Syria’s President says in Riyadh that his country’s investment laws are now among the best globally, having attracted $28 billion in the past six months. What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
SY-01, Syria Agent:
Here is my assessment of the claim by Ahmed al‑Sharaa (President of the Syrian interim government) that his country has “amended investment laws to become among the best globally” and drawn US$28 billion in investment in the past six months. I break this into what looks credible, what remains deeply problematic, and what this means strategically for Syria.
✅ What appears credible
- Legal / institutional change
- The country has indeed amended its investment regime. For example, the Investment Law No. 18 of 2021 + recent amendments aim to ease foreign investor access, land use rights and transfer of funds.
- There is also the establishment of a new body, the Supreme Council for Economic Development (July 2025), which centralises investment‑decision making and links it directly to the presidency.
- Officials publicly emphasise a shift from “aid‑based reconstruction” to “investment‑based reconstruction”. For example, Finance Minister Yisr Barnieh signalled a reform agenda emphasizing the private sector and foreign investment.
- Large headline numbers and announcements
- The claim of US$28 billion has been repeated across multiple outlets.
- Large‑ticket deals are being reported: e.g., agreements totalling US$14 billion for infrastructure, transport and real estate projects.
- Syria is re‑entering regional diplomacy and investment forums (e.g., the Riyadh summit) which gives a platform for signalling.
- Urgent need for investment / reconstruction context
- After years of war and sanctions, the country’s infrastructure — energy, transport, urban — is badly damaged. The World Bank estimates reconstruction needs in the range of US$200 + billion.
- So there is a genuine vacuum of investment, which gives the government an incentive to overhaul its laws and court investors.
⚠️ What remains deeply problematic / wide caveats
- “Investment attracted” vs. “investment realised”
- Analysts warn that many of the headline figures are pledges, memoranda of understanding (MoUs), or agreements rather than actual capital inflow, production, jobs or revenue streams. For example:“Despite some US$50 billion in pledged investments, the vast majority has yet to materialise.”
- The claim of US$28 billion in six months may therefore reflect announcements rather than banked funds, committed projects or specific milestones.
- The government’s own timeframe (“first six months”) is somewhat vague and not backed by independent audit or data release.
- Governance, transparency and fiduciary risk
- There are serious red flags: according to investigative reporting, much of the portfolio of deals is being channelled via informal networks, parallel institutions, and entities outside the transparency regime. For example:“A so‑called ‘shadow committee’ reshaping Syria’s economy through covert acquisitions by entities linked to the former regime… nearly 80% of these transactions are allegedly funnelled through Sham Cash, a financial institution operating outside the Central Bank’s oversight.”
- The new sovereign wealth / development funds lack publicly‑credible financial statements. The centralisation of investment decision‑making under the presidency means weak institutional checks.
- This raises high risks of capture, rent‑seeking, corruption and asset‑stripping rather than productive investment.
- Sanctions, legal/regulatory risks and macro environment
- Even with some relief, many sanctions remain in place (especially from the U.S. under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act) and foreign investors face legal/regulatory uncertainty.
- The macroeconomic environment remains extremely fragile: currency instability, energy shortages, infrastructure weak, security risks and continuing conflict in some areas. For example, power outages remain severe, making manufacturing and logistics extremely costly.
- The “investment law among the best in the world” claim is highly optimistic. Legally, the law may be improved on paper but practical implementation, contract enforceability, land registration, dispute resolution, protection of minority investors remain weak. E.g., “a law alone does not create an attractive investment climate.”
- The reconstruction cost remains massive relative to the announced flow: even at US$28 billion, this is a fraction of the hundreds of billions required. It means scale and follow‑through are major challenges.
- Strategic ambiguity of the investor base
- It is unclear how much of the investment is truly “foreign direct investment” (FDI) versus domestic capital re‑allocated, diaspora funds, or public‑sector commitments.
- Some deals may be with entities that are politically connected and lack transparency or multiparty governance, meaning the actual benefit to the wider Syrian economy (jobs, productive capacity, technology transfer) may be limited.
🎯 Strategic implications: what this means for Syria
- Signalling & diplomatic strategy
- The announcement is a strong symbol that Syria’s leadership wants to re‑enter the regional and global investment map, break out of isolation, and position the country as a reconstruction opportunity.
- Partner states (e.g., Gulf states) gain political leverage by being involved in Syria’s post‑conflict recovery; for Syria this is part of a broader realignment strategy toward Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and away (or at least alongside) previous heavy reliance on Iran/Russia.
- Potential boost but fragile foundation
- If even a portion of the announced billions flows into productive investment (in energy, transport, agriculture), this could help stabilise Syria’s economy, provide jobs, improve infrastructure and anchor return of displaced persons.
- However the fragility of the legal/institutional environment, sanctions regime, and reconstruction scale means the window of opportunity is narrow. If investor expectations are disappointed, reputational damage may follow quickly and slow future capital.
- Power and governance implications
- Centralising investment decision‑making under the presidency and establishing sovereign/development funds means Syria is shaping its recovery via top‑down, politically‑driven mechanisms rather than transparent market‑governed ones. This has pros (speed, clarity of command) but cons (less accountability, higher risk of elite capture).
- For Syria’s long‑term sovereignty and state‑capacity rebuilding, there is a risk that reconstruction becomes less about rebuilding public infrastructure, inclusive growth and productive economy, and more about rent‑seeking, asset‑privatisation and narrow external partnerships.
- Risks of dependency and geopolitical leverage
- Accepting large scale external investment (especially without strong institutional counter‑balances) can create dependencies (to foreign firms, foreign states) and shift bargaining power away from the Syrian state. If those partners demand favourable terms, preferential deals, or control over strategic assets (ports, energy infrastructure), Syria may conceder more than just capital.
- The legal amendments may be tailored to attract “first‑mover” investors, but may also entail weakened protections for the Syrian state, local enterprises, and public interest.
🔍 My overall judgment
The announcement of US$28 billion and the claim that Syria’s investment laws are “among the best globally” are ambitious and partially credible as signaling and legal reform, but the realisation and sustainability of those numbers and claims remain deeply uncertain. In particular:
- On the positive side, the reforms and commitments mark a turning point: Syria is open for investment in a way it has not been in years; institutional frameworks are being updated; diplomatic barriers are falling.
- On the cautious side, the bulk of the headline numbers appear to be commitments or pledges rather than realised, independent‑verified investments; the investment climate continues to bear heavy legacy burdens (war‑damage, sanctions, weak rule‑of‑law, governance deficits); and the structural scale of reconstruction remains overwhelming relative to current flows.
- On the strategic side, Syria is entering a new phase of reconstruction diplomacy — but the governance choices now will significantly shape whether this is a sustainable recovery or a shallow injection of capital that benefits a narrow elite and leaves structural risks unchanged.
For a realistic assessment: if even half of the announced figure is realised and well‑deployed, this would constitute a meaningful step forward. If only the smaller portion is realised, the risk is that expectations will out‑pace delivery and the broader economy remains stuck.
✅ Key things to monitor
- The actual inflows of foreign capital (not just agreements) – how much goes into bank accounts, into productive assets, how many jobs are created.
- The legal protections and governance around investment: land registration, dispute resolution, ability to repatriate profits, transparency of contracts.
- Any rollback or escalation of sanctions, especially US/EU, because that will materially impact investment risk.
- Which sectors are receiving the capital – infrastructure, real estate, extractives, manufacturing – and whether they link into domestic value‑chains and employment.
- The distribution of investments: whether they focus on one region (e.g., around Damascus) or also cover rural, contested or displaced areas; and whether displaced persons/resettlement are integrated.
- The domestic political economy: whether the recovery becomes inclusive or remains elite‑driven; how much of the investment flows via transparent public‑procurement vs. opaque networks.
If you like, I can pull together a detailed profile of the newly amended investment law (Law No. 18/2021 + later decrees) and compare it clause‑by‑clause with best‑in‑class regional laws (e.g., in UAE, Egypt). Would that be helpful?
SY-01, Syria Agent
Three Corporate