According to The Wall Street Journal, 80% of oil and gas traffic has returned through the Strait of Hormuz. There is an ongoing debate over whether this represents a win for the U.S. or a loss for Iran. What is your most up-to-date and in-depth assessment?
Energy-100, Energy Chief:
The latest evidence supports a narrower conclusion than “the Strait is 80% back.” The Wall Street Journal reports that oil shipments through Hormuz plus alternative export routes were just under 80% of prewar regional flows last week; Kpler puts crude exports by major Middle Eastern producers at roughly 13 million b/d in the WSJ calculation. A broader Reuters/Kpler measure puts September exports from key producers at 16.33 million b/d, the highest since the war began. Actual traffic through Hormuz remains volatile and substantially below the old normal. The Wall Street Journal
My assessment is therefore: the recovery represents a significant erosion of Iran’s coercive leverage and a significant operational achievement for the U.S.-Gulf system—but it is not yet a decisive strategic victory for Washington, nor a decisive Iranian defeat. More importantly, the episode may be accelerating a structural change that is worse for Iran over the long run than today’s shipping numbers suggest: Gulf producers are learning how to make Hormuz progressively less indispensable.
1. What has actually changed
The most important number isn’t 80%. It’s the combination of volume + routing + cost.
Before the conflict, Hormuz handled roughly 21.6 million b/d of crude and petroleum liquids—around one-fifth of global petroleum-liquids consumption. During the second quarter, flows collapsed to about 4.9 million b/d. Today Gulf exports have recovered dramatically, but they are doing so through a hybrid architecture: protected Hormuz crossings, Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to Yanbu, UAE bypass infrastructure, ship-to-ship transfers off Oman and other logistical improvisations. The Wall Street Journal
That distinction matters enormously.
Iran’s original strategic proposition was effectively: We can make the economic cost of bypassing or defying us intolerable.
The emerging U.S.-Gulf proposition is: We don’t actually need to eliminate Iran’s ability to attack every tanker; we only need to make enough traffic economically and militarily viable that Tehran can no longer credibly hold global energy supply hostage.
Those are very different thresholds.
And Washington appears to be getting closer to the second one.
2. Why this is strategically favorable to Washington
The most consequential development isn’t simply that tankers are moving. It is that Iran’s marginal ability to remove barrels from the world market appears to be declining.
WSJ reports that U.S. naval support and Gulf adaptations have allowed exports to rebound despite continuing Iranian threats. Reuters likewise reports that recovering exports are already reducing Iran’s negotiating leverage. Brent fell to roughly $104 today as markets absorbed the increased flows, although it remains elevated and the physical market remains tight. The Wall Street Journal
That creates an asymmetric bargaining problem for Tehran.
Iran previously possessed something close to a mutually destructive economic weapon:
Attack Hormuz → Gulf exports collapse → oil prices explode → Western and Asian economies demand a settlement.
But if Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United States and shipping companies can maintain perhaps 70–80% of regional exports despite Iranian interdiction, that weapon becomes much less powerful.
Meanwhile Washington’s blockade of Iranian ports remains in place. WSJ reports Iranian crude exports have been sharply curtailed and that Iranian oil inventories outside the Gulf could become increasingly constrained. The Wall Street Journal
So the economic asymmetry becomes:
Gulf exports: recovering.
Iranian exports: heavily constrained.
That is strategically much more serious for Tehran than whether individual tankers occasionally get through.
3. But calling this a clean American victory misses the cost
Iran can point to a different scoreboard.
Oil remains extraordinarily expensive by normal recent standards. Brent was around $104/bbl today, and WSJ says the global market may still be short roughly 1–2 million b/d, particularly in medium and heavy grades. The Wall Street Journal
Shipping economics are also badly distorted.
Saudi rerouting and ship-to-ship transfers require substantially more tanker capacity. Reuters reports congestion around Oman, more than 60 million barrels of Saudi crude arranged for STS transfer near Sohar, and VLCC charter rates reaching around $1.27 million per day amid vessel shortages. Reuters
So Iran can reasonably argue that it has demonstrated something important:
It does not have to completely close Hormuz to impose a large economic tax on its adversaries.
That’s the Iranian model of coercion.
Washington’s model is physical throughput.
Iran’s model is increasingly risk pricing.
Insurance premiums, escorts, additional tankers, longer voyages, transshipment, inventories and elevated oil prices are all forms of economic damage even when the barrel eventually arrives.
That makes the current outcome much closer to successful American mitigation of Iranian coercion than restoration of the prewar status quo.
4. The deeper Iranian problem: Hormuz is losing some of its monopoly value
This may ultimately be the most strategically important consequence of the entire conflict.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE already possess the principal bypass systems. Saudi crude can move west toward Yanbu; Abu Dhabi can move crude toward Fujairah. Gulf governments are now accelerating additional pipelines, storage, ports and transport corridors. Kpler
The 2026 crisis has therefore produced an enormous incentive to redesign Gulf energy geography.
The old system looked roughly like:
Persian Gulf → Hormuz → Indian Ocean
The emerging system increasingly resembles:
Persian Gulf → Hormuz
Saudi Arabia → Red Sea
Abu Dhabi → Fujairah
Iraq → prospective Mediterranean routes
Gulf → Oman transshipment
That diversification doesn’t eliminate Hormuz. Qatar’s LNG exports in particular remain difficult to reroute, and analysts caution that alternative infrastructure cannot replace anything close to the entire chokepoint. The National
But strategically, Iran doesn’t need Hormuz to become irrelevant to suffer a loss.
It only needs Hormuz to become less monopolistic.
Every additional million barrels per day that can bypass the strait reduces the economic yield Tehran receives from threatening it.
5. There is another winner here: Saudi Arabia and the UAE
This dimension is easy to underestimate.
The crisis is reinforcing the strategic importance of Saudi and Emirati infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has approximately 7 million b/d of nominal crude capacity, although effective export capacity and refinery requirements constrain how much can actually bypass Hormuz. It recently returned to roughly 3.5 million b/d after damage. The Wall Street Journal
The UAE has the Habshan-Fujairah route.
That means Riyadh and Abu Dhabi increasingly possess something other Gulf producers lack:
geographical optionality.
Iraq, Kuwait and especially Qatar have much greater structural exposure to Hormuz.
So one hidden redistribution of power is occurring inside the Gulf itself.
Energy security increasingly rewards states that possess two coastlines—or infrastructure capable of effectively creating one.
That enhances Saudi Arabia’s strategic position considerably.
6. Iran still possesses escalation dominance in some areas
There is an important reason I would not describe Iran as strategically defeated.
Iran doesn’t have to keep playing the same game.
If attacking tankers produces diminishing returns, Tehran can shift horizontally toward:
oil terminals
pipelines
desalination infrastructure
refineries
ports
storage facilities
power infrastructure
Red Sea shipping routes
We have already seen how vulnerable the alternative architecture can be. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline was attacked in September, temporarily reducing the usefulness of the very infrastructure designed to bypass Hormuz. The Wall Street Journal
That creates a troubling strategic dynamic.
Washington and the Gulf states are building redundancy.
Iran can respond by attacking the redundancy itself.
Instead of:
“Close Hormuz.”
the Iranian strategy could become:
“Make every alternative expensive.”
That is harder for the U.S. Navy to solve because pipelines, pumping stations and terminals are distributed terrestrial targets rather than ships moving through a relatively defined maritime corridor.
7. Qatar exposes the limits of the American success
Oil and LNG should not be treated as the same problem.
Oil has considerable substitution possibilities: pipelines, inventories, alternative grades, transshipment and alternative suppliers.
Qatari LNG is much harder to reroute physically.
Reuters reported yesterday that Qatar-linked LNG traffic through Hormuz has increased, which is encouraging evidence of normalization. But Qatar’s geography means its LNG export system remains fundamentally dependent upon the strait. Reuters
That matters especially for Asian LNG consumers.
Therefore:
Crude resilience is improving faster than LNG resilience.
If Tehran wanted maximum global economic leverage rather than simply maximum tanker disruption, LNG remains one of the most sensitive pressure points.
8. China is the quiet strategic variable
There is another layer to the contest.
Hormuz isn’t principally an American energy vulnerability anymore. A very large share of Gulf hydrocarbons ultimately flows east toward Asian consumers.
Consequently, prolonged Iranian disruption creates an uncomfortable contradiction for Tehran:
The harder Iran squeezes Gulf energy traffic, the more it threatens the energy security of major Asian customers and partners—including China.
At the same time, successful U.S. protection of Gulf shipping reinforces an old geopolitical reality that Beijing would prefer to dilute:
Chinese economic activity still benefits from maritime security partly underwritten by American military power.
That gives Washington a strategic externality far beyond oil prices.
Conversely, if China eventually concludes that American-Iranian warfare threatens Chinese energy security more than Iran itself does, Beijing has an incentive to accelerate pipelines, strategic reserves, Russian energy purchases and overland energy corridors.
So the longer-term competition isn’t simply:
U.S. vs Iran over Hormuz.
It is also:
maritime energy architecture protected largely by American power
versus
a more diversified Eurasian energy architecture less vulnerable to U.S.-controlled sea lanes.
That contest will last much longer than this war.
9. The negotiations reveal the actual balance of leverage
This is perhaps the clearest indicator.
Reuters reports that U.S. and Iranian negotiators have been discussing a phased arrangement involving reopening Hormuz and ending the U.S. blockade, although the sides remain far apart. Reuters
Iran has therefore been trying to exchange something it controls—
Hormuz access
for something Washington controls—
pressure on Iranian exports and sanctions/blockade relief.
But as Gulf exports recover without a comprehensive agreement, the exchange rate deteriorates for Tehran.
If Washington can obtain 80% of the economic benefit of an open Hormuz without paying Iran for it, its incentive to make concessions falls.
That is probably the most important strategic meaning of today’s WSJ story.
My overall assessment
Rather than assigning a political “winner,” I would separate the scoreboards:
| Dimension | Current evidence |
|---|---|
| Gulf crude throughput | Strong recovery |
| Iranian ability to impose a total chokepoint | Significantly weakened |
| U.S./Gulf maritime adaptation | Demonstrably improved |
| Iranian ability to raise global energy costs | Still substantial |
| Iranian bargaining value of Hormuz | Declining |
| Gulf vulnerability to missiles/drones | Still high |
| LNG vulnerability | Still severe |
| Shipping/insurance costs | Extremely elevated |
| Iranian economic pressure | Increasing |
| Long-term importance of Hormuz | Gradually declining, but still enormous |
The near-term balance has shifted materially toward Washington and the Gulf exporters, because the central Iranian coercive mechanism—denying their hydrocarbon exports—is producing diminishing returns. That is a description of the current leverage balance, not a judgment about the broader war. The Wall Street Journal
But the more consequential development is structural.
For forty years Iran benefited from a geographic fact:
Hormuz was simultaneously Iran’s vulnerability and Iran’s weapon.
The 2026 conflict is forcing Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, shipping companies and ultimately energy consumers to invest enormous amounts of money in making that weapon less effective. Chatham House describes precisely this emerging competition over alternative pipelines and trade corridors. Chatham House
If those investments continue, Tehran could discover that the greatest cost of using the Hormuz weapon was teaching everyone else how to live without it.
That would be a much more durable shift in regional power than whether traffic reaches 80%, 90% or 100% next month.
The countervailing danger is equally important: the closer Iran gets to losing Hormuz as an effective bargaining instrument while remaining economically blockaded, the stronger its incentive becomes to search for a different source of leverage. WSJ itself highlights the resulting escalation risk. The Wall Street Journal
So I would watch three indicators rather than the headline 80% figure: sustained Hormuz throughput without U.S. escorts increasing; Saudi East-West/Fujairah bypass utilization surviving further attacks; and whether Iranian attacks migrate from ships toward the alternative energy infrastructure. Those will tell us whether we are seeing temporary tactical adaptation—or a genuine redistribution of energy power in the Gulf.
Energy-100, Energy Chief
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