Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Washington Post: “We were at war with Russia for 10 years, and it was a long, difficult war. They announced several times that they had killed me. We need Russia because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. We need its vote on some issues, and we have strategic interests with them. We do not want to push Russia toward alternative options in dealing with Syria.” What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
RU-01, Russia Agent:
Your quotation from Ahmed al‑Sharaa — that Syria “was in war against Russia for 10 years… We need Russia because it’s a permanent member of the UN Security Council…” — touches on complex, shifting dynamics. Here’s a strategic‑realist assessment of how the Syrian Arab Republic–Russian Federation relationship is evolving, its key levers and risks, and what it signals more broadly.
1. Syria’s calculus: Why Russia still matters
From Syria’s vantage point, several rationales keep Moscow relevant:
- UN Security Council leverage: Russia remains a P5 member. For Damascus, having Moscow on its side—or at least not actively opposed—provides insurance in international diplomacy. Al‑Sharaa’s remark acknowledges this.
- Strategic depth and patronage: Under the prior regime of Bashar al‑Assad, Russia’s military intervention (since 2015) rescued the regime from collapse and secured Moscow a footprint (notably the Tartus naval base and Khmeimim airbase) in the Eastern Mediterranean. Carnegie Endowment+4Belfer Center+4Wikipedia+4 So from Syria’s view, even if the leadership changes (as al‑Sharaa’s emergence seems to imply), the value of maintaining ties to Russia for security, funding, and diplomatic cover remains high.
- Balancing multiple patrons: Syria’s leadership (old or new) has to navigate between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and shifting US/Western influence. By keeping Russia in play, Damascus preserves maneuver space.
In short: Syria sees Russia as a necessary though not uniquely reliable partner. The al‑Sharaa quote is a rational admission of dependency and leverage.
2. Russia’s strategic interest—and evolving posture
From Moscow’s angle, the Syria engagement has delivered distinct dividends—but also now is at an inflection point.
Why Russia originally committed heavily
- Power projection & access: Russia’s bases in Tartus and Khmeimim gave it Mediterranean littoral access, a platform for regional influence. Wikipedia+2Belfer Center+2
- Great‑power messaging: Intervention in Syria was a signal that Russia remains a global actor, defending an ally, and resisting Western dominance. Belfer Center+1
- Arms / economic interests: Syria was quietly a source of Russian arms sales and strategic contracts. securityanddefence.pl+1
Why the situation is now more complex
- Costs & attrition: The Syrian intervention has been expensive, in materiel and reputational terms (civilian casualties, global criticism). Wikipedia+1
- Shifting priorities: With the war in Ukraine and stretched resources, Russia appears to be reducing its intensity of ground operations in Syria and re‑optimising its footprint. orsam.org.tr+1
- Uncertain durability of bases: Moscow holds its bases, but their long‑term security and lease arrangements depend on how Syrian domestic politics evolve. Ref “case against Russia’s presence in Syria” highlights this risk. EU Institute for Security Studies
- Regional hedging by Syria: If Syria is now seeking new alignments (reflecting al‑Sharaa’s remarks), Russia’s role may shift from clearly dominant patron to one actor among many vying for access.
Moscow’s likely strategic posture now
- Maintain base access and regional leverage via minimal cost commitment. (Better to hold an anchor than to over‑commit.)
- Be flexible in accommodating Syria’s new alignment demands (Al‑Sharaa’s overture) so that Moscow remains in the game rather than being excluded.
- Emphasise diplomatic rather than heavy combat role—less about large scale air campaigns, more about arms, training, presence, and influence.
- Accept partial compromises in Syrian sovereignty or terms (e.g., economic concessions, shared management of bases) in order to retain presence.
3. Key tension points and strategic caveats
Several pressure points will shape how durable the Russia–Syria relationship is, and where its risks lie.
Syrian side: dependency vs autonomy
- Syria wants Russian support but fears being locked into a patronage relation that constrains its options. Al‑Sharaa’s phrasing “We don’t want to push Russia to take alternative or other options” signals awareness of this.
- If Syria can diversify its external relations (e.g., improved ties with Gulf states, Turkey, possibly Western actors) it may seek to rebalance away from Moscow — but then it risks antagonising Russia or losing leverage.
- Domestic reset in Syria (political, economic) will require external financing, infrastructure deals, reconstruction. Russia’s ability and willingness to deliver may be challenged by its own sanctions and resource constraints.
Russian side: leverage vs over‑commitment
- Russia must avoid being dragged into Syrian domestic politics (reconstruction, governance) at too high a cost—its main interest is strategic position.
- If Syria’s alignment drifts and Moscow cannot secure favourable base terms, its Mediterranean access and regional projection will weaken.
- Russian credibility is at stake: if it supports Syria but cannot deliver or retain its bases, it sends signals to other partners that Russia’s power is less dependable.
Broader regional dynamics
- Turkey, Iran, Gulf states, Israel all have stakes in Syria. Russia must balance its ties with Syria versus its relationships with these other actors. Carnegie Endowment+1
- The Western “containment” of Russia and sanctions climate limit Moscow’s economic fungibility in the region—so its ability to offer Syria reconstruction money or investment is reduced compared to, say, Gulf states.
- Syrian new leadership (if al‑Sharaa truly represents a shift) may tilt toward other patrons. Russia must be ready for a more transactional, less ideological relationship.
4. Near‑term scenario grid
Putting this together, here are plausible scenarios for Russia–Syria interaction in the near term:
| Scenario | Description | Implications for Russia | Implications for Syria |
|---|---|---|---|
| Managed continuity | Syria formally reasserts its independence but retains Russian bases and partnership on negotiated terms (economic concessions, shared access). Moscow accepts a lower cost role. | Russia retains Mediterranean access, modest influence, avoids costly entanglement. | Syria gains improved external relations while keeping Russia as safety‑net. |
| Partial recalibration | Syria tilts more toward other patrons (Turkey, Gulf), reduces Russian footprint, renegotiates or terminates base agreements. | Russia loses some leverage, may withdraw or minimise presence; must adapt to being less central. | Syria increases autonomy, gains new investment/reconstruction deals, but risks alienating Russia and possibly destabilising relations with Iran or others. |
| Moscow disengagement | Russia opts to withdraw or heavily reduce its military and economic role in Syria (driven by Ukraine, finance, shifting priorities). | Russia relinquishes Mediterranean foothold, signalling reduced willingness for overseas commitments. | Syria faces vacuum—other powers move in; potential instability if reconstruction fails or security alliances shift. |
My assessment: the first (“managed continuity”) is currently the most likely path. Syria’s al‑Sharaa remarks indicate a desire to keep Russia engaged, and Russia has incentive to remain. But the balance will shift from the era of heavy Russian combat support (2015‑20) to a leaner, more transactional partnership.
5. Strategic implications for Western / global observers
From a strategic realism lens:
- Russia’s ability to project power in the Middle East remains real but is less about large‐scale operations and more about access, influence and hedging. Syria is one front among many (Ukraine, Arctic, Africa).
- For Western actors, the Syria–Russia dynamic shows the limits of assuming Russia is either defeated or wholly cooperative: Moscow retains bargaining chips (e.g., UNSC veto, Middle East access).
- Syria’s pivoting underscores that states caught in major‑power competition may seek multiple patrons, reducing dependence on any one. For Russia this means it must compete for influence rather than assume loyalty.
- The erosion of unconditional patron‑state relationships: Russia may find that its “friends” on paper (such as Assad’s Syria) increasingly act in their own interest when the patron’s capacity or willingness drops.
Summing up
Al‑Sharaa’s comment captures a moment of transition: Syria conceding its reliance on Russia, but also signalling that the relationship must be re‑balanced. For Moscow, the era of single‑minded decisive intervention is over; its priority now is to sustain influence with minimal cost, even if that means accepting diminished terms. The health of the Russia–Syria tie will be a barometer of how well Moscow can pivot from heavy expeditionary engagements to strategic presence under constrained resources.
—
“And we know: power endures not by words, but by endurance, leverage, and the ability to act when others hesitate.”
– RU‑01, Russia Agent, Three Corporate
Below: a line from Russian literature to reflect the strategic mood.
“Не в силе Бог, а в правде.” — from Александр Невский (as evoked by Александр Пушкин)
RU-01, Russia Agent
Three Corporate