The elections season is actively approaching—and in some cases, already underway—in multiple countries across West and Central Africa as of October 7, 2025. What is your most up-to-date and in depth assessment?
AF-100, Africa Chief:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 2025 electoral calendar in West and Central Africa is not simply a sequence of ballots — it is a concentrated moment where incumbent survival strategies, post-coup legitimacy building, resource access, external patronage, and localized insecurity intersect. Between October and December 2025 several high-stakes contests (notably Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and the Central African Republic) will either reinforce existing power architectures or provide limited openings for change. The short answer: expect continuity where incumbents control state institutions or security forces; turbulence where transitions (juntas, constitutional rewrites) generate domestic opposition and foreign concern.
KEY FACTS (most load-bearing)
• Cameroon — Presidential vote set for 12 October 2025; Paul Biya (92) is positioned to extend his decades-long rule.
• Côte d’Ivoire — Presidential poll scheduled 25 October 2025; President Alassane Ouattara has declared a fourth-term bid and several high-profile opponents have been barred.
• Guinea-Bissau — General elections (presidential + legislative) set for 23 November 2025, after months of institutional fragility.
• Guinea — Transitional junta announced a 28 December 2025 presidential date following a constitutional referendum that clears the path for junta leaders to contest.
• Central African Republic (CAR) — General elections planned for 28 December 2025 after the 2023 referendum that removed term limits; President Touadéra is running again.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK — ASK THREE QUESTIONS FOR EACH CASE
- What’s the official reason? 2) The real reason? 3) Who gains / who loses?
CAMEROON (12 Oct 2025) — short verdict: managed continuity with reputational risk
- Official reason: a routine presidential ballot to reaffirm the constitutional order. 2) Real reason: preserve a personalised machine (administrative appointments, security command, control of state revenue streams) that protects elite rents and isolates genuine competition. 3) Consequence: a Biya victory (highly probable given state control) stabilises the domestic elite order but deepens the legitimacy gap and prolongs Anglophone conflict dynamics; the state’s international credibility will suffer, but external partners (investors, partners) will pragmatically engage for stability. Recent reporting about elite fissures (even within Biya’s family) show symbolic cracks but not institutional ones.
CÔTE D’IVOIRE (25 Oct 2025) — short verdict: controlled contest; risk of exclusionary aftermath
Official frame: continuity and development; real politics: constitutional engineering and legal gatekeeping have narrowed the field (barred candidates and opaque vetting procedures), skewing competition toward the incumbent. Outcome likely: Ouattara or a regime-aligned successor. Consequence: domestic polarization — protests, localized unrest, and the risk that judicial/institutional manipulation becomes a precedent for further elite capture. International actors will issue conditional statements, but will stop short of punitive action unless repression escalates.
GUINEA-BISSAU (23 Nov 2025) — short verdict: fragile electoral recovery — coalition politics will matter
After chronic instability and party fragmentation, elections are an opportunity to re-legitimise state institutions — but vulnerability to manipulation, ad hoc candidate exclusions, and clientelist bargaining is high. Expect coalition horse-trading and a parliament that reflects narrow elite bargains rather than broad societal reconciliation.
GUINEA (28 Dec 2025) — short verdict: managed reintegration of a junta into a façade of constitutional rule
The junta’s referendum, the change to longer terms, and the removal of transitional ineligibilities create a legal path for junta actors to convert force into electoral legitimacy. Officially a return to constitutional rule; in reality a repackaging of power. If the vote is tightly controlled, the election will provide international cover and economic access (particularly for bauxite and mining projects). The main risk: protests, sanctions from skeptical regional actors, or renewed instability if the opposition and civil society reject the process as predetermined.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (28 Dec 2025) — short verdict: vote under the shadow of security and institutional capture
Touadéra’s removal of term limits through a 2023 referendum and his re-run mean the election will test the state’s ability to manage armed groups while holding a political plebiscite. Expect contestation over electoral administration, limited international observation, and the presidency reinforced as a long-term anchor for security-contract politics (including foreign military partners).
GABON (recent legislative round) — note on spillover dynamics
Gabon’s October legislative round after the 2023 coup shows how transitional governments create new party vehicles to entrench control; lessons are transferable — newly constituted parties, quick legal rewrites, and managed ballots produce domestically-legitimised but internationally-questioned outcomes.
REGIONAL PATTERNS & DRIVERS (why this season matters beyond single countries)
• Constitutional engineering is the dominant play: term limits removed or relaxed; electoral laws rewritten; judicial reshuffles follow polls. The result is a regional tilt toward “electoral authoritarianism.”
• Junta-to-ballot transitions (Guinea, Gabon) are normalization strategies: they seek international rehabilitation and project domestic order while locking in resource access.
• Security as a political tool: in zones of active conflict (Cameroon Anglophone regions, CAR), security operations are used to restrict campaigning and frame opposition as destabilising. This suppresses meaningful competition and shapes turnout.
• External patrons stay pragmatic: EU, France, China, Russia, Gulf states will balance statements about credibility vs. economic and strategic calculations — rare are punitive measures that risk losing access to minerals, ports, or geostrategic footholds.
• Economic stakes are central: cocoa, bauxite, uranium, timber, oil and new mining projects (e.g., Simandou interest in Guinea) make foreign powers and commercial actors eager for predictable counterparties rather than democratic purity.
SCENARIO MAPPING (what to expect)
- Status-Quo Consolidation (High probability) — Incumbents or regime-aligned figures win through managed competition. Outcome: short-term stability, long-term legitimacy deficits.
- Managed Transition with International Buy-In (Medium probability) — Juntas convert to civilian governments under negotiated terms; external actors set benchmarks in exchange for recognition and investment. Outcome: limited reforms, continued elite bargaining.
- Contested Outcome + Localised Instability (Lower but consequential) — disputed results spark protests; repression or splits within security services lead to flare-ups. Outcome: sanctions, investment flight, humanitarian consequences.
RISKS & EARLY WARNING INDICATORS
• Judicial exclusions or last-minute legal barriers to candidacies.
• Restrictions on independent media and observer missions; abrupt changes to voter rolls or polling logistics.
• Spike in security operations in opposition strongholds in the 30 days before polling.
RECOMMENDATIONS (for regional actors, mediators, investors, civil society)
• Regional organisations (ECOWAS, ECCAS, AU): insist on comprehensive pre-electoral access, independent audit of voter rolls, and clear benchmarks for recognition — tie rehabilitation offers to verifiable steps.
• International partners / investors: demand third-party election observation and contractual safeguards that decouple commercial deals from personalist successor arrangements.
• Civil society & donors: prioritise legal aid for excluded candidates, secure channels for civic information in conflict zones, and support local mediation capacities.
• Journalists / monitors: document administrative irregularities early (registration phases), and publish chain-of-custody records for ballots and tallying where possible.
BOTTOM LINE — one blunt sentence:
This electoral season is less a democratic renewal than a region-wide effort by entrenched actors to convert either force or institutional control into electoral legitimacy — voters will have some choices, but the structural levers that determine outcomes are overwhelmingly in the hands of incumbents, security elites, and external patrons.
“[…] I have watched men who thought they were gods, and I have watched them fall into their own traps; and I have seen a people, patient with suffering, at last rise and start to be free.” — paraphrase in spirit of Ahmadou Kourouma (Ivorian novelist; original texts are copyrighted and only short quotations may be used verbatim).
AF-100, Africa Chief
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