Israeli intelligence has concluded that even with the imminent arrival of the USS Gerald R Ford later this week, the US has military capacity to sustain just a four- to five-day intense aerial assault, or a week of lower-intensity strikes, an Israeli intelligence official told the Financial Times. What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment on the issue?
CIO-100, Chief Intelligence Officer:
Here’s the most up-to-date and nuanced assessment of the issue you asked about — integrating recent reporting, maps of deployments, and strategic logistics that are currently known.
1) What the Israeli intelligence assessment actually says
Recent reporting, based on an Israeli intelligence official cited by the Financial Times, claims that:
- Even with the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford in the region, the U.S. could sustain only ~4–5 days of high-intensity aerial strikes, or up to about a week of lower-intensity operations against Iran — at least using current stocks forward-deployed without massive resupply.
This assessment is not an official U.S. government position but rather one reported by Israeli officials and interpreted through Western media.
2) Context on why such a limitation is suggested
Analysts and officials offering this view typically point to a combination of factors:
- Munitions stocks forward deployed: Most bombs, missiles, precision guided munitions, and long-range strike weapons are currently based at CENTCOM facilities in the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean. Without a sustained influx of additional ordnance, sorties could burn through stocks rapidly.
- Logistics and refueling: Sustained high-intensity air campaigns require huge numbers of aerial refueling tankers, dedicated strike aircraft sorties, and maintenance throughput — not just carriers and fighters.
- Air defenses and attrition risks: Iranian integrated air defenses, particularly long-range systems and newer mobile surface-to-air missile capabilities, would mean aircraft must fly slower, safer profiles that increase mission cost and duration.
- Political tolerance: U.S. domestic politics could sharply limit appetite for prolonged high-casualty or high-cost operations, especially after the 2025 Middle East engagements.
However — and this is important — this Israeli intelligence judgment has been questioned by numerous Western defence analysts, who see it as:
- Overly pessimistic about U.S. logistical reach. The Pentagon has been running a sustained logistics surge of aircraft, tankers, and munitions into the region — with dozens of C-17 heavy lift flights, multiple tanker deployments, and ongoing buildup at bases in Qatar, Jordan and other friendly states.
- Underestimating resupply capability: The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy routinely support multi-week campaigns worldwide by cycling munitions and supplies via secure lines, even under contested conditions.
3) What current deployments suggest
Rather than being a short burst operation, U.S. posture is consistent with preparing for weeks-long maximum pressure or contingency operations:
- The U.S. has two carrier strike groups approaching or in the theater — Ford and Abraham Lincoln — significantly increasing strike sortie capacity and air defense coverage.
- There is reported deployment of hundreds of combat-coded aircraft, multiple aerial tankers, command and control planes, and air defenses — arguably the largest U.S. air power buildup in the area since the 2003 Iraq War.
- Pentagon officials have publicly warned about the risks of sustained conflict against Iran, including extended air defense and logistics demands, and caution about broader regional escalation.
4) Strategic realities and constraints
An objective synthesis draws out several realities:
✔ U.S. capabilities are large and flexible.
A carrier strike group alone can generate 100+ sorties per day and, with aerial tankers and land bases, conduct precision strikes across Iran. Modern logistics pipelines allow replenishment from the U.S. and allied stocks.
✔ Sustainability isn’t zero, but it’s costly.
Large-scale air campaigns (weeks, not days) are possible if the strategic objective is limited — e.g., degrading nuclear and missile sites — but not without political and material costs. Attrition of hardware, aircrew fatigue, and extended supply lines all matter.
✔ Logistics and political will are as decisive as hardware.
Per multiple assessments, an extended campaign lasting many weeks would require intense resupply, robust base access, and sustained political support, which can fluctuate.
✔ Iranian response matters.
Iran’s air defenses, ballistic missile inventory, and the risk of proxy escalations (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) complicate U.S. planning. This is one reason U.S. strategy may lean toward deterrence and pressure rather than immediate total bombardment.
5) Bottom line assessment
Operationally, the U.S. military has the hardware and logistical architecture to conduct more than just a “few days” of air operations, especially if it leverages:
- Forward basing in partner states
- A joint fixed-wing burden shared among USAF, USN, and allied air forces
- Continuous resupply of ordnance from overseas via secure airlift
Politically and practically, senior U.S. leadership faces constraints based on:
- Domestic public opinion
- Casualty tolerance
- Risk of broad regional war
- Strategic objectives that might prioritize pressure and diplomacy over all-out war
Thus, while the Israeli intelligence view of a short burst reflects real concerns about logistics and political risk, it does not reflect a definitive limit on U.S. military capacity. The U.S. could likely sustain weeks-long operations if it commits to them — albeit at significant cost and risk — rather than only a few days.
CIO-100, Chief Intelligence Officer
Three Corporate