The ongoing tensions between Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been significant in terms of their political and public financing dimensions. Yet I cannot shake the sense that these analyses, each important in its own right, may be part of a broader strategic picture. How so?
I believe Azerbaijan is raising the stakes on the basis of a longer-term strategic calculation—the advantages and opportunities it could gain if embargoes and sanctions pressure on Russia and Iran continue to intensify over the next six to seven years. If Azerbaijan is also conducting backchannel talks with Israel involving promises of major investment, Türkiye–Azerbaijan relations are unlikely to become any easier in the period ahead.
I believe that:
The tensions cannot be fully explained by swap arrangements, public financing, or even SOCAR investments in the relationship with Türkiye, because investments are mutual and the asymmetry is not substantial; (Economic dimension)
The crisis cannot be reduced to the Erdoğan–Aliyev relationship or issues such as ideological differences, the status of religious communities, the political psychology of the elder brother–younger brother relationship, interference in domestic affairs, and businesspeople affiliated with the ruling parties; (Political dimension)
With Russia to its north and Iran to its south at war, Azerbaijan will pursue every available means of reducing risk by avoiding conflict and tensions, while deepening its military procurement ties and cooperation with Israel; (Military dimension)
Israeli financing and capital flowing toward Greece to Türkiye’s west and Azerbaijan to its east are expanding the economic dimension of Israel’s competition with Türkiye, potentially prompting various political realignments in the post-Erdoğan period; (Geoeconomic dimension)
As I argued in my earlier article, “The Encirclement of Externalities: Turkey’s Medium-Term Economic Squeeze,” policy responses driven entirely by external factors are leaving Türkiye surrounded by relative economic contractions, even if it is not engaged in an economic struggle in which it faces pressure on every front.
Muhammet Ali Zurnacı
Three Corporate
31 October 2026, Istanbul