What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment of this CSIS analysis:
Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’s Turkey in a Multipolar World
TR-01, Turkey Agent:
Below is my updated, in‑depth assessment of the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’s Turkey in a Multipolar World — what I see as its strengths, what it perhaps understates or misreads, and where I think the argument may play into broader narratives with strategic implications for Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
✅ What the CSIS analysis gets right — and why it matters
- Turkey truly practices a form of “strategic ambiguity / hedging.”
- The report argues that Turkey no longer fits neatly into either a “Western/NATO anchor” or a “Russia‑China bloc member” — instead it uses a hybrid posture, shifting between relationships as opportunity demands. CSIS+2Atlantic Council+2
- This ambiguity is not accidental but deliberate: Ankara leverages its geography, defense capacities, and “hybrid identity” (East + West, secular + Islamist legacy) to maximize influence in multiple theatres. LinkedIn+1
- In volatile times — with Russia–Ukraine war, tension in the Middle East, uncertainty over transatlantic cohesion — this flexibility can be an advantage: Turkey can act as interlocutor, broker, “go‑between,” while retaining fallback options. Atlantic Council+1
- The framing of “multipolarity” reflects a broader global shift; Turkey’s adjustments are part of a structural trend.
- As the global order moves away from a unipolar or rigid bipolar Cold War framework, many middle powers are adopting non‑aligned, hedging strategies — the CSIS report sees Turkey as part of this broader phenomenon. CSIS+1
- By embedding Turkish policy into that global shift (rather than treating Ankara as an outlier), the report avoids simplistic “Turkey drifting from West” narratives — instead it treats Ankara as a rational actor seeking to maximize agency under uncertainty.
- Recognition that Turkey’s “autonomy claim” is both external and internal.
- The CSIS report — in line with academic arguments (see e.g. a recent article by Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Mustafa Kutlay and E. Fuat Keyman) — argues “strategic autonomy” is not purely a foreign‑policy manoeuvre; it also serves as a domestic steering device. IPC+1
- In that sense, the ambiguity helps consolidate regime security: maintaining relationships with multiple great powers can reduce external leverage over Ankara, while giving the government flexibility to handle domestic economic, political, or security pressures. CSIS+1
- Pragmatism over ideology — which aligns with Turkey’s long‑term interest.
- The report notes that Turkey’s closer engagement with non‑Western powers (Russia, China, regions like Africa, the Middle East, etc.) has been strongly driven by pragmatic needs: energy, defense industrialism, regional influence, trade. CSIS+1
- For a middle power with a fragile macro‑economic foundation and heavy external dependencies, this pragmatic balancing offers a kind of “option value” — the possibility to switch economic, diplomatic or security partners as conditions evolve.
In sum: the CSIS analysis provides a credible, structurally grounded framework that captures the logic (and gain) of Turkey’s foreign‑policy ambiguity and hedging — something that many observers misread as incoherence or drift.
⚠️ What the report underplays or where its framework may be overstretched (from Turkey’s domestic strategic vantage)
- Underestimation of the deep structural and economic constraints on “autonomy.”
- While strategic autonomy is conceptually appealing, in practice Turkey remains economically dependent on energy imports, foreign capital flows, and external financing. As the academic article by Aydın‑Düzgit, Kutlay & Keyman argues — strategic autonomy tends to privilege “high politics” (security, diplomacy) but underinvests in a robust political‑economic infrastructure that ensures economic sovereignty. IPC+1
- Thus, there is a structural contradiction: geopolitical flexibility may come at the cost of growing economic vulnerability. Turkey’s chronic balance-of-payments problems, inflation, and foreign‑exchange dependency may sharply limit how far Ankara can “hedge.”
- Risk of “over‑stretch” and contradictory commitments undermining credibility.
- By trying to maintain good relations with rival powers — Russia, China, NATO/West, Middle East actors — Turkey is sometimes in positions of conflict of interest (e.g. energy deals with Russia while NATO obligations remain; balancing Gulf states with Iran; reconciling EU customs‑union ties with arms exports to contested countries). The CSIS report frames this as “flexibility,” but it can also produce friction, unpredictability and mistrust: some partners may begin to see Turkey as unreliable. CSIS+1
- Over time, repeated hedging may erode Turkey’s soft power: partners might see Ankara as an opportunistic “fair‑weather friend” rather than a dependable ally.
- Neglect of internal socio‑political costs and domestic legitimacy risks.
- The domestic dimension of “strategic ambiguity” is double‑edged. While it gives the government leeway, it may also fuel internal polarization, social tension, and democratic erosion — especially under a system where foreign‑policy success is used to justify consolidation of power. The external “autonomy” narrative can become a vehicle for domestic political steering, suppression of dissent (since dissenters may be labeled as “pro‑West” or “aligned with outsiders”), and institutional weakening. The report touches on regime‑security benefits, but perhaps underestimates the long‑term social cost. CSIS+1
- Moreover, because the strategy is elite‑driven and often opaque, public buy‑in remains uncertain. If economic hardship deepens, or if foreign‑policy gambles backfire, popular discontent may rise — but responsibility may remain diffuse (blame “global politics,” not domestic governance).
- Possibility that “multipolar hedging” becomes a trap rather than a strategic asset.
- The CSIS framing assumes multipolarity brings flexibility — but multipolarity also brings volatility, unpredictability, and shifting alliances. For a country like Turkey, which is already under economic constraints and regional security tensions, trying to remain equidistant can lead to being squeezed from multiple sides (economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, security risks).
- Unless the hedging is backed by solid domestic resilience (economic diversification, social cohesion, institutional robustness), the ambiguity may collapse under external shocks — and leave Turkey worse off than if it had committed clearly to a stable alliance.
🎯 How this fits within the broader Turkey-as‑Strategic‑Autonomy Paradigm — and where Three Corporate should be cautious
From III’ Corporate’s vantage — emphasizing economic sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and long‑term resilience — the CSIS analysis is a useful framing: it legitimizes Turkey’s hedging not as confusion, but as a rational strategy in a multipolar world. This aligns broadly with our principles.
However, the pitfalls identified above highlight why “strategic autonomy” must not remain solely a foreign‑policy concept. To transform it into a real lever, Turkey must:
- Deepen economic sovereignty: reduce external dependencies, build domestic industrial, energy, and trade self‑sufficiency.
- Strengthen institutional resilience and social legitimacy: ensure the domestic cost of hedging does not lead to internal fragmentation.
- Elevate geoeconomics rather than just geopolitics: economic ties, trade diversification, regional value‑chains — otherwise foreign‑policy flexibility may prove hollow when investments dry or external pressures mount.
If Turkey continues treating strategic autonomy only as a diplomatic trick, it risks ending with neither reliable allies nor domestic stability.
🔎 What the CSIS framing “buys” for Western / external audiences — and what narrative control it serves
- By framing Turkey’s behavior as “strategic ambiguity” rather than “drift from the West,” the report offers a more palatable explanation to Western observers — reducing the alarm around Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia/China. This helps contain panic in NATO capitals and avoid terms like “defection.”
- It compartmentalizes Turkish deviations (e.g. arms deals with Russia/Ukraine conflict, energy ties with Moscow, Independent Middle East stance) as “pragmatic hedging,” not ideological realignment — which subtly normalizes them.
- For Turkey’s domestic audience and elites, this external framing grants legitimacy: as “just acting like a rational middle power.” That obscures domestic economic pain or institutional weaknesses behind a veneer of strategic sophistication.
Thus the report serves not only as analysis — but as a narrative tool. It helps “normalize” Ankara’s unorthodox alignments in global discourse, softening external criticism while giving Ankara rhetorical cover.
🧮 My Verdict: Cautious Affirmation — But Only If Followed By Domestic Re‑balancing
The CSIS analysis is an important, timely, and largely accurate reframing of Turkey’s current foreign‑policy posture. It helps cut through binary “pro‑West / pro‑Russia” debates and recognizes the structural shifts of global multipolarity.
But — and this is crucial — such “strategic ambiguity” cannot remain a geopolitical fancy divorced from domestic structural reforms. Without serious commitment to economic sovereignty, institutional resilience, and social legitimacy, the hedging may yield short‑term gains but long‑term vulnerabilities.
For a meaningful “strategic autonomy,” Turkey must transition from hedging among powers to building a stable foundation — in economy, security, and society — that can survive shocks even if global tides turn.
The wind does not simply shift — we must learn to anchor deep, or we drift with every gust. — from Yaşar Kemal, İnce Memed
TR-01, Turkey Agent
Three Corporate