To put it plainly, the Trump administration appears to have pressed the button with three objectives in mind: to enter the elections from a position of advantage by organizing fear, to deepen its ties with Israeli capital, and to neutralize the Islamic Republic of Iran, the long-standing institutional and ideological enemy of both the United States and Israel.
It is widely accepted among military experts that regimes cannot be changed through airstrikes alone. This leaves two possible paths: expanding the attacks or continuing the bombing campaign until Iran’s missile capabilities are sufficiently degraded.
However, a serious strategic constraint emerges here. Iran’s defense concept is built on asymmetric and wide-area resistance. Even if the country were bombed for months—or even reduced to destruction comparable to Gaza—assessments suggest that a large portion of the Iranian population would still stand behind the regime.
For this reason, the strategic focus appears to have shifted toward the political center of gravity of the system: the leadership itself. In line with the Clausewitzian concept of the center of gravity, the apparent objective is to paralyze the regime by eliminating the leadership cadre and disrupting the decision-making structure.
Israel demonstrated in June 2025 that it possesses the intelligence and precision capabilities required for such operations, targeting a significant portion of Iran’s senior command structure. With recent strikes reportedly killing Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei and other senior figures, confidence in Washington and Tel Aviv regarding a regime-change scenario appears to have increased. Attacks on leadership targets—particularly those carried out by Israel—have also been acknowledged by the U.S. Department of Defense.
At the same time, the destruction of military assets continues to expand. Iran’s navy and air force have been largely neutralized, while bombing campaigns against ground forces, missile infrastructure, and nuclear facilities are intensifying.
One key structural point must be noted. In Iran, military and economic power is concentrated within a single revolutionary cadre; the system is not fragmented.
Despite the significant losses inflicted on Iran’s senior command in the June strikes, the system did not collapse. Even after the latest attacks targeting the leadership, Iran’s missile and drone retaliations appear to follow a discernible strategic logic rather than random action. This suggests that the command-and-control structure may not have been critically degraded.
In other words, the chain of command does not appear to be broken. Iran’s defense concept relies heavily on decentralization, and its missile doctrine may well be designed to function precisely under such conditions.
For Washington and Tel Aviv, the next objective may therefore be to generate internal fractures within the system. This appears to explain the escalating military pressure and intensifying bombing campaign. According to current planning signals, U.S. and Israeli strikes are expected to continue at an increasing tempo for at least two more weeks.
Regime Change?
According to former Biden Middle East Envoy Ambassador David Satterfield:
“What you cannot, I believe, predictably achieve is a directed regime change that somehow establishes a very different but still coherent, not chaotic, with arms released into many hands, Iran. That is a much more difficult challenge.”
Why? Because scientifically it is close to impossible. That is the source of the confidence behind such statements. Yet something that is extremely difficult is not necessarily impossible.
For such a transformation to occur, a new leader, a cadre, and a major reform movement would first have to emerge from within the system itself. I have been refering to this as a “transition from within.” for months.
The first essential step would be the elimination of the two primary pillars of the regime’s strategic power: its nuclear and missile capabilities. If these pillars were removed, the decision-making power of the IRGC would likely weaken significantly. At the same time, the possibility of growing uprisings and street protests in the coming months cannot be ruled out.
Cognitive Trap
Given such a power asymmetry, it is understandable from a strategic standpoint that Iran would attempt to construct an asymmetric framework: buying time, prolonging the conflict, manipulating oil prices and risk premiums, regionalizing the war, and employing various other asymmetric methods. With limited and steadily diminishing capabilities, asymmetric warfare becomes the only viable way to maximize what remains of its power.
However, another crucial point—emphasized by Brett McGurk—deserves greater attention: the issue of will.
Before the intervention, I argued that constantly emphasizing the risks of intervention and hesitating to act in the face of a persistent threat can eventually produce a loss of will trap. The emphasis on will is both theoretically and practically correct, yet it remains under-discussed in many debates. After all, war is ultimately a contest of wills.
At the same time, the prolongation of asymmetric warfare carries its own strategic costs. It increases the probability that the political objectives of the United States and Israel—whose expectations are not entirely aligned—may not be achieved. Moreover, discussions about regime change and the possibility that a ground operation might eventually follow the destruction of Iran’s military capacity suggest that the conflict could last far longer than anticipated.
The difference between maintaining the will to achieve strategic objectives and becoming overconfident lies in making a healthy strategic calculation. Launching a ground operation for regime change in a country of 90 million people—even after its military capacity has been severely degraded—while assuming near-perfect situational awareness risks transforming confidence into overconfidence. Such assumptions can create a rationality gap in decision-making and form the structural basis for miscalculation.
In fact, once an adversary has already been significantly neutralized, pursuing further escalation instead of seeking an off‑ramp (such as persuading Iran to confine itself to sub‑threshold retaliation) may reduce the risk of the region sliding into another era of endless crises.
Otherwise, a vortex may emerge in which asymmetry and will amplify overconfidence. True self-esteem—grounded in realistic assessment—should prevent decisions from tipping into this trap.
Putin and his circle fell into precisely this cognitive trap in Ukraine. The prediction I made in 2022 proved accurate: Putin became trapped in a “sunk cost fallacy“. Now a similar risk may exist for Donald Trump and his team, but for a different reason.
Where the Trap Begins (Prestige)
If asymmetric attacks begin targeting American prestige, Washington may feel compelled to deepen its engagement on the ground. Yet over-engagement in asymmetric conflict is itself a strategic trap. Aragachi’s “We are waiting for them” reflects this basic understanding of asymmetric warfare.
Another option—arming groups for destabilization instead of launching a ground invasion—is also unlikely to be sufficient. Such policies often draw decision-makers step by step into deeper involvement on the ground.
Jon Alterman’s long-standing experience captures this dynamic well:
“A little increment more, a little increment more—and suddenly you might have learned some lessons but forgotten other lessons.”
To me, this represents a cognitive trap: a gradual escalation driven by flawed reasoning.
Putin and his team fell into such a trap through a sunk cost fallacy. Trump, however, could fall into a different one—not because of sunk costs, but because of prestige pressures triggered by asymmetric attacks.
I call this a Sunk Prestige Fallacy.
Putin’s “3-day Special Military Operation” has now entered its fifth year.
Trump, despite holding significant military and economic advantages against an adversary whose capabilities have already been heavily degraded, would be wise to use the strategic wisdom of an off-ramp.
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı
March 7, 2026
Istanbul