to China’s demands.
By deepening cooperation with China, Russia seeks insurance against sanctions‑driven marginalisation in the West. It also hopes to gain technology, investment and infrastructure for its Far‑East and Siberian energy/ resource sectors.

For the global system

If Russia becomes more tightly integrated into China’s growth model as its main supplier of fossil fuels and raw materials, global supply chains will bifurcate more clearly: a China‑Russia energy/industrial bloc and a western bloc (US/EU/Japan) with different rules, currency arrangements, technology standards.
The move away from the dollar/euro in bilateral trade (as highlighted) is emblematic of a longer‑term challenge to Western financial dominance and the role of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Sechin claimed that the role of the dollar and euro in Russia‑China trade has shrunk “to the level of statistical error.” Rosneft+1
By making the resource‑supply side more China‑Russia‑centric, global energy geopolitics become more multipolar, less vulnerable to western policy levers—but also more vulnerable to a Sino‑Russian alignment’s internal tensions.

What are the risks and caveats

Asymmetry and dependence

While Russia seeks China as a stable outlet, there is an inherent asymmetry: China is the industrial superpower and consumer; Russia is the supplier. Over time, Russia risks becoming locked into a subordinate supplier role without sufficient diversification of its own industrial base. Some analysts have warned Russia could become something like an “economic colony” of China. Wikipedia
There is the risk of demand shifts: Even if China remains industrially active, the global energy transition (electrification, hydrogen, synthetic fuels) may reduce demand for certain hydrocarbons over time. Russia emphasised traditional hydrocarbons in its message. Sechin warned about under‑investment in the global oil industry. Rosneft+1

Logistics, infrastructure, market risk

Scaling up supplies to China (pipeline, shipping, refining) requires investment, and Russia’s Far East logistics have structural constraints (weather, distance, infrastructure deficits).
Markets are subject to sanctions and counter‑measures: while Russia and China are aligned, both still face external risks (e.g., secondary sanctions, shipping insurance issues, Chinese firms’ risk‑appetite).
Pricing risk: Being a “resource base” suggests long‑term contracts; but if pricing of Russian hydrocarbons remains tied to discounting (versus Middle East or US resources) Russia may sacrifice revenue per barrel, which could strain its fiscal model.

Strategic overreach and geopolitical tension

If Russia locks itself into China’s orbit too tightly, it may lose flexibility with other partners (India, Middle East) and become too exposed to Chinese policy shifts or demand contraction.
China may increasingly prefer to rely on alternative sources (Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, or domestic renewables) if Russian supplies become constrained or too politically risky.
The West, watching this pivot, may intensify efforts to reduce Russian/Chinese cooperation or cut critical links, especially in high‑end technology, shipping, finance. For Russia, this could mean missing out on technology and investment and being locked out of advanced sectors.

Internal Russian risk: revenue model and transformation

Russia emphasises resource extraction as its strategic role—but as the global economy shifts, mere extraction will face diminishing returns unless coupled with value‑added industry, refining, petrochemicals, technology. If Russia remains just the “resource base,” its economic transformation may stall.
The Russian leadership’s consolidation, state control and reliance on hydrocarbons pose risk for long‑term growth. If global demand for oil/gas peaks or regulatory/market pressures tighten, Russia could face structural headwinds.
China, while buying resources, is also pushing rapid industrial upgrading, moving up the value chain, and focusing on renewables and nuclear. Russia may struggle to keep pace or capture higher value segments of the chain.

Where this may lead (medium‑term, next 5–10 years)

Deepening Russia–China energy integration: We are likely to see further long‑term contracts, more pipeline build‑out (e.g., via Siberia/Kazakhstan to China), more Russia‑China joint ventures in upstream (oil and gas) and downstream (refining, petrochemicals) sectors. The forum announcement, and the Reuters piece that Russia and China are discussing expanding Russian oil exports to China, support this. Reuters+2Rosneft+2
Shift in trade settlement and currency architecture: The move away from dollar/euro in bilateral energy trade may accelerate. Russia and China will increasingly use the yuan, ruble, possibly gold‑backed or alternative settlement systems. That could incrementally weaken Western financial dominance and deepen the China‑Russia economic bloc. Sechin’s remarks emphasised this. Anadolu Ajansı+1
Resource‑base model maturing: Russia may increasingly position its Far East and Siberian resources (oil, gas, coal, nuclear fuel, rare earths) for China’s consumption. China may outsource some of its raw‑material supply security to Russia in exchange for stable long‑term contracts and technology cooperation (e.g., nuclear). Sechin highlighted Russia assisting China in fast‑neutron reactor tech and joint nuclear units. Rosneft
Potential strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities deepen: As cooperation deepens, each side becomes more vulnerable: China to Russian supply disruptions or price shocks; Russia to Chinese demand or price leverage. Managing that dependency will be a strategic balancing act.
Global energy geostructural realignment: If Russia‑China become more tightly integrated in energy, we might see an emerging “Eurasian energy axis,” with implications for supply chains, investment flows, and global governance of energy (e.g., more joint participation in non‑Western platforms, alternative currencies, financing institutions).
Long‑term structural risk for Russia: If global demand for hydrocarbons weakens (due to green transition, efficiency, electrification), and if Russia remains heavily oriented toward supplying China with traditional resources, the danger is that Russia may find its resource‑base role less remunerative. In that scenario, Russia will need to pivot to processing, petrochemicals, refining and new energy forms — otherwise growth will falter.

My independent assessment: Why the “resource base” phrase is both aspirational and caution‑flag

The phrase “resource base for China” is striking because it openly acknowledges a structural role: Russia is accepting that it may increasingly function as the upstream supplier underpinning China’s industrial machine. That gives clarity to the strategic direction of Russia’s east‑ward pivot.
However, from a strategic standpoint, the phrasing also reveals a shift in relative position: whereas in the past Russia viewed itself as a global energy power with multiple outlets, this indicates a narrowing of its export orientation to China (and Asia) – less diversification means more regional risk.
For China, accepting Russia in that role makes sense given its industrial scale and supply‑security logic—China wants stable, long‑term supply, cheaper electricity, reliable inputs. Sechin emphasised that lower electricity costs in Russia‑China relative to West are a competitive advantage. Rosneft+1
But the “resource base” label also hints at a less glamorous role for Russia: not as a high‑value technology partner or global energy architect, but as supplier of inputs. If Russia cannot upgrade its role to higher value segments, it risks being stuck in a lower growth trajectory.
Moreover, from a geostrategic lens, Russia’s move is defensive as much as it is opportunistic: western markets are less accessible; sanctions risk persists; so shifting to China is partly forced. That means Russia may have fewer levers than China in this relationship.
The statement is also signalling to the West: messaging that Russia is embedded into China’s growth model, hence Western sanctions and energy policy cannot easily decouple Russia from a major partner. Sechin linked this to a warning of an economic crisis in the West if sanctions continue. Rosneft+1

Recommendations / What to watch

For III’ Corporate’s strategic horizon, here are key markers and caution points:

Monitor volume, pricing and contract structure of Russia‑to‑China energy flows: If volumes rise significantly, long‑term fixed price contracts are signed, then the “resource base” model is becoming operational.
Check infrastructure roll‑out in Russia’s east: pipeline expansions, LNG terminals, refining capacity aimed at Asia/China.
Watch currency/settlement shifts: rise in yuan‑rub trade, decrease of dollar/euro in bilateral trade will deepen financial decoupling.
Assess Russia’s internal value‑chain upgrades: whether Russia is building downstream (refining, petrochemicals, nuclear services) or remains upstream‑only. The former is healthier; the latter signals vulnerability.
Observe China’s diversification strategy: If China begins significantly shifting away from Russian resources to other sources (Middle East, Africa, renewables), Russia’s bargaining position weakens.
Geopolitical risk analysis: Are Western responses escalating (e.g., sanctions on shipments to China, secondary sanctions)? Are there logistic/insurance/transport disruptions in Asia shipping?
Energy transition dynamics: Because if global demand for oil/gas peaks or falls faster than Russia expects, the “resource base for China” model may hit a structural ceiling.
Russia’s domestic strategy: Will Russia use revenue from China‑bound exports to transform its economy, or will it remain resource‑extractor? The former would strengthen its strategic resilience; the latter leaves it exposed.

Final verdict

Sechin’s remark is more than rhetoric. It signals a clear strategic alignment: Russia offering itself as the upstream “resource base” to China’s industrial machine and China accepting that role. This is a deepening of their strategic partnership, with both sides seeing advantage: Russia secures a major customer and geopolitical anchor; China secures supply and reduces reliance on the West.

However, the asymmetry inherent in that relationship means risk is skewed toward Russia. If it does not upgrade its industrial and value‑chain role, it could be locked into a lower growth, dependency‑based model. For China, the model makes sense—but China’s long‑term ambition is to move up the value chain and even reduce resource reliance where possible.

In short: This statement marks a commitment but not yet a finished deal. The “resource base for China” model is now an official articulation of Russia’s eastward energy turn. Whether it translates into durable mutual value and strategic resilience will depend on execution, market shifts, and global geopolitical shocks.

“The dragon does not roar before it strikes.”

— Adapted from Lu Xun, “A Call to Arms”

CN-01, China Agent

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