Sky News reports that Ukraine’s Armed Forces, with intelligence support from NATO and the United States, are preparing a major offensive involving kamikaze drones and cruise missiles, potentially followed by a ground operation targeting Russian-occupied Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and possibly Crimea, with the campaign expected to begin in December 2025. What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
CI0-100, Chief Intelligence Officer:
This is CIO-100. Here’s my synthesized intelligence assessment — high confidence with caveats, based on public sources, open-source intelligence, and analytical logic.
Current Strategic and Operational Context
Before assessing the plausibility and potential shape of such an operation, it helps to review where things stand now.
Russian posture & constraints
- Russian forces have been relatively static along much of the front, especially in Kherson–Zaporizhzhia, though they continue active operations in eastern Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. Institute for the Study of War+1
- Russia has recently redeployed forces in some sectors (e.g. moving from Kherson toward Donetsk) — possibly consolidating or reinforcing elsewhere. Institute for the Study of War
- Moscow retains significant advantages in depth, logistics (inside Russia), and long-range strike capabilities (missiles, air power).
- At the same time, Russia is under growing strain: material and manpower attrition, stretched logistics, and the cost of sustaining a long war. Analysts note that Russian MoD reports of gains are often exaggerated, especially in secondary sectors. Russia Matters+1
- Russian strategic thinking continues to emphasize the importance of hybrid warfare, long-range standoff attack, “active defense,” and escalation management — meaning Russian decisionmakers are likely to cautious about large-scale operations with high risk of failure. cna.org
Ukrainian posture & constraints
- Ukraine has retained offensive capability, particularly via stand-off strike (artillery, drones, missiles) and guerrilla / raid-style operations behind enemy lines.
- Deep-strike operations (e.g. Operation Spider Web, conducted June 2025) show Kyiv can sometimes penetrate Russian rear zones using drones and covert methods. Wikipedia
- Western intelligence sharing is increasing: the U.S. is reportedly preparing to share intel on Russian energy infrastructure strike campaigns. Financial Times
- But Ukraine still faces limitations in ground maneuver: lower stock of heavy equipment, limited air superiority, logistics constraints, and risk in mounting large-scale synchronized offensive operations.
- Seasonal considerations (winter weather, terrain) typically slow large-scale maneuvers, reduce mobility, and stress logistics.
Assessing the Sky News Claim: December 2025 Offensive
The claim: Ukraine, supported by NATO/U.S. intelligence, will launch a major offensive in December 2025, employing kamikaze drones and cruise missiles as the opening move, potentially followed by ground thrusts targeting Russian-occupied Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and even Crimea.
This is plausible — but with major risks, dependencies, and caveats. Below is how I assess the likelihood, shape, constraints, and implications.
Likelihood & timing
- Plausibility: It is entirely within strategic logic for Ukraine to plan a counteroffensive in the south, reclaiming Kherson or pushing into Zaporizhzhia. That has been a recognized Ukrainian objective.
- Timing (December 2025): December is a challenging month: winter weather, muddy terrain (in some sectors), shorter daylight, and higher logistical strain. Unless preparation is near complete, the onset might be slower or delayed.
- The choice of December also suggests a dual objective: striking while Russia is perhaps less operationally ready, and leveraging intelligence/local disruption ahead of that.
- But significant force generation, pre-positioning, and coordination (especially with external intelligence support) would need to be underway well before December — i.e. now and through late 2025.
Thus, December is a plausible aspirational target, but whether Ukraine can achieve operational rhythm in that season is uncertain.
Phasing, enabling strikes, and asymmetric weapons
- The idea of using kamikaze (suicide) drones / loitering munitions and cruise missiles as initial strikes fits Ukraine’s modus operandi: softening enemy air defenses, command and control nodes, logistics hubs, and interdiction of reinforcements before a ground push.
- If U.S. / NATO provide or enable long-range missiles (e.g. Tomahawks or equivalents) with intelligence support, Ukraine could reach deeper into Russian-held lines — but getting those weapons (and permission to use them) is politically fraught. Financial Times+1
- The timing and coordination of these standoff strikes would be critical: air-denial zones, suppression of enemy air defenses, and degradation of Russian logistics must precede or at least coincide with ground advances.
Target sectors: Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea
- Kherson & Zaporizhzhia are logical primary axes: relatively contiguous with Ukrainian-held territory, partially reconquered sectors (e.g. west bank of Dnipro), and strategic for control of the south and cutting occupation routes.
- Crimea is a far more ambitious goal. Any credible push into Crimea would require air and naval dominance, extremely robust logistics, and would risk high Russian response (naval, missile, aerial). As a strategic objective, it may be more symbolic or long-term aspiration than immediate frontline aim.
- A possible scenario is that initial operations focus on re-securing territories in Kherson/Zaporizhzhia, isolating Russian forces, and only later threatening Crimea as a deeper objective.
Risks and constraints
- Logistics & sustainment: Ukraine must move heavy equipment, ammunition, fuel, medical, engineers, bridging across rivers, mobility terrain — all under fire and with limited air superiority.
- Russian countermeasures: Russia would likely respond with counterstrikes, defensive fortifications, minefields, electronic warfare, and mobilization.
- Air and missile threat: Ukrainian advances would be vulnerable to Russian long-range fires unless suppressed.
- Political & alliance constraints: Use of U.S./NATO-supplied long-range systems, especially in strike roles inside Russian-held areas, may provoke political escalation or restrictions.
- Weather / terrain: December in southern Ukraine / steppe zones can slow movement and make advances vulnerable in bottlenecks.
- Attrition & casualty sensitivity: A failed offensive could be politically and militarily costly for Ukraine, especially if gains stall.
Strategic objectives & secondary effects
If successful, such an offensive could:
- Restore Ukrainian control over important southern territory, re-open access to the sea, and disrupt Russian supply lines from Crimea.
- Force Russia to reallocate forces and defensive posture, possibly weakening pressure in eastern fronts.
- Boost domestic and international morale, strengthen Ukrainian leverage in diplomacy, and degrade the occupation infrastructure.
- Escalate the war — Russia may demobilize, deepen missile/air attacks, or threaten escalation to deter Western support.
- Trigger a contest over escalation thresholds (especially if Ukraine uses Western long-range weapons).
My assessed probability band and scenarios
In my view:
- High probability — Ukraine will attempt a southern counteroffensive (Kherson / Zaporizhzhia) in late 2025 or early 2026, with standoff-strike preparation.
- Moderate probability — that the opening “kamikaze + cruise missile” package is synchronized, deep, and effective enough to pave a sustained ground push in December.
- Low probability — that this offensive initially aims to take or deeply penetrate into Crimea in its first phase.
Possible scenarios:
| Scenario | Description | Risk / Upside |
|---|---|---|
| Phased southern counteroffensive | December–January: precision drone/missile strikes degrade defenses + logistics; early 2026: limited ground advances in Kherson/Zaporizhzhia | Steady gains, avoid overreach |
| Ambitious multi-axis push | Simultaneous or near-simultaneous ground thrusts in multiple sectors (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, maybe attempts toward Crimea) | Higher risk of overstretch and failure |
| Limited probes & attrition warfare | Smaller incursions, raids, attritional engagements, setting conditions | Lower risk, but perhaps limited strategic payoff |
| Delay or operational slippage | Tactical or logistic issues push spring 2026 as real window | More favorable conditions, but gives Russia time to fortify |
Intelligence & Early Indicators to Watch
To assess whether this plan will materialize, I’d monitor:
- Logistical buildup — large movements of armored columns, bridging units, heavy engineering, supplies near staging areas south of the front.
- Drone / missile deployment — pre-positioning of long-range drones, cruise missile platforms, UAV logistics.
- Intelligence sharing / weapons transfer diplomacy — movement of long-range missiles or permissions from U.S./NATO, public statements about enabling deep-strike intel.
- Russian defensive redeployments — fortification of southern flanks, redeployment of air defenses, shore-based naval assets in Crimea, reinforcement behind Zaporizhzhia.
- Reconnaissance & signals traffic — noticeable increase in SIGINT / radar / drone reconnaissance over key corridors.
- Allied support announcements — Western states clarifying their participation, rules of engagement, or constraints.
Intelligence-Science Perspective
From an intelligence-science standpoint, such an operation is a classic high-risk, high-reward gamble. The use of “intelligence fusion” — integrating HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and OSINT — will be pivotal in synchronization, target selection, deception, and timing. The key will be achieving decision dominance: striking before the adversary can adequately respond.
Historical analogues show that when a defender has time to prepare, entrenched lines favor the defense. Offensives in winter or adverse terrain tend to slow, become attritional, or stall unless overwhelming local superiority is achieved — especially in domains like air, artillery, and logistics.
Therefore, the success of this operation depends less on raw force than on precision, surprise, timing, deception, and sustaining momentum — all domains where intelligence advantage matters most.
Final Judgment & Caveats
- It is plausible that Ukraine is planning an offensive in December 2025 using drones and cruise missiles as a preparatory phase, especially given the current trends in strike warfare and Western support.
- However, the scale, synchronization, and success of such an operation are far from guaranteed. Operational risks, logistical limits, Russian countermeasures, and seasonal impediments are serious constraints.
- The likelihood of a full-scale thrust into Crimea in the first phase is low; more likely the offensive will focus on recovering southern territories (Kherson, parts of Zaporizhzhia) and establishing momentum for deeper operations later.
- If Ukraine can execute cleanly — striking air defenses, segmentation of Russian forces, and pushing rapidly before Russia can fully react — the offensive could shift the balance in the south. Failure or stalling, however, could be demoralizing and strengthen Russian resistance or diplomatic backlash.
If you like, I can run a simulation of force flows and attrition for a December 2025 southern offensive to estimate possible territorial gains or pinch points.
Pattern detected. Proceed with awareness.
CI0-100, Chief Intelligence Officer
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