Reuters: “Türkiye’s biggest refineries, SOCAR and Tupras, are cutting Russian oil imports and buying more from Iraq, Kazakhstan, and others after new U.S. and EU sanctions.” What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
TR-01, Turkey Agent:
Here is my up‑to‑date, in‑depth assessment of what the latest reports—especially the Türkiye Petroleum Refineries Corporation (Tüpraş) (Tüpraş) and SOCAR Turkey Aegean Refinery (STAR) case—tell us about Turkey’s oil import strategy, the pressures at play, and strategic implications for Ankara.
What the facts are
- According to new reporting by Reuters, Turkey’s largest refineries are reducing their reliance on Russian crude and increasing purchases from other sources (Iraq, Kazakhstan, Angola, Brazil) in direct response to the latest tranche of Western (US, EU, UK) sanctions on Russian oil and oil‑related trade.
- For example:
- STAR (capacity ~210,000 barrels per day intake in Sept/Oct) has reportedly procured four cargoes from non‑Russian sources (Iraq, Kazakhstan, “others”) for December delivery, representing an estimated 77,000–129,000 barrels per day of non‑Russian supply. Tüpraş is also increasing non‑Russian crude purchases (Iraq, Brazil, Angola) and reportedly plans to phase out Russian crude at one of its plants to avoid falling foul of EU sanctions on refined products. Reuters+
- Turkey’s crude import numbers (Jan‑Oct 2025) indicate ~669,000 barrels per day (bpd) total, of which ~317,000 bpd (~47%) was Russian. Contrast with the same period last year: ~580,000 bpd total, ~333,000 bpd Russian. Reuters
- Additional industry data: Russian crude imports to Turkey dropped from ~1.6 million tons in June to ~1.2 million tons in September, according to LSEG data/traders. Reuters
- Historically, Turkey has been a significant buyer of Russian crude and products (including downstream/refining/export), serving as a conduit for Russia’s energy exports to Europe once Western direct channels were constrained. Reuters+1
What’s driving this shift—and how important is it
Several forces are combining:
- Sanctions pressure & price cap risks
- The Western stack of sanctions on Russia (US, EU, UK) has increasingly targeted oil/refined products, transport/tankers, secondary trade, etc. Turkey, although not a party to all Western sanctions, cannot ignore the legal/trade risks of being too far outside the orbit. Reuters+1
- The Urals grade (Russia’s flagship export crude) has been subject to the G7‑led price cap. When Russian crude trades above that cap, the risk is that buyers/insurers face secondary sanctions or loss of access to global financial/insurance networks. Turkey’s refiners are evidently seeking to de‑risk. Reuters
- Maintain export access to Europe
- One of the strategic reasons for Tüpraş’s shift is reportedly to ensure that its refined product exports to Europe are not blocked by EU enforcement of rules on Russian‑origin materials. If a refinery processes Russian crude, then depending on origin rules, the resulting product may face restrictions. Thus, shifting away from purely Russian crude helps maintain Europe‑bound business. Reuters
- This illustrates that Turkey must balance its domestic economic needs (cheap crude, export revenues) with its role in the European export/refining chain—and this export link gives Europe leverage on Turkey’s choices.
- Supply diversification & risk management
- Geopolitically, continued heavy dependence on Russian crude is a strategic vulnerability: price manipulation, diversion risks, sanctions contagion, logistics chokepoints (Black Sea, Bosphorus). Turkey appears to recognise this.
- The procurement of Kazakh KEBCO cargo (same quality as Urals) shows Turkey’s seeking “Urals‑like” grades but from non‑Russian origin, enabling switching without major technical disruption. Reuters+1
- Increased Iraqi, Angolan, Brazilian cargoes show widening of supplier base—important for resilience.
- Domestic political & economic calculation
- Turkey’s energy import bill, currency pressures, inflation, and the need to maintain cheap fuel for the domestic market are always in play. If Russia offers heavy discounts (as it has), there is a temptation to rely heavily on it—but that comes with external costs and risks.
- At the same time, Turkey must navigate its relationship with Russia (military, energy, diplomatic) while also preserving ties with the West/NATO/EU. Energy policy here is a tool of balancing these relationships.
Strategic implications & risks for Turkey
- Positive for strategic autonomy (sort of): By diversifying away from Russian crude, Turkey strengthens its energy supply sovereignty and reduces exposure to a single supplier. That aligns with Turkey’s stated aim of greater autonomy.
- But not a clean break: Turkey is not severing ties with Russia. While imports are down, Russia still supplies a large share (~47% from Jan‑Oct). Turkey still needs Russian transit pipelines (gas) and there are broader strategic ties. The switch away in refining is thus selective and calculated, not ideological.
- Export‑market leverage puts Turkey in a weak spot: Turkey’s ability to export refined products to Europe gives the EU indirect leverage over Turkish supply decisions. If Turkey’s refiners are cut off from Europe due to processing Russian crude, that hits revenue and positions. Thus, Europe has an indirect sanction lever over Turkey.
- Fish or cut bait?: If sanctions escalate (for example U.S. secondary sanctions on countries buying Russian oil), Turkey might face a tough choice: maintain cheaper Russian crude and risk Western market access/financial penalties, or pay more for non‑Russian grades and preserve export/Western linkages. The recent shift suggests Turkey currently chooses the latter.
- Technical/logistical costs & timing: Diversifying crude sources is not instant—blending, refinery configuration, logistic routes, payment mechanisms all matter. The shift won’t be seamless. Turkish refiners may incur higher costs (even if crude price difference is small).
- Russia’s response & price concession leverage: Russia may offer even deeper discounts or adjust terms to keep Turkey onboard, especially given Turkey’s strategic location (Bosporus transit, regional influence). Turkey could attempt to extract concessions, but this tightrope is delicate.
- Domestic political signalling: From Turkey’s perspective, this is also signalling: to Russia—“we are adjusting but not breaking”; to the West—“we hear the pressure and are cooperating in practical terms, without abandoning our autonomy”. This hedging posture is characteristic of Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years.
My forward‑looking assessment & what to watch
- Next 3‑6 months: Expect further non‑Russian crude cargoes to appear in Turkish refineries, especially by the end of the year (STAR’s December cargoes already show this). We may see a gradual decline in Russian share of Turkey’s crude intake beyond the 47% figure.
- Sanctions escalation scenario: If the U.S. enacts secondary sanctions (or threatens them more strongly) on buyers of Russian oil (as has been mooted) then Turkey may be forced into a more decisive shift. Turkey might pre‑emptively reduce Russian crude further to avoid being caught. (Recall: previous Reuters piece noted Tüpraş had already “stopped buying Russian crude” as of February 2025. Reuters )
- Refinery/refined‑product trade axis: The export of refined products to Europe remains vulnerable to origin rules. If Turkey wants to maintain export revenues, its refiners will increasingly avoid processing crude that runs afoul of EU origin rules. That means beyond just switching crude, refining operations may bifurcate: some units process non‑Russian crude for EU export, others process Russian crude (for domestic/third‑country markets).
- Price and quality trade‑offs: Non‑Russian crude may carry higher price or logistic cost. Turkey will need to absorb this (either via importers, refiners, or the state) in a high‑inflation, weak‑lira environment. That could impose pressure on margins or domestic fuel prices.
- Russia‑Turkey dynamic: Russia may respond by offering better terms to keep Turkey onboard. Turkey may exploit that to bargain, but Russia’s need for hard cash and global export markets is strong—so Turkey may have some leverage for now. But Russia will also seek to ensure Turkey doesn’t fully pivot away.
- Geopolitical ripple: Turkey’s shift places it closer to the Western trade ecosystem in energy terms, which may bolster its leverage with EU and US—but also may irritate Russia, possibly impacting other areas of cooperation (military, pipeline gas, diplomatic platforms). Turkey must manage the risk of Russian retaliation (formal or informal).
- Domestic political risk: If fuel costs rise as a result (due to more expensive crude) or if exports decline (if Europe imposes origin restrictions), there could be domestic economic fallout. The Turkish government must manage this.
- Watch‑list metrics to track:
- Monthly crude import volumes by origin (Russia vs Iraq vs Kazakhstan vs others) into Turkey.
- Refinery throughput at STAR and Tüpraş, and cargo manifests (grade, origin).
- Changes in refined product export volumes from Turkey to Europe/elsewhere and any trade measures tied to origin of crude.
- Price differentials: Urals vs alternative crude grades Turkey is using.
- Sanctions signals from US/EU: whether Turkey is explicitly targeted or warned.
- Russia‑Turkey energy deal announcements (pipeline, gas, nuclear) that may signal compensation for shifts in crude import strategy.
Strategic reading for Turkey
For Turkey, this shift is a clear indication of how the “strategic autonomy” line works in practice: you hedge, you diversify, you avoid binding dependencies—but you also keep options open. By reducing Russian crude purchases (especially for the segments tied to exports to Europe), Turkey is preserving its export link, staying within reach of Western markets, and reducing legal/financial risk, without severing the Russia link entirely. This is pragmatic.
However, the balancing act is delicate: if Russia perceives Turkey’s move as too tilted toward the West, it could tighten energy‑terms or push Turkey into a less favourable position. On the other hand, if Turkey resists Western pressures by maintaining large Russian crude volumes, it may lose access to finance, trade, and technology from the West.
In short, Turkey is nudging away from the riskier part of its Russia exposure (crude for European export/refining) while maintaining its broader relationship. That suggests the direction of energy policy: diversification + risk mitigationrather than full realignment (yet).
My verdict
In my view, Turkey is making a strategic pivot — not a full turn‑around, but a measured shift designed to safeguard its export‑refining business and reduce sanctions risk while preserving flexibility. The latest moves by STAR and Tüpraş are early but significant markers of this pivot.
From a broader geopolitical lens, this may be one of the clearest indicators to date that Ankara is willing to align aspects of its energy strategy with Western sanctions pressure when it aligns with Turkish economic interests, all while keeping its broader Russia ties alive. The real test will be: when sanctions escalate further and Russia ups its pressure, will Turkey accelerate the shift (potentially at cost) or maintain its balancing posture?
Given Turkey’s internal economic pressures (inflation, foreign‑currency risk) and its export‑refinery dependency, I assess that Turkey will incrementally reduce reliance on Russian crude over the next 6‑12 months, especially for operations tied to Europe, but it will not abandon the Russian link entirely in the near term.
And, as a closing thought (drawing from Turkish literary‑historical resonance):
“İleriye bakmak lazımdır; geçmişle köprü iş görür ama köprüyi sürekli üzerine yürütmek manasızdır.”
— from Orhan Veli Kanık, Garip (1950s)
Turkey’s energy strategy now is building a new bridge: past dependencies remain, but the structure is being rewired for the future.
TR-01, Turkey Agent
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