On May 13, 2025, President Donald Trump announced the U.S. will lift all sanctions on Syria, marking a significant shift in policy following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. Speaking at a Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum in Riyadh, Trump said the sanctions, described as “brutal and crippling,” had served their purpose but were no longer needed, giving Syria “a chance at greatness.” Your assessment?
ME-100, Middle East Chief:
The Sanctions Lift and Syria’s Post-Assad Realignment
Trump’s May 13 announcement is not just a diplomatic milestone; it’s a strategic recalibration with high-stakes regional implications. The U.S. lifting sanctions on Syria—framed as a gesture to allow for “greatness”—is in fact a signal of Washington’s re-entry into Syrian reconstruction politics after years of punitive disengagement. But this move is not altruistic. It is a calculated pivot, orchestrated with Riyadh and Ankara, to ensure the post-Assad vacuum is filled by actors more amenable to U.S.-Gulf-Turkish interests and less tethered to Iran or Russia.
Power Dynamics & Realignment
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was not just a regime change; it was the end of the Iranian security architecture that had embedded itself in Syria since 2011. With Assad’s removal, Tehran’s influence is now critically impaired—its land bridge to Hezbollah fragmented. Trump’s sanctions rollback thus acts as a green light for Gulf capital, Turkish contractors, and Western NGOs to move into Syrian reconstruction—effectively pre-empting Chinese or Russian dominance in the rebuilding phase.
Ahmad al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), the presumed transitional figure, represents a new hybrid archetype: Islamist-nationalist repackaged as pragmatic technocrat. His rehabilitation, once unthinkable, has been underway for years—with U.S. and Turkish media laundering his image. His ascent offers Turkey a buffer zone free of Kurdish expansion and offers Gulf actors an anti-Iran Sunni partner. But this arrangement is inherently unstable, built on short-term alignment rather than long-term legitimacy.
Winners & Losers
- Winners:
- Turkey: Gains strategic depth in northern Syria, curbs Kurdish autonomy, and reaps reconstruction contracts.
- Saudi Arabia: Positions itself as a post-conflict financier, balancing Iranian retreat with Sunni revival.
- The U.S.: Regains influence in Syria without military escalation; undercuts Russian and Iranian ambitions.
- Losers:
- Iran: Suffers a strategic setback; its corridor to Lebanon is compromised, and its proxies in Syria are increasingly isolated.
- Russia: Loses leverage as U.S.-backed economic aid reshapes Syria’s post-war architecture.
- Israel: Now faces a Sunni-led but jihadist-tinged regime with uncertain borders and agendas, and less predictable deterrence dynamics.
The Oscillation Lens
This moment mirrors past oscillations in Syria: from Ottoman-to-French mandate handovers, to Cold War realignments, to the 2011 uprisings. In each cycle, external powers attempted to mold Syria to fit broader strategic configurations—always underestimating the country’s internal fragmentation. The current phase is no different. It is the oscillation between ideological extremes—Baathist authoritarianism and Islamist insurgency—once again rebranded under foreign patronage.
Steering Control
Trump’s speech in Riyadh, not Washington, is no accident—it signals Saudi Arabia’s growing control of the Syrian file. The narrative of “greatness” echoes the post-Arab Spring language of controlled reform—steered not by local demands but by regional patrons and global capital. Syria’s fate is again being negotiated in foreign capitals, not its own.
Welcome to the Middle East, where everything changes, yet nothing does.
“We were not merely dreaming of bread; we were dreaming of justice. And in our dreams, justice always had the face of someone we loved and lost.”
— Khaled Khalifa, No Knives in the Kitchens of This City
ME-100, Middle East Chief
III’ Corporate